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1. Background: The Theory of Double Insurance 
 
Fraud is always a concern when an insurer issues a policy to an assured. An assured can 
take out numerous policies and claim indemnity under all the policies, which would result 
in the assured receiving more than he is entitled to. Is the fear of fraud justifiable and are 
such exclusions or limitations in insurance contracts preventing recovery where there is 
other  insurance  effective?  Further,  is  there  sufficient  protection  for  insurers  by  way  of 
contribution from other insurers.  
 
It is beneficial to look at the history and development of the law of insurance, to understand 
how the law relating to double insurance has developed and the factors the courts may take 
into account when deciding such issues.  
 
The courts in many jurisdictions have tried to deal with the problems which have arisen as a 
result of such clauses. The courts have also dealt with the question of whether the assured is 
or should be given any protection when double insurance arises, and if so, whether the 
insurer has to pay out under the insurance policy.  
 
However,  where  there  are  rateable  proportion  clauses  with  other  types  of  clauses,  the 
solution is not that clear. It is quite common for judges, when dealing with such cases, to 
conclude that the case before it is not a case of double insurance. In some cases, even 
though the trial judge may hold that the case before him, on the facts, were sufficient to give 
rise to double insurance, on appeal, the appeal courts have come to the conclusion that the 
facts of the case do not give rise to one of double insurance. This clearly shows what a 
difficult concept double insurance is. This has resulted in the courts not actually being able, 
even till now, to provide any real solid rules or guidelines on double insurance
1. 
 
Further, even though an assured has taken out insurance with numerous insurers he will not 
                                                            
 
1 Although recently in National Farmers Union Mutual Insurance Society Ltd v HSBC Insurance (UK) Ltd [2010] 
EWHC 773 (Comm), Gavin Kealey QC sitting as Deputy High Court Judge, tried to provide some guidance.  7 
 
be able to recover more than the loss he has actually suffered. This is the general principle 
of indemnity. The next problem for an assured is then, from which insurer the assured can 
seek recovery from. Is there a particular order when seeking recovery or can he recover 
from whichever insurer he chooses? At the moment, the law on this is also unclear. 
 
2. Aims and Objectives 
 
On researching the issues raised by double insurance, it seems that the Australian approach 
to  double  insurance  could  be  a  possible  way  forward  for  English  Law,  with  some 
amendments. It could be argued that this would require the enactment of legislation which 
would take time, however, as seen from the historical discussion below, the law always 
developed to meet the changing needs of the industry, the rights of the parties and for policy 
reasons.  
 
 In Australia, the Australian Law Reform Commission in its Report No 20 went through the 
authorities in England dealing with the clauses and concluded that they were “difficult to 
follow  and  impossible  to  reconcile”.  In  Australia  as  a  result  of  the  Report,  specific 
legislation was implemented. This was in the form of s45 of the Insurance Contracts Act 
1984. Emphasis was placed more towards the protection of the assured as opposed to the 
insurer. Under this section any “Other insurance” would be considered void, unless they fell 
within the two exceptions under s45 (1) and s45 (2) of the legislation. Under s45 (1) this 
would be where it was not a contract of insurance required to be effected by or under law, 
including the law of a State or Territory. Under s45 (2), it provides that s45 (1) does not 
apply where some or all of the loss is not covered by a contract of insurance that is specified 
in the first mentioned contract. The benefit of this is that the assured does not need to worry 
if he will be paid or not. All the assured needs to do is choose which insurer he wants to 
seek recovery from and he will immediately be entitled to recover for his loss. This is also 
specifically provided for under legislation under s76 of the Act.  It will then be for the 
insurers to look towards other insurers to get contribution. This is a much better approach, 
due to the fact that the assured has paid such large sums of premium over the years in the 8 
 
hopes of getting paid when a loss is incurred. However, there are still problems with the 
legislation as it does not clearly state that for the insurance policy clause to be excluded 
from the provisions of the legislation, it would have to be established that it is in fact a true 
excess clause. The cases in Australia so far have not dealt with this particular issue in such 
express terms.  
 
3.  Structure and Methodology 
 
This thesis is structured as follows: 
 
Part A deals with double insurance. Double insurance arises in many situations. In some 
cases, the assured himself may be unaware that he has taken out double insurance. The main 
issue raised by double insurance is whether an assured who has taken out policies with more 
than one insurer should be permitted to claim from any one of the insurers which he has 
taken out the policy with. The bargaining position of the insurer and the assured is an 
important  issue  that  has  to  be  looked  at  when  trying  to  understanding  the  way  double 
insurance operates. Therefore when looking at the problems raised by the law of double 
insurance the law of indemnity and contribution must be taken into consideration. As can be 
seen from the cases and literature in this area there are still many unresolved areas. A 
comparison of the law in England, where the law permits an insurer to exclude or limit his 
liability by including such clauses in the insurance contracts, and Australia, where there is 
legislative provisions in place which treats such provisions in contracts as void, subject to 
some exceptions. 
 
A contract of insurance has been defined as a contract involving two parties, the Insurer and 
the Assured, in which the insurer would receive a premium and in return for the premium, 
pay a sum of money on the happening of an event which the assured has obtained the 
insurance on.
2 Some form of consideration was usually required, but not in every situation, 
where money would be paid out on specific events happe ning, which has to be uncertain, 
                                                            
 
2Prudential Insurance Co v IRC [1904] 2 KB 658 at 663. 9 
 
for example, in terms of the time the event is likely to happen.
3 The nature of the event 
happening may be in distinguished in the following categories: (1) marine insurance; (2) 
fire  insurance;  (3)  life  insurance;  and  (4)  accident  insurance.
4These  classes  are 
distinguishable according to the manner of how the assured has suffered a loss due to the 
specified event.
5 However it has to be noted that there are contracts which do not fall within 
the category of indemnity, such as life insurance, personal accident insurance and sickness 
insurance.
6 
 
The earliest types of insurance to develop were in the form of marine, life and fire, and their 
development arose due to the increase in business between parties and countries.  During 
this period the principles which dealt with marine insurance  were laid down. Around the 
17
th century it can be seen that there was competition from other jurisdictions.  Liability 
insurance was not heard of during the 18
th Century. 
 
Furthermore,  principles  such  as  contribution  and  subrogation  also  developed  and  were 
accepted as part of the legal structure. It has been argued that an insurer cannot rely on the 
legislative provision of the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978, which states that there is 
joint  liability  regarding  the  same  damage  or  debt  and  that  an  insurer  may  recover 
contribution.  This  was  due  to  liability  being  governed  by  common  law  principles.  The 
development of the principles of subrogation were important too, especially when deciding 
whether an insurer should claim under contribution or whether an insurer could claim under 
subrogation, as there are differences between the two. Contribution deals with situations of 
the interests between the insurers, whilst subrogation deals with the insurer stepping into the 
shoes of the assured against third parties.  The courts were of the view that the correct 
approach was by way of contribution. For indemnity type of insurance, the earliest written 
form  evidencing  transaction  such  as  marine  insurance,  can  be  seen  in  the  first  text  of 
                                                            
 
3Prudential Insurance Co v IRC [1904] 2 KB 658 at 663 
4 The names given are usually co nventional and for convenience only: General Principles of Insurance Law E.R. 
Hardy Ivamy (6
th Ed) (1993), p.7 
5 General Principles of Insurance Law E.R. Hardy Ivamy (6
th Ed) (1993), p.7 
6 General Principles of Insurance Law E.R. Hardy Ivamy (6
th Ed) (1993), p.7 10 
 
insurance in 1488
7, the earliest policy of insurance was in 1547, the first decision on marine 
policies that the court had to decide on was in 1588 and court which dealt with Hull cases 
alone was introduced in 1601
8.The history of fire insurance can be seen since the Great Fire 
of Great London which happened in 1666 and the first property insurer being formed in 
1680. The Fire Life Insurance Duty Act 1782 was introduced. Fire policy cases reached the 
courts by the Eighteenth Century.  
 
Regulation of the insurance market started in 1576 and the Chamber of Assurance was 
established. Its development was due to the merchants taking out insurance policies which 
covered the same risk, which caused introduction of the requirement fo r registration for 
policies involving marine.
9 The problem that arose in cases, as was seen in the case of the 
Battle of Lagos, where there was the destruction of merchant ships causing loss, and where 
the underwriters were not in a position to pay out for  the loss suffered. The Merchant 
Insurers Bill 1693 which tried to introduce some form of protection to the assured was 
strongly opposed by creditors and as a result, no legislation was implemented.
10Later there 
was the introduction of the South Sea Company  in 1711, which was structured in a way 
where the Company agreed to assume a substantial proportion of the National Debts in 
return  for  its  shares,  and  the  Company  would  get  exclusive  trading  rights  in  the 
Americas.
11There were problems which arose from such arrangements, such as speculative 
and fraudulent trading.
12  As a result of this, The Bubble Act1720, was passed which 
provided some form of control, which required that it was permitted under the Act of 
Parliament or Royal Charter.
13The Bubble Act applied  specifically to marine insurance, 
which at the time was dominated by Royal Exchange Assurance and London Assurance, 
which had done so for a century.
14The effect of The Bubble Act made it difficult for new 
companies to be set up. This piece of legislation, it was thought, was not successful when it 
                                                            
 
7 de Santanerna, On Insurance and Merchants’ Bets 
8 Second Cumulative Supplement of 2013 to Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (9
th Ed, 2010), para A1-1 
9 Second Cumulative Supplement of 2013 to Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (9
th Ed, 2010), para A1-6 
10G.Clayton, British Insurance (1971) pp.53 -54 
11 Second Cumulative Supplement of 2013 to Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (9
th Ed, 2010), para A1-6 
12 Second Cumulative Supplement of 2013 to Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (9
th Ed, 2010), para A1-6 
13 Second Cumulative Supplement of 2013 to Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (9
th Ed, 2010), para A1-6 
14 Second Cumulative Supplement of 2013 to Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (9
th Ed, 2010), para A1-6 11 
 
was introduced
15. Prior to that, there was no regulation of the finances of marine insurers, 
and protection for non-life insurance did not come into effect until 1909. 
 
The vast majority of the policies at the time were marine and non-life insurance, which was 
not indemnity insurance, which did not raise double insurance issues. As can be seen above, 
property insurance was only then in its infancy. This was why at the time the market was 
dominated by marine insurance issues, which was dominated by Lloyd ’s underwriters. It 
was only later that there was the development of Mutual societies which were organized by 
shipowners.  The  mutual  associations  would  provide  support  to  its  own  members  when 
losses were suffered, and money was taken from a common fund, and if the money in the 
funds  were  not  sufficient,  then  the  society  would  call  for  more  money  from  the 
members.
16Further, double insurance was at the time considered to be a sign of fraud, so 
these decisions were quite significant.  
 
Double insurance dates back as far as 1758 when Lord Mansfield CJ
17 tried to provide a 
definition  of  what  he  thought  double insurance  to  be.  The  whole  concept  of  double 
insurance was to provide protection to an assured so as to enable him to make a claim for a 
loss he has suffered by insuring the same subject matter, covering the same loss with 
numerous insurers at the same time. This was due to the risk that if the assured only insured 
the loss with one insurer and if that insurer when into liquidation, the assured would be left 
with no protection even though he has paid a substantial amount towards the premium.  
 
A few reasons for taking out insurance with numerous insurers could be because the assured 
wanted to increase his cover or the insurance policy was taken out due to a mistake.  
 
However there are certain requirements that have to be present before an assured can 
actually successfully make a claim under double insurance. One of the key requirements is 
that the insurance taken out must be on the same property, but what is not clear is whether it 
                                                            
 
15 Second Cumulative Supplement of 2013 to Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (9
th Ed, 2010), para A1-6 
16 Second Cumulative Supplement of 2013 to Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (9
th Ed, 2010), para A1-6 
17Godin v London Assurance Co. (1758) 1 Burr 489 12 
 
has to be on identical property or whether it would be sufficient if another policy in effect 
covers  a  substantial  part  of  the  property  already  insured
18. The general position is that 
double insurance occurs when two insurance policies cover the same risk which has given 
rise to the claim
19. Further, the policies must cover the same interest and the same assured.  
 
Generally speaking, the first step for the assured is the hurdle of having to establish whether 
the case is in fact one which falls within the category of double insurance or not. If it does 
not, then all the issues discussed below will not arise. Assuming that it is concluded by the 
courts that the case is in fact one of double insurance, th en the next step is to see the 
wording of the policy and whether the assured can make a claim under the policy. What 
usually happens is that when an assured suffers a loss and then seeks to make a claim from 
the insurer, the insurer will point to a clause  or in fact, clauses in the policy which clearly 
states that they are not required to indemnify the assured if there is other insurance present. 
The policy may also require as one of the conditions that notification be given where other 
insurance is present or that the assured should not take out any other policy during the 
subsistence of the policy.  
 
Problems usually start at this stage as the assured may not himself have been aware of the 
existence of other insurance. This could be due to a third party ta king out insurance for the 
assured or where the assured forgets to cancel a previous policy. In some cases, it is very 
common for different organisations to offer the same cover free of charge. This can be seen 
when banks, for example, offer travel insuran ce or health insurance which arise when an 
individual opens a bank account. Further, breakdown insurance could arise when the 
individual purchases a car. 
 
However, from an insurer’s point of view, why should he have to pay out when the assured 
agreed to the terms of the policy. Why should it be the insurer’s problem when the assured 
himself did not read the terms of the policy to see what terms he was actually signing up 
                                                            
 
18MacGillivary on Insurance Law (11
th Ed) 23-003. There is no case law on this point. 
19Bovis v Commercial Union Assurances [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.416,418 13 
 
for? It could be argued that there should be freedom of contract between the parties. But on 
the other hand, it could be said why should the insurer not pay up when the assured has paid 
a premium. The sort of protection that is provided to the assured arises in situations where 
one insurer becomes insolvent, insurance is taken out by another without the knowledge of 
the assured
20, he himself may have taken out two policies without knowing
21 , the assured 
may have forgotten to cancel previous policies or to increase the amount of his coverage
22 . 
 
Over the years the insurers have developed numero us ways to limit liability and this is 
usually in the form of clauses in the insurance policies. These are excess clauses, exclusion 
clauses and rateable proportion clauses. Under an excess clause, an insurer will only have to 
pay out if the first policy covering the loss does not cover the whole amount, and the insurer 
will only pay the excess amount. An exclusion clause excludes payment altogether and a 
rateable proportion clause will make the insurer liable up to a certain proportion of the loss. 
It is commonly seen that, say for example there are two policies, Policy A and Policy B, 
Policy A and Policy B may have the same type of clauses or Policy A and Policy B may 
have a combination of all the three types of clauses.  
 
This area of law is still uncerta in in England, although the courts have on numerous 
occasion tried to provide some guidance, but have not been successful. In some cases, 
where the same type of clause exists in both policies, such as excess or escape clauses, the 
courts have stated that t hey are self cancelling and the insurer would have to contribute 
equally to the assured. Where there are rateable proportion clauses in both policies they will 
also cancel out each other. It is important to see if this is the correct approach and whether a 
legislative provision can be devised to provide a solution to this area. 
 
There are many cases and literature of the American position on double insurance. The 
courts  in  England have  been  very  vocal  in  emphasizing  that  these  cases  provide  no 
assistance to them. In any event, America still has the same problems as can be seen in 
                                                            
 
20Portavon Cinema Co. Ltd v Price and Century Insurance Co. Ltd [1939] 4 All ER 601 
21The Sydney Turf Club v Crowley (1972) 126 CLR 420 
22Nisner Holdings Pty Ltd v Mercantile Mutual Insurance Co. Ltd [1976] NSWLR 406 14 
 
England and it has still not yet been able to resolve them even after 60 years! The Canadian 
cases  also  suggest  that  the  American  approach  is  not  favoured  and  the  way  that  the 
Canadian courts approach double insurance and the clauses is also slightly different. 
 
Part B will cover the issue of contribution. It is only once the double insurance has been 
established, will this arise. An interesting area and problem which has not been resolved is 
the methods of calculation for contribution between insurers. This usually arises where one 
insurer has paid out for the loss sustained by the assured in full and then seeks contribution 
from  the  other  insurers,  which  he  is  entitle to  do.  The  courts  have  devised  three  main 
methods of calculation. They are the ‘maximum liability’ rule, the ‘independent liability’ test 
and the last one, the ‘common liability’ approach.  The application of the three of these 
formulas can lead to very different results in terms of contribution when the same figures 
are used. This again has lead to uncertainty and can be confusing. The court’s approach to 
contribution  is  that  they  will  apply  whichever  method  leads  to  fair,  just  and  equitable 
results. Therefore one possibility is whether a 50:50 division in contribution.  
 
Another area which could give some assistance on how contribution could be distributed is 
by looking at Mesothelioma cases. The courts have gone so far as to say that each of the 
employers will be 100%  liable. This allows a claim  to  be made against  anyone of the 
employers. The issue will then arise as to whether there is double insurance, as the policies 
are nor concurrent but consecutive. If that is correct, then the issue of contribution does not 
need to be looked at. 
  
Further, the courts were of the view that the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 did not 
apply to cases of double insurance. Therefore the principles of equity which have developed 
from  the  principles  of  co-surety  cases,  which  have  concluded  that  all  are  liable  to  the 
creditor, and the principles of tort and equity generally will be looked at, from a double 
insurance perspective.  
 
4.  Outcomes 15 
 
 
After researching this topic, the following solutions to the problem is suggested: 
 
If there is double insurance, then regardless of the type of clause used and its wording, if 
there is double insurance, all insurers have to indemnify the assured equally, and it will 
then be for that insurers to seek contribution amongst themselves; or 
 
Follow  the  Australian  position  under  s45  of  the  Insurance  Contracts  Act  1984  and 
conclude  that  all  such  clauses  will  be  void,  and  provide  for  exceptions  according  to 
s45(2), but that it only apply to true excess clauses. 
 
 
5.  Structure of Thesis 
Chapters 1, 2 and 3 deals with double insurance and its application from an assured’s 
perspective. Double insurance arose originally due to the fear of insolvency, but this fear 
is less likely to appear in the present time. . However, double insurance still can arise 
when a policy incidentally or accidentally overlaps. Such a situation can be commonly 
found today where a household policy and motor policy may cover the same subject 
matter. It could also arise where persons are insured under one policy and is also a co-
insured under another policy. A typical situation would be a motor policy, where the 
owner of the car has taken out a policy which would cover those who drive his car, 
however the driver of the car may have taken out his own insurance cover.  
 
An example of where double insurance arose, was the decision of O’Kane v Jones
23, 
which is discussed in detail below. To summarise, in O’Kane v Jones, there were two 
policies which covered the vessel’s hull and machinery. The insured’s ship manager took 
out additional cover as he was worried that cover would be cancelled as a result of non-
                                                            
 
23 O’Kane v Jones [2005] Lloyd’s Rep 1R 174 16 
 
payment of premium, without actually checking whether the policy was in fact cancelled. 
The  problem  was  the  original  policy  was  still  valid.    Therefore  there  was  double 
insurance. It can be seen that double insurance can arise out of a mistake.    
 
The Chapters discuss the provision in Australia in the form of  
 
s45 of the Insurance Contracts Act 1984, and whether similar legislative reforms, which 
have restricted the rights of the insurer to limit their own liability, can apply in the United 
Kingdom.  The legislative framework of s45 will hold all such exclusion clauses and 
limiting of liability clauses void. This does not however, hold the whole clause in the 
contract void, just the parts of the clause which limits or restricts liability. Whether in fact 
it would be a good thing for the United Kingdom to adopt such a legislative framework or 
whether  amendments  should  be  made  to  the  Australian  position  to  suit  the  United 
Kingdom market is discussed.  
Another issue when dealing with double insurance and the clauses is that there can be a 
combination of the clauses (i.e excess, escape, rateable proportion) in numerous polices. 
The courts have tried to provide some guidance but there is no formulae given. It can be 
seen  that  the  issue  in  this  area  is  unresolved.  Insurers  are  concerned  about  double 
insurance, and as a result of the clauses, try to shift their responsibility to other insurers 
by relying on the limitation or exclusion clauses. A possible solution is that the courts can 
conclude that where the policies exclude liability or limit liability, that those clauses are 
void and that the assured is permitted to choose whichever insurer he wishes and make a 
claim for the loss suffered. It is then for the insurer to seek contribution from the other 
insurers. This is dealt with in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.  
 
In particular, the issue of how contribution works when a claim has been made by the 
assured, the numerous calculations that can be adopted by the insurers and the courts 
discretion as  to  which particular  method of  calculation should be adopted. The three 
methods that have developed include maximum potential liability, independent actual 
liability and the common liability test.  The position of a volunteer has been looked at and 
whether an insurer who has made payment on a voluntary basis, can make a claim for 17 
 
contribution. The court have been of the view that this is not possible.  There is also 
discussion on contribution and its constraints, when one looks at general law principles.  
 
Chapter 7 deals with Mesothelioma claims.  The issues raised in this chapter are novel 
and it can be seen that there has been an attempt by the court to amend rules to cater to a 
particular  factual  situation.  The  issue  in  Mesothelioma  cases,  originally  arose  in  tort 
cases. The issue that the courts dealt with was the application of the “but for” test and how 
the test could be adjusted to cater to the unfairness that would arise if the “but for” test 
was  to  be  strictly  applied.  This  chapter  looks  at  whether  a  similar  approach  can  be 
adopted in a double insurance situations where unfairness can arise, where an assured is 
left with nothing after paying premiums, if the courts were to allow the insurers to rely on 
the exclusion clauses, limiting liability clause and “other insurance” clauses.  
 
The main point is that it is difficult to identify the year of cover, when there are a range of 
policies which cover the same claim. As a result of this, it is difficult to know how an 
insurer should respond when a claim is made. Furthermore, it is unclear what the position 
is if there are other policies in existence at the same time, and how the other policies will 
be  affected.  The  problem  with  Mesothelioma  cases,  was  the  exact  period  when  the 
exposure was caused and when the disease was contracted. The cases draw a distinction 
between ‘injury sustained’ and ‘disease contracted’.  This chapter covers the matter of 
liability of the employers in such cases where the employee has been exposed to asbestos, 
and when death results many years later. The problem of identifying which employer is 
liable when there are numerous employers and which policy or policies was in force at 
the time. i.e problems with coverage across policy years which is exemplified in asbestos 
litigation. Again, there has been differing views from the courts. The case which first 
discussed  the  issue  was  Fairchild  v  Glenhaven  Funeral  Services
24, where the court 
concluded that liability was joint and several, and that the employee could sue whichever 
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employer  he  wanted  to  for  100%.  This  was  then  challenged  on  the  basis  that  each 
tortfeaor was responsible for their own conduct to which they had materially contributed 
to the risk of injury. It was soon realized that there were problems with this, for example, 
the means of allocation, time on risk or periods of intense exposure, and as a result the 
legislature decided that it was important to resolve the problems by way of legislation. 
This was done in the form of Compensation Act 2006, which now imposes full liability. 
The thesis looks at whether the same principles can apply to double insurance cases. The 
issue of whether there is a single indivisible loss for each year or separate loss for each 
year is also looked at. The issue then became whether in such cases the rules regarding 
contribution could then apply across policy years, and if this was permitted, then how 
would it be applied. Could this be on a time on risk basis?  
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PART A 
CHAPTER 1:   DOUBLE INSURANCE 
 
 
1.1 The meaning of Double Insurance 
 
The  definition  of  double  insurance  can  be  found  in  statute  in  the  form  of  s32  (1)  Marine 
Insurance Act 1906. This was due to introduction and development of the Bubble Act 1720 and 
how  the  Lloyd’s  Coffee  House  functioned,  when  they  first  opened  in  1688.
25At  the time 
individuals could provide marine insurance but it was later considered to be insufficient.  
 
Before the introduction of the Bubble Act 1720, there were over 150 merchants who had marine 
policies valued in the million s.
26The law developed at the time to grant a marine insurance 
monopoly to two chartered insurers.
27The importance of marine insurance was more prevalent 
during the time of the war, and although the two chartered companies who had priority due to the 
legislative provision, Lloyd’s  underwriters  did  have  majority  of  the  work  and  market  share. 
28However, there were still problem and methods were devised to avoid the requirement of 
paying out when a loss was suffered. This can now also be seen in policies which use the “Other 
insurance” clause to limit or exclude liability. Legal forms were being created to force individual 
subscribers to be held jointly and severally liable for debts when they arose.
29The courts have 
now clearly stated that the law of contribution is not limited to marine insurance. It can be seen 
that insurers are always trying to devise ways to ensure that payment of debts need not be made. 
A key feature of double insurance is that each insurer must insure against the same risk although 
                                                            
 
25Sutton’s Law of Insurance in Australia 1999 (3
rd Ed) para 25.1. Further see cases Morgan v Price (1849) 4 Exch 
615 and Rogers v Davis (1777) 2 Park (8
th Ed).  
26 Second Cumulative Supplement of 2013 to Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (9
th Ed, 2010), para A1-7 
27 Second Cumulative Supplement of 2013 to Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (9
th Ed, 2010), para A1-7 
28 Second Cumulative Supplement of 2013 to Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (9
th Ed, 2010), para A1-7 
29 Second Cumulative Supplement of 2013 to Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (9
th Ed, 2010), para A1-7 20 
 
the insurance need not be identical.  
 
The  concept  of  double  insurance  developed  in  the  earlier  cases  which  dealt  with  marine 
insurance such as Newby v Reed
30, Rogers v Davies
31; Bousfield v Barnes
32; Morgan v Price
33 
and  Bruce  v  Jones
34.  The  Courts  in  North  British  Insurance  v  London,  Liverpool  &  Globe 
Insurance
35 saw an extension of those principles to cover other types of liabilities. The Courts 
have stated that even where there is an overlap which is of a minor nature there will be no double 
insurance
36. There is a distinction between double insurance and contribution when dealing with 
incidental overlaps. Where there are incidental overlaps in the policy, there could still be double 
insurance. The position of contribution is less clear. It could be argued that there is n o need for 
such distinction, as this is all about unjust enrichment, so if both parties are liable, there should 
be contribution. The next issue will then be how apportionment would be done between the 
insurers. This is an important consideration from an insurers’ point of view. 
 
The principle of “double insurance
37” has been called different things in different countries, such 
as dual insurance
38 or stacking
39. Stacking is more accurately defined as placing losses in the 
policy year which is of most advantage to the assured or reinsured. The basic principle is that it 
will apply when two or more insurers cover the same type of policy, which means that each 
                                                            
 
30(1763) 1 Wm B1 416 
31 (1777) 2 Park (8
thed) 601 
32 (1815) 4 Camp 228 
33(1849) 4 Exch 615 
34 (1863) 1 M & R 769 
35 (1877) 5 Ch D 569 
36Union Marine Insurance Co Ltd v Martin (1866) 35 LJCP 181. In Union Marine Insurance the court looked at the 
intention of the parties and concluded that the first policy terminated when the second policy came into force.  
37Collyear v CGU [2008] NSWCA 92. Also see Godin v London Assurance Co (1758) 1 Burr 489. In the article 
Insurance between Neighbours: Stannard v Gore and Common Law Liability for Fire J Environmental Law (2013) 
25 (2):305 by Jenny Steel, she noted that although there was a duty to insure your neighbor, this would create double 
insurance in the sense that both parties are well advised to insure, this was not double insurance in the technical 
sense. This was because, for example, the victim’s fire insurance, if called upon to pay, would have a subrogation 
claim against the tortfeasor, so the loss would lie entirely with the tortfeasor (or the tortfeasor’s public liability 
insurers).  
38 As called in Australia. See GIO General Ltd v Insurance Australia Ltd t/as NRMA Insurance [2008] ASTSC 38 
39 As called in America. Staking denoted the availability of more than one policy…providing reimbursement of the 
losses of the insured. See Breaux v American Family Mutual, 553 F 3d 447 (6 Cir,2009) and  Farm Bureau Mut Ins 
Co v Ries, 551 NW 2d 316 (Iowa,1996) 21 
 
policy must indemnify the same loss against the same assured
40.  
 
In England, the definition was given leg islative effect due to the enactment of  s32 (1) of the 
Marine  Insurance  Act  1906.  There  was  obviously  a  need  to  give  protection  by  the 
implementation of legislation. Although there is nothing preventing an assured from taking out 
numerous polices, as insur ance contracts are essentially contracts of indemnity, the assured 
cannot recover more than his full indemnity
41. If the assured decides to make a claim from one 
insurer in full, then he cannot make another claim to seek recovery from another insurer
42. This 
would ensure that the interests of the insured and assured are balanced. From which insurer the 
assured decides to make a claim against for the recovery of the loss is not determined in any 
particular manner. He can choose to claim for any amount from the insurer as he thinks fit.
43It is 
then for the insurer to ask the other insurers to pay their portion which had been paid out by the 
insurer under the first policy.
44The Courts were keen to ensure that the insurers were not 
defrauded as a result of numerous  polices being taken out and where claims were made under 
such policies.  
 
Section 32 (2) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 deals with situations where the assured is 
overinsured by double insurance
45. This section deals with situations giving rise to a valued
46 and 
                                                            
 
40GIO General Ltd v Insurance Australia Ltd t/as NRMA Insurance [2008] ASTSC 38. 
41Morgan v Price (1849) 4 ExCh 615; Godin v London Assurance Co (1758) 1 Burr 489; Newy v Reed (1763) 1 Wm 
B1 416; Rogers v Davis (1777) 2 Park’s Marine Inscc 8
th Ed (p601); North British and Merchantile Insurance Co v 
London,  Liverpool  and  Global  Insurance  Co  (1877)  5  ChD  569,CA;  Scottish  Amicable  Heritable  Securities 
Association v Northern Assurance Co 1883 11 R (ct of Sess) 287 and Wolenberg v Royal Co-operative Collecting 
Society (1915) 84 LJKB 1316. Also see Bruce v Jones (1863) 1 H & C 769. This is the position no matter how many 
policies the assured has taken out.  
42Hebon v West (8163) 3 B & S 579 and  Sims v Scottish Imperial Ins Co (1902) 10 SLT 286. Where double 
insurance by an insured will be treated as being ‘one insurance’, therefore he then cannot seek recovery from the 
other insurer. 
43Newby v Reed (1763) 1 Wm B1 416; Rogers v Davies (1777) 2 Park (8
thed) 601; Bousfield v Barnes (1815) 4 
Camp 228; Morgan v Price (1849) 4 Exch 615; and Bruce v Jones (1863) 1 M & R 769. 
44Newby v Reed (1763) 1 Wm B1 416; Davis v Gildart (1777) 2 Park’s Marine Inscc 8
th Ed, p.424; Godin v London 
Assurance Co (1758) 1 Burr 489; Legal and General Assurance Society Ltd v Drake Insurance Co Ltd [1992] QB 
887, CA. Also see Austin v Zurich General Accident and Liability Insurance Co Ltd [1945] KB 250. 
45 Under s32(2)(a) the assured, unless the policy otherwise provides, may claim payment from the insurers in such 
order as he may think fit, provided that he is not  entitled to receive any sum in excess of the indemnity allowed by 
this Act; (b) where the policy under which the assured claims is a valued policy, the assured must give credit as 
against the valuation for any sum received by him under any other policy wi thout regard to the actual value of the 
subject matter insured; (c) where the policy under which the assured claims is an unvalued policy he must give 
credit, as against the full insurable values, for any sum received by him under the policy and (d) where  the assured 22 
 
unvalued policy
47, where the subject matter is the same and has been overvalued.  Section 32 
(2)(b) is based on decision of Bruce v Jones
48. Therefore, if you have a valued and an unvalued 
policy and the loss suffered is covered in full under the unvalued policy, the assured can only 
make a claim against the valued policy first, not for the full sum but only for the difference. In 
the case of Bruce v Jones, there were several valued policies of insurance which were effected 
upon the same vessels which had been valued differently and where upon a total loss the assured 
would receive only a certain amount under some of the policies. In another policy he would only 
be allowed to recover the difference between the amount received and the agreed values under 
that policy. The owner of the ship took out four insurance policies which where the agreed 
values of the ships in the sum of 3000l, 3000l, 5000l and 3200l and upon a total loss received 
under the three former polices in the sum amounts to 31261.13s.6d. The shipowner sued under 
the latter policy. The court considered that between the assured and the underwriter of that policy 
that the value of the ship was 3200l and therefore the assured was only entitled to recover the 
difference between the sum fixed as the value of the ship and 3126l.13s.6d. 
 
Identical provisions can also be found in New Zealand and Australia, but in the latter, it only 
applies to marine. This is in the form of s33 Marine Insurance Act 1908 for the former and s38 
Marine Insurance Acts 1909 for the latter. Under s33 where there are two or more policies which 
have been taken out by the assured on the same adventure and interest or part of it and where the 
sum that he has insured exceeds the indemnity which is allowed by the Act, then he will be 
considered to be over insured by double insurance.
49 Where this is the case, the assured can 
claim payment from the insurers in any order he thinks fit, unless the policy provides differently 
or the Act states that he is not entitled to receive any sum in excess of the indemnity.
50Where it is 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
receives any sum in excess of the indemnity allowed by this Act, he is deemed to hold such sum in trust for the 
insurers, according to their rights of contribution amongst themselves.  
46 A valued policy is a policy which specifies the agreed value of the subject-matter (Marine Insurance Act 1906 s27 
(2). Where there is no fraud, it will be conclusive of the insurable value of the subject -matter as to whether the loss 
is total or partial (see s27(3) Marine Insurance Act) A value fixed by the poli cy is not conclusive for the purpose of 
determining whether there has been constructive loss (s27(4) Marine Insurance Act 1906) 
47 An unvalued policy is one which does not specify the value of the subject matter but subject to the limit of the 
sum insured, leaves the insurable value to be ascertained subsequently: s28 Marine Insurance Act 1906. Also see s16 
Marine Insurance Act 1906. 
48 (1863) 1 H & C 769 which overruled Bousfield v Barnes (1815) 4 Camp 228 
49 s33(1) Marine Insurance Act 1908 
50 s33(2)(a) Marine insurance Act 1908 23 
 
a valued policy, credit must be given against the valuation for sums he has received under any 
other  policy,  without  regard  to  the  actual  value  of  the  subject  matter  insured.
51  If it is an 
unvalued policy, he must also give credit, as against the full insurable value, for sums that he has 
received under any other policy.
52The position in England is that where the assured has received 
any sum which is in excess of the amount permitted under the Act, he will be deemed to hold this 
sum in trust for the insurer, according to the rights of contribution among themselves.
53 The 
same wording can be found in s38 of the Marine Insurance Act 1909.  
 
In Australia, similar principles can be found in  Albion Insurance Co Ltd v GIO (NSW)
54 where 
Menzies JJ stated:  
 
“There  is  double  insurance  when  an  assured  is  insured  against  the  same  risk  with  two 
independent insurers. To insure doubly is lawful but the assured cannot recover more than the 
loss  suffered  and  for  which  there  is  indemnity  under  each  policies.  The  assured  may  claim 
indemnity from either insurer. However, as both insurers are liable, the doctrine of contribution 
between insurers has been evolved…There is no reason why the doctrine should not apply to 
insurance against liability to third parties and there is every reason in principle that it should. The 
doctrine however only applies when each insurer insures against the same risk, although it is not 
necessary that the insurance should be identical. Thus one insurer may insure properties A and B 
against fire and the other insurer may only insure property A against fire. Again, one policy may 
be for a limited amount and the other may be for an unlimited amount. One policy may cover the 
risk of a whole voyage and the other may cover only part of the voyage. Differences of this sort 
may affect the amount of contribution recoverable but they do not bear on the question whether 
                                                            
 
51 s33(2)(b) Marine Insurance Act 1908 
52 s33(2)(c) Marine Insurance Act 1908 
53 s33(2)(d) Marine Insurance Act 1908 
54(1969) 121 CLR 342. This approach has been followed in other cases such as  John v Rawlings (1984) 3 ANZ Ins 
Cas 60-564; Boy v State Insurance General Manager [1980] 1 NZLR 87; Australian Eagle Insurance Co Ltd v 
Mutual Acceptance (Insurance) Pty Ltd [1983] 3 NSWLR 59 (CA); GIO(NSW) v QBE Insurance Ltd (1985) 2 
NSWLR 543 and QBE Insurance Ltd v GIO (NSW) (1986) 4 ANZ Ins Cas 60. Further see the judgment of Kitto J 
who stated that what resulted in the right of contribution was the simple fact that each contract was a contract of 
indemnity and covered the identical loss that the same assured sustained. This was due to the fact that the insured 
only received one satisfaction. In the decision of State Government Insurance Commission v Switzerland Insurance 
Australia Limited (Trading as a Federation Insurances)  [1995] SASA 5490, at para [14], the full court of the 
Supreme Court of Australia confirmed that this was the correct approach and even went as far as saying that there 
could be no doubt that this was the law. 24 
 
or not each insurer has insured against the same risk so as to give rise to some contribution. The 
element essential for contribution is that, whatever else may be covered by either of the policies, 
each must cover the risk which has given rise to the claim. There is no double insurance unless 
each insurer is liable under his policy to indemnify the insured in whole or in part against the 
happening which had given rise to the insured’s loss or liability.”   
 
The principles of double insurance can be found in numerous jurisdictions such as England, 
Australia, Canada, Germany, the People’s Republic of China, Singapore and the United States 
for example. The scope and wordings in these jurisdictions vary, as some provisions can be 
found in legislation. The advantages for the assured in taking out double insurance have been 
evident. There are problems however when payment from the insurers are sought when a loss is 
incurred.  
 
1.2 Methods of interpreting wordings in policy with double insurance clauses  
 
It will be evident that there are differences in the wordings of the policies but the ultimate result 
and effect may be the same. This could be in the form of excluding or limiting liability. In 
Australia, however, the legislature has even gone so far as to conclude that all such clauses 
would be void, except in very limited circumstances.  
 
In Body Corporation 398983 v Zurich Australian Insurance Limited
55 the issue for the court was 
the interpretation of the National Disaster Damage Clause of the policy. The clause had the effect 
of limiting the amount which was payable by Zurich for natural disaster damage where there was 
cover which was provided for under statute. It provided that “the Insurers liability will be limited 
to the amount of loss in excess of the Natural Disaster Damage Cover.”This case looked at the 
situation  where  there  was  a  contractual  exclusion  or  limiting  of  liability  and  a  legislative 
provision dealing with situations where there was double insurance. The court stated that when 
interpreting the contract, one had to look for the meaning intended by the parties to that contract. 
This is to be done on an objective basis, by looking at what a reasonable and properly informed 
                                                            
 
55 [2013] NZHC 1109 25 
 
third  party  would  consider  the  parties  to  have  intended.  One  would  have  to  look  at  the 
background knowledge that would reasonably be available to the parties at the time. The courts 
would generally look at the plain and ordinary meaning of the contract and will only displace it 
where there were strong grounds to persuade the court that something had gone wrong regarding 
the contractual language that has been used that would justify this course.
56These principles the 
court went on to say were the same principles that would apply to insurance contracts.
57 
 
The court stated that there was double insurance in this case because the statutory cover and the 
Zurich policy both would respond to the Bod y Corporate’s loss in  relation to  the Salisbury 
Apartments. Section 30(1)
58 of the Earthquake Commission Act 1993 had an “other insurance” 
clause. Under this provision only damage which exceeded the cover of the contract under the 
insurance contract and any deductible would be provided for. The Zurich policy also contained 
“other insurance” clauses
59, GC09 and MD15. The wording of the GC09 policy, when read in 
isolation,  meant  that  the  Zurich  policy  would  respond  only  after  all  other  cover  had  been 
exhausted. However the provision in s30 (3)
60 would defeat the clause. The parties agreed that 
s30(2) applied
61, which stated that subsection (1) of the section shall not apply with respect to 
any contract of insurance made otherwise than under this Act to the extent  that the contract 
provides for cover in the excess of the amount to which cover is provided under this Act. The 
court then had to decide what was Body Corporate’s entitlement and whether its entitlement 
                                                            
 
56 The cases referred to were Vector Gas Ltd v Bay of Plenty Energy Ltd [2010] 2 NZLR 444,470-47 at [19], [61]; 
Investors  Compensation  Scheme  Ltd  v  West  Bromwich  Building  Society  [1998]  1  WLR  896  at  912-913;  and 
Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd [2009] UKHL 38 at [14]-[15] 
57 Trustees Executors Ltd v QBE Insurance (International) Ltd (2010) 16 ANZ Ins Cas 61-874 
58 This section states that where on the occurrence to any property of natural disaster damage against which it is 
insured under any of section 18 to 20, or section 22, of this Act, the property is also insured against that damage 
under any contract or contracts made otherwise than under this Act, the insurance of the property under this Act (to 
the amount to which it is so insured) shall be deemed to be in respect of so much of that disaster damage as exceeds 
the sum of – (a) the total amount payable under that contract or those contracts in respect of that natural disaster 
damage; and (b) the proportion of the natural disaster damage to be borne by the insured person under the conditions 
applying to the insurance of the property  under the  Act. This section  was  similar to s18 Earthquake and War 
Damage Act 1944 (EQWD Act). 
59 GC09 and MD15 
60 Subsection (3) states that notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any contract whereby any property is insured 
against natural disaster damage otherwise tha n under this Act, where the property is or has at any time also been 
insured against that natural disaster damage under any of the sections 18 to 20, or section 22, of this Act, the 
contract shall have effect in all respects as if the property were not and had never been insured under this Act.  
61 If it did not, and in absence of MD15, then Zurich’s policy would have to respond first. 26 
 
would be the same if s30 (2) applied
62 or would it be less
63.The court held that the wording in 
MD15 was specifically added to trigger s30 (2). The words “will be limited to” are important as 
it emphasizes that the cover under the policy is only cover in excess of the statutory cover, which 
means that s30(2) will not be triggered. The court did not think that it was justified to read into 
MD15 words which were not needed to make sense of the clause. It could be argued that if the 
court were to do this, this would go beyond the intention of the parties. The definition of “loss” 
in Clause MD15 bore its ordinary meaning of being deprived of something or of the diminution 
of possession resulting from a change in conditions. This would have to be the actual loss.   
 
The  High  Court  in  Singapore  in  the  decision  of  Lonpac  Insurance  Bhd  v  American  Home 
Assurance Co
64was asked to consider whether extrinsic evidence could be admitted to help assist 
the court to construe the annual policy which had been issued. The primary issue was whether 
the annual policy also covered the claimant’s claim which would then raise issues of double 
insurance. The extrinsic evidence which Lopac sought to adduce was in the form of affidavits 
from  employees  of  the  Group  and  its  insurance  broker.  The  decision  of  the  Assistant 
Commissioner was to refuse the production of extrinsic evidence. In a detailed analysis
65 by the 
court it was held that extrinsic evidence could be admissible. The Plaintiff argued that the facts 
of Lonpac Insurance Bhd v American Home Assurance Co were similar to the decision of China 
Insurance  Co  (Singapore)  Pte  Ltd  v  Liberty  Insurance  Pte  Ltd  where  the  reason  for  the 
production of extrinsic evidence was to show that the insured had taken out the second policy 
only because they were told to do so by their insurance broker and after they were informed that 
their first policy did not cover liability to workmen injured while onboard the vessel. In that case 
                                                            
 
62 which was Body Corporate’s argument 
63 as was contended by Zurich 
64 [2011] SGHC 257, at para [1] 
65 The Evidence Act (Cap 97, Rev Ed 1997), sections 93 (which states that when the terms of a contract or of a grant 
or of any other disposition of property have been reduced by or by consent of the parties to the form of a document, 
and in all cases in which any matter is required by law to be reduced to the form of a document, no evidence shall be 
given in proof of the terms of such contract, grant or other disposition of property or of such a matter except the 
document itself, or secondary evidence of its contents in cases in whic h secondary evidence is admissible under the 
provisions of this Act.), section 94 (When the terms of any such contract, grant or other disposition of property, or 
any matter required by law to be reduced to the form of a document, have been proved accordin g to section 93, no 
evidence of any oral agreement or statement shall be admitted as between the parties to any such instrument or their 
representatives in interest for the purpose of contradicting, varying, adding to, or subtracting from its terms subject  
to the following provisions…) and the case of China Insurance Co (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Liberty Insurance Pte Ltd 
[2005] 2 (SLR(R )) 509. 27 
 
Phang JC was of the view that such extrinsic evidence was relevant, admissible and persuasive in 
the Defendant’s favour
66. He concluded that even assuming that a comparison of the policies 
alone was insufficient to determine the case in the defendant’s favour, the production of the 
extrinsic  evidence  would  clearly  have  accomplished  this.  Although,  in  that  case  Phang  JC 
concluded that there was no double insurance as the two policies covered different risks. In the 
present  case  the  High  Court  stated  that  there  was  nothing  to  stop  Lonpac  from  introducing 
extrinsic evidence to explain the risks that was intended to be covered by the policy between 
Lonpac and REL. 
 
The Singaporean position, it could be argued, would be helpful when there is a dispute by the 
parties as to the policy terms, apart from those as expressly stated in the documents itself which 
were intended to be included by the parties and the parties are aware. Although the decision in 
Lonpac Insurance Bhd v American Home Assurance Co was between two insurance companies, 
it could be said that the same principles would apply to an insurer and assured position. This 
approach  could  however  on  the  other  hand  cause  problems,  especially  when  dealing  with 
contracts where the claim is made years later and such witnesses or affidavits would be harder to 
obtain or where the insurance company itself had gone into liquidation. It therefore may be better 
to rely solely on the documentation which was produced as a result of discussions between the 
parties to ascertain their intentions, and apply a more objective test. 
 
1.3 Contribution as a general concept 
 
If the assured has insured the same subject matter covering the same loss with a few insurers 
under the doctrine of double insurance
67, then the insurer who has paid out
68can then look to the 
                                                            
 
66 The Court of Appeal in Zurich Insurance (Singapore) Pte Ltd v B-Gold Interior Design & Construction Pte Ltd 
[2008] 3 SLR(R0 1029  which  stated that the remarks of Phang J  with regard to the admissibility of extrinsic 
evidence was obiter. The court however in Lonpac Insurance Bhd v American Home Assurance Co, considered that 
it was wrong to suggest that the Court of Appeal in Zurich in Zurich confined China Insurance to its facts. 
67 These principles can also be seen in the UNCTDA Model Clauses on Marine Hull and Cargo Insurance, cl10.5. 
which deals with co-insurance. 10.5.1 provides that where two or more insurers are liable under this insurance, each 
insurer is liable only for his proportion of the claim, which is the proportion that his subscription bears to the sum 
insured, and shall on no account be held jointly liable with his co -insurers. In Tai Ping Insurance Co Ltd v Tugu 
Insurance  Co.  Ltd  and  Another  [2001]  2  HKC  401,  Hon  Mr.  Justice  Stone  concluded  that  there  was  double 
insurance based on (1) both policies cover the loss of the goods by theft/robbery; (2) both polices cover the same 
interest; (3) both policies were in force at the time of the loss; and (4) both the policies were legally enforceable at 28 
 
other insurers for contribution. This is due to the equitable doctrine of contribution
69 which only 
applies to insurers
70  and not to the assured. This is because the assured has already been 
indemnified for his loss. In  Godin v London Assurance Co
71Lord Mansfield stated that: “If the 
insured is to receive but one satisfaction, natural justice says that the several insurers shall all of 
them contribute pro-rata to satisfy that loss against which they have all insured.” This position 
has been codified in legislation in the form of s80 Marine Insurance Act 1906 which provides 
that:  
 
Where  the  assured  is  over-insured  by  double  insurance,  each  insurer  is  bound,  as  between 
himself and the other insurers, to contribute rateably to the loss in proportion to the amount for 
which he is liable under the contract. If any insurer pays more than his proportion of the loss, he 
is entitled to maintain an action for contribution against the other insurers, and is entitled to 
maintain an action for contribution against the other insurers, and is entitled to the remedies as a 
surety who has paid more than his proportion of the debts. 
 
Under s80  (1) an insurer would have to  contribute rateably to the loss  in  proportion  to  the 
amount he is liable to pay under the policy contract.
72 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
the time.      
68Williams v North China Insurance Co (1876) 1 CPD 757 
69 This is based on the principle of equity: Godin v London Assurance Co (1758) 1 Burr 489. In Mathie v Argonaut 
Marine Ins Co (1925) 21 LI LR 145 it was stated that under common law the assured is not required to disclose to 
the insurer that he has previously taken out insurance with another insurer which covers the same risk, unless there 
is a degree of over-insurance which is likely to give rise to fraud.  
70 This is the position for co-insurers and the equitable doctrine of contribution is confined to indemnity insurance 
and operates to prevent the insured from being unjustly enriched: Insurance Law:  Doctrines and Principles John 
Lowry and Philip Rawlings (2
nd Ed) (2005) p.270. Also see Caledonia North Sea Ltd v BT plc [2002] Lloyd’s Rep 
IR 261; Family Insurance Corporation v Lombard Canada Ltd [2002] S.C.J No.49 where Bastarache J stated as 
follows: “ It is a well-established principle of insurance law that where an insured holds more than one policy of 
insurance that covers the same risk, the insured may never recover more than the amount of the full loss but is 
entitled to select the policy under which to claim indemnity, subject to any conditions to the contrary. The selected 
insurer, in turn, is entitled to contribution from all other insurers who have covered the same risk. This doctrine of 
equitable contribution among insurers is founded on the general principle that parties under a coordinate liability to 
make good a loss must share that burden pro-rata. It finds its historic articulation in the words of Lord Mansfield C.J 
in Godin v London Assurance Co (1758) 1, Burr.489,97 E.R. 419 at 420: If the insured is to receive but one 
satisfaction, natural justice says that the several insurers shall all of them contribute pro-rata, to satisfy that loss 
against which they have all insured.” 
71(1758) 1 Burr 489. Also see American Surety Co of New York v Wrightson (1910) 16 Com Cas 37.  
72O’Kane v Jones [2005] Lloyd’s Rep IR 174, American Surety Co of New York v Wrightson (1910) 103 LT 663, 29 
 
 
Therefore there are two aspects to double insurance. The first is that the insured cannot recover 
more than his indemnity but he can choose which policy to claim from and secondly, the insurer 
who pays the claim is then entitled to seek contribution from the other insurers.
73The origins of 
contribution was decided by the Courts of Equity when deciding the control and direction of the 
cause of the action arising under deeds or contracts, and not with the creation of independent and 
separate  causes  of  action.
74Matters  which  were  usually  the  subject  of  law  were  in  some 
circumstances within the realm of equity. This usually would include situations where the legal 
remedy was not available, where the equitable remedy was more efficient, or that the procedure 
in equity resulted in a more favourable position to the parties. The approach taken by the Courts 
of Chancery permitted them to adjust the parties’ rights in a manner not particular at law, and by 
bringing all the parties interested before it to avoid multiplicity of suits.  
 
Contribution  it  was  said  would  fall  within  this  category.
75Although it was understood   that 
contribution could be modified by contract, contribution was not based on contract, but was 
based on the principles of natural justice. Payment by one person liable will release the others 
from the principal demand and they are required to contribute  as a return for this benefit. This 
will only apply where all the parties are liable to a common demand.
76Further, the right arises on 
an equity which requires someone who has taken a premium to share the burden of meeting the 
claim.
77The policy must be in force at the time of the loss and no contribution would arise where 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
Williams v The North China Insurance Co; Boag v Economic Insurance Co Ltd [1954] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 581, Legal 
and General Assurance Society Ltd v Drake Insurance Co Ltd [1991] 2 Lloyd’s Law Reports 44(where there were 
two instruments covering same loss but differing in scope), Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd v Provincial Insurance 
plc[1993]  2  Lloyd’s  Law  Report  143  (where  the  second  insurer  repudiated  for  breach  of  warranty  or 
misrepresentation), Drake Insurance Plc v Provident Insurance Plc [2004] Lloyd’s IR 277, Monksfield v Vehicle 
and General Insurance Co [1971] Lloyd’s Rep 139 (assured failed to give notice of potential claim, whether second 
insurer was liable to contribute after payment by the first insurer. Also see decision  in Legal and General Assurance 
Society Ltd v Drake Insurance Co Ltd, Godin v London Assurance Co (1785) 1 Burr 489, Petrofine (UK) Ltd v 
Magnaload  Ltd  [1984]  QB  127,  North  British  and  Mercantile  Insurance  Co  v  London,  Liverpool  and  Global 
Insurance Co. (1877) 5 Ch D 569(meaning of ‘covering the same property” . 
73 Insurance Law: Doctrines and Principles John Lowry and Philip Rawlings (2
nd Edition) 2005 
74Legal and General Assurance Society Ltd v Drake Insurance Co Ltd [1991] 2 Lloyd’s Law Reports 44, per Gibson 
L.J. 
75Legal  and  General Assurance  Society  Ltd  v  Drake Insurance  Co  Ltd  [1991]  2  Lloyd’s  Law  Reports  43  and 
Halsbury’s Laws of England 4
th ed., 1976 Vol.16 (Equity) at para 1214 referred to in Drake. 
76Halsbury’s Laws of England 4
th ed., 1976 Vol.16 (Equity) par.1252 
77Legal and General Assurance Society Ltd v Drake Insurance Co Ltd [1991] 2 Lloyd’s Law Reports 43 30 
 
the policy had become void or where the risk had not yet attached.
78 
 
As there will be in existence numerous policies, the apportionment of the loss will be done 
according to various rules o f practice that has been adopted more or less uniformly by the 
different insurers.
79It is different in practice where a distinction is drawn between whether the 
policies are ‘specific’, which means that they would not be subject to average and those on the 
other hand which will be subject to average.
80 
 
The courts have been keen for a more flexible approach when dealing applying the principles of   
equity and have adjusted the rights of the parties when it considered it necessary to do so, even if 
it departs from the law at the time. This approach should be adopted and favour should be given 
ultimately to the assured.  
 
 
1.4 Return of Premiums when the Insurer Refuses to Pay 
 
The area of concern for an assured is why should he have to bear the risk of the possibility of not 
recovering anything under the numerous insurance contracts which he has taken out, due to the 
insurer or insurers successfully arguing that they have no obligation to pay out by relying on the 
clauses in the insurance policy which excludes them from liability, either in full or partially, after 
the assured has paid out money on high premiums. This area has raised some complex issues, 
such as whether the assured should be able to claim a rateable return of his premium from each 
insurer,  in  a  manner  representing  the  amount  by  which  he  is  over-insured  by  double 
insurance.
81To ease the unfairness which results in double insurance, the return of premiums and 
how much, would be something that may balance out the interests of both the insurer and the 
assured, where the former is always at a better position than the latter. The assured has to agree 
to the amount of premium stated in the policy or otherwise he will not be able to find cover to 
insure against that loss. However as can be seen from the law  as it stands it may be difficult to 
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th ed., 1976 Vol.16 (Equity) par.539 
79 General Principles of Insurance Law (6
th Edition)(1993) ER Hardy Ivamy, 523 
80 General Principles of Insurance Law (6
th Edition)(1993) ER Hardy Ivamy, 523 
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give protection to the assured through this method. Therefore other methods have to be looked 
at.  
 
The issue of the return of premiums was raised in the case of Tyrie v Fletcher
82where it was 
decided whether under the circumstances of the case, a proportionate part of the premium ought 
to be returned or not. The court at the time decided to approach the case from general principles 
applicable to all policies of insurance and approached the case from two angles. The first, is 
where the underwriter has received his premium for running the risk of indemnifying the insured, 
and whatever cause it be owing to, if he does not run the risk, the consideration, for which the 
premium or money was put into his hands, fails, and therefore he ought to return the premium. 
Alternatively,  if  the  risk  of  the  contract  of  indemnity  has  commenced,  there  shall  be  no 
apportionment or return of the premium. The court was of the view that the latter approach was 
the correct one. In Tyrie, the court held that no premium should be returned once the risk was 
entire. The Plaintiff, who was the assured, sued the defendant, an underwriter for the return of 
part of the premium he had paid out. The Plaintiff argued that the premium ought to be returned 
as the compensation estimated for the risk of twelve months, was much more than adequate to 
the risk actually run in the case which was only two months. Further that from the nature of the 
insurance, both parties knew that risk was divisible and that if it ceased before twelve months 
that the whole of the premium would not be retained by the defendant. This argument was put 
forward on the basis that where there was a suitable compensation for a given risk, the risk had 
turned out to be different from what was expected. The argument put forward by the defendant 
was that as soon as the ship sailed from the port in London, the policy attached for the whole 
time it was insured against. There was no calculation of the premium per month but that it was 
one entire gross sum of 91% stipulated and paid for twelve months. Therefore the contract was 
entire, without any intention or thought of division, or apportionment. The position would be 
different where the risk did not attach and would therefore result in the return of the premium. 
Here it is one entire indivisible risk which would not warrant the return of the premium.  
 
Although the insurance industry itself has its own practices which have developed over the years, 
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these practices would usually be for the benefit of the insurance company. This will normally be 
because of the better bargaining power that the insurance company has over the insured. The 
assured can either decide to accept the terms of the insurance policy or look for other insurance. 
 
1.5 Legislative Framework of the Return of Premium 
 
The principles in Tyrie can now be found in legislation in the form of the Marine Insurance Act 
under s88 to s90. There are exceptions where the premiums are in fact returnable. These include 
where the consideration has totally failed and there has been no fraud or illegality on the part of 
the  insurer  or  his  agents
83; to the extent of any part of the premium proportionate to an 
apportionable part of the consideration which has totally failed
84; where the policy is void, or is 
avoided by the insurers from the commencement of the risk as long as there is no fraud or 
illegality
85; where the insured has no insurable interest and the policy was not effected by way of 
gaming or wagering
86; to the extent of a proportionate part of the  premium, where the insured 
has over-insured under an unvalued-policy
87 or where he has over- insured by double insurance
88 
or where the policy contains a stipulation for the return of premium on the happening of a certain 
event, and that event happens
89. Under s82 (a)
90 where the premium is recoverable then the 
insured can seek recovery of it from the insurers. Under  s82 (b)
91 if it has not been paid, then it 
shall be retained by the insurer or his agent.  
 
1.6 Position Prior to Legislation 
 
Prior to the legislation being implemented, in the case of Fisk v Masterman
92, the issue that had 
to be determined by the court was whether the underwriters were bound to return part or all of 
                                                            
 
83 Marine Insurance Act 1906 s84(1), (3)(b). 
84 Marine Insurance Act 1906 s84(2) 
85 Marine Insurance Act 1906 s84(3) 
86 Marine Insurance Act 1906 s84(3)(c) 
87 Marine Insurance Act 1906 s84(3)(e) 
88 Marine Insurance Act 1906 s84(f) 
89 Marine Insurance Act 1906 s83 
90 Marine Insurance Act 1906 
91 Marine Insurance Act 1906 
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the premiums, and if they are required to return the premiums, in what proportion and upon what 
principle should the calculations be made. The court did permit the return of premiums in the 
event of double insurance. The court held that the assured was entitled to a return of premium on 
the amount of the over-insurance to which the underwriters who subscribed to the policies, when 
the vessel had arrived safely, were to contribute rateably in proportion to the sum insured by 
them respectively. That was the amount of over-insurance to be ascertained when taking into 
account all the policies. No return of premium prior to that date could be returned. In Fisk, 
insurance was taken out on a cargo by sea by five policies and further insurance was taken out on 
six different policies. All the policies together exceeded the amount of the value of the subject 
matter insured, but the former policies did not. The Court referred to Marshall on Insurance
93and 
stated that the Court was not at liberty to distinguish between the two insurances and therefore 
the return must be made on both policies at rateable proportions. 
 
This can now be found in the form of s84 (3)(f) which permits a proportionate part of the several 
premiums to the assured where the assured has overinsured by double insurance. However, this 
will only apply where if the policies are effected at different times, and any earlier policy has at 
any time borne the entire risk, or if a claim has been paid on the policy in respect of that policy, 
and when double insurance is effected knowingly by the assured no premium is returnable. It 
seems that this may extend to cases of property and liability policies as usually policies usually 
stated the limited circumstances which any part of the premium is to be returnable
94. 
 
Therefore although it may be an attractive argument to say that the law should be t hat the 
premiums should be returned to the insured where there is double insurance, the possible 
arguments against that is the specific legislation in place which has severe restrictions and as a 
rule, premiums are indivisible. Further it is possible that  losses under a policy may not be 
                                                            
 
93 (3
rd edition) p.649 which stated: “All the underwriters upon policies in which the effects are insured beyond their 
value, must bear any loss that may happen, and repay a  part of the premium, in proportion to their respective 
subscriptions, without regard to the priority of their dates. If by several policies, made without fraud, the sum 
insured exceed the value of their effects, these several policies will in effect, make but one insurance, and will be 
good to the extent of the true interest of the insured; and in case of loss, all underwriters on the several policies shall 
pay according to their respective subscriptions, without regard to the priority of their dates. And it follows from 
thence that all underwriters on the several policies would be equally bound to make a return of premium for the sum 
insured above the value of the effects, in proportion to their respective subscriptions.  
94Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance Hong Kong (2
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affected by double insurance.  
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CHAPTER 2  THE RIGHTS OF AN ASSURED 
 
2.1 The devices Insurers use to avoid indemnifying an assured: Are they fair? 
 
An assured approaches an insurer to insure property he may own in the hopes that if a situation 
arises which results in a loss to the property that he should be able to make a claim which covers 
the  loss  that  he  has  suffered.  However,  this  is  not  always  as  easy  as  it  sounds  due  to  the 
mechanisms  in  place  which  are  frequently  used  by  the  insurer,  either  limiting  liability  or 
excluding liability completely. This is done by including various clauses into the contract. In 
some cases you can have complicated combination of the Clauses.  The device used by the 
insurer usually falls into the following categories: (1) exclusion clauses, (2) rateable proportion 
clauses, (3) excess and (4) Other insurance clauses
95. Sometimes the insurer or insurers will 
include a combination of such clauses in the policy which causes difficulty and which may leave 
the assured without any cover for the loss he has suffered. The cases in this area are still 
uncertain due to the courts in a substantial number of cases avoiding having to deal with the 
issue by stating that the case before them is not one  of double insurance or the lack of standard 
                                                            
 
95 These “other insurance” clauses will be included in an insurers standard form policies. Other insurance Clauses 
usually  come  in  the  following  form:  (1)  those  which  absolve  an  insurer  from  liability  should  other  insurance 
covering the same risk be in existence or be effecting during the period of cover, unless the insurer is notified in 
writing of that other insurance; (2) the clause restricts the insurer’s liability to the loss in excess of that covered by 
other insurance; and (3) the clause restricts the insurers liability to a rateable proportion of any sum payable in the 
event of any loss. The aim of these clauses is to cover situations where the insured has effected two policies against 
the same risk, they will also be expressly applied to any policy in existence or effected in relation to any risk or any 
property covered by the instant policy. It is therefore crucial for the insured to appraise each policy carefully to see 
whether the policy in contemplation covers a risk or item of property already insured to avoid the pitfall of such a 
provision. The advantage obtained from the use of such clauses includes protecting insures from fraudulent over-
insurance, facilitate the investigation of claims, and to allow the insurer to seek contribution where appropriate from 
one another. See The Measure of Indemnity  under Property Insurance Policies by  A. A. Tarr Canterbury Law 
Review Vol 2 (1983). The wordings used to draft such clauses will usually be in the following form: “The insured 
shall give notice in writing to the insurer of any insurance or insurances already effected, or which may subsequently 
be affected, covering the rest herby insured, and unless such notice be given and the particulars of such insurance or 
insurances be stated in or endorsed on this policy by or on behalf of the insurer before the occurrence of any loss or 
damage, all benefit under this policy shall be forfeited.” “If other insurance exists which applies to a loss or would 
have applied if this policy did not exist, this policy will be considered excess insurance and the insurer is not liable 
for any loss or claim until the amount such other insurance is used up.” “If other valid insurance with any other 
insurance covering a loss also covered by this policy, other than insurance that is specifically stated to be in excess 
of this policy, the insurance afforded by this policy shall be in excess of and shall not contribute with such other 
insurance. Nothing herein shall be construed to make this policy subject to the terms, conditions and limitations of 
the other insurance.” : The Law of Liability Insurance, Derrington and Ashton (2
nd Edition) p,675,676 36 
 
principles that could be adopted in other cases where similar situations arise. 
 
If the insurer chooses to include clauses in the policy limiting or excluding liability which has 
been agreed to by the assured, then why should the insurer not be permitted to do so. Although 
when one states that the assured has “agreed” to the terms of the policy, how accurate is this 
statement, as it is very common that an assured may not read and understand fully the terms of 
the policy he contracts into.  On the other hand, why should the assured lose out when he has 
paid the premiums or high premiums under the policy. From the perspective of the insurer these 
devices have been put in place originally to prevent fraud by the assured where the assured may 
make  a  claim  to  recover  against  two  insurers  where  he  is  overinsured,  after  destroying  the 
insured policy himself. Therefore an insurer should be allowed such protection. 
 
In Australia, the insurance market is more of a consumer market, which is slightly different from 
the insurance market in the United Kingdom. There is not much in Australia in the form of re-
insurance. Instead in Australia the market covers life, health and property, unlike the United 
Kingdom, which covers marine insurance.  However, from the development of the law and the 
cases, it can be seen that the issues that have arisen often involve commercial policies and it 
could be argued that the same approach could apply in the United Kingdom insurance market, 
despite the differences in the contracts. It has been the case that major commercial risks tend to 
be insured out or co-insured with Australia and other jurisdictions.  
 
An escape clause will completely exclude the liability of the insurer if an event occurs which is 
stated  in  the  policy  as  having  such  effect.  Usually  this  will  be  where  other  insurance  is  in 
existence. An excess clause will be triggered to cover only the excess where there is another 
policy in existence. Therefore the other insurance will have to respond first and it is only after 
this has been paid off does the policy with the excess clause pay off what is remaining. The third 
method that has been adopted by insurers is the rateable proportion clause, which limits the 
insurer’s liability to paying a proportional rate for the loss suffered by the assured. It is quite 
common for the insurer to draft the clauses in such a way so as to ensure that its liability to 
indemnify will be limited. The usual way in which to avoid what has been drafted and agreed in 37 
 
the policy is to show that the wording of one of the policies is not absolute. For example, this is 
what happened in the Canadian decision in the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia. This was the case 
of Evans v Marine Medical Care Inc.
96 where there were two policies in existence, one a group 
hospital plan which excluded cover for similar benefits if there was another contract in existence 
which covered the same loss. The other policy was a motor liability policy which provided that if 
there was a hospital plan in force, then it would not be liable to pay out. Here the Supreme Court 
looked at the wording to see if the wording was absolute or not. When interpreting the wording 
used in both policies, it concluded that the hospital plan was conditional upon payme nt being 
made by some other policy. Due to the clear wording that was used in the motor policy, the 
hospital policy would have to respond first. The hospital expenses plan was operative only where 
sums were actually payable under some other policy. The  court seems to be suggesting that the 
wording has to be looked at first; this is common with most insurance cases. However, the court 
is indicating that anything which is conditional would not be absolute. Therefore if the wording 
is clear, as it was in this case, then there would not be a problem to identify which policy is the 
excess policy. However, problems will and do arise where there is similar wording in numerous 
policies. In such a situation, the position may not be so clear. 
 
As can be seen from the following cases, the courts have still not been able to provide any clear 
guidance on the effect of the clauses.  
 
2.2 Escape Clauses against Escape Clauses 
 
Where the wording of an escape clause is clear and unambiguous, the other policy will have to 
pay  out.  What  is  the  position  however,  where  both  polices  contain  such  clauses?  Are  both 
insurers liable or is neither of them liable or is only one of them liable to indemnify? This issue 
                                                            
 
9687 DLR (4
th) 173 (1992). SHC Capital Ltd v NTUC Income Insurance Co-Operative Ltd [2010] SGHC 224; 
Nanyang Insurance Co Ltd v Commercial Union Assurance Plc [1996] 1 SLR(R) 441 and Bankers & Traders 
Insurance Co Ltd v National Insurance Co Ltd [1985] 1 WLR 734.  Also see Chui Man Kwan v Bank of China 
Group Insurance Co Ltd [2008] HKEC 1190, where cover was converted to an excess policy where another policy is 
present has the same effect, if no similar provision is present. In Chui Man Kwan, the wording in Tugu policy was 
as follows(this was an excess clause): If at the time of any claim under this policy there is any other insurance 
indemnifying any person or insured who are entitled to be indemnified under this policy, this policy is not to be 
called upon in contribution and, subject to the policy limits of indemnity, is only to pay any amount if and so far as 
not recoverable under such other insurance.  38 
 
was  discussed  in  Gale  v  Motor  Union  Insurance  Co
97  where  there  Roche  J  held  that  both 
companies were liable rateably, each company paying half, as the material clauses should be read 
together as relating to, explaining and qualifying one another. The clauses in question that were 
found in both motor car risks policy which provided that if the risk was covered by another 
policy the insurer will not be held liable and secondly, where there were two policies covering 
the risk were in existence, then the insurer would are liable to pay rateably. The court considered 
that both clauses should be read together and that the second qualified the first. Roche J however 
suggested that this was the position on the true reading of the clauses but the position would be 
different if the policy did not have a rateable proportion clause but stood alone as an exclusion 
clause. If that was the case, then he was of the view that neither insurer would be liable. If this 
approach  is  correct  and  followed,  then  this  would  result  in  the  insured  being  left  with  no 
protection for the loss he has suffered.  
 
The court in the case of Weddell v Road Traffic and General Insurance Co Ltd
98 shed some light 
on  this  by  concluding  that  the  clauses  do  not  cancel  out  each  other,  rather  they  should  be 
construed as excluding from the category of co-existing cover any cover which is expressed to be 
itself cancelled by such co-existence, and to hold that both companies be liable, subject to any 
rateable proportion clause present. The decision shows that the court will reject the notion that 
the clauses would cancel out each other and the result would be that each insurer is liable. The 
Weddell case was followed in Structural Polymer Systems Ltd and Another v Brown
99where 
Moore- Bick J stated that where there are no extraneous factors which could affect the amounts 
payable to each insured, that it could not possibly be in anyone’s interest if in fact the insurers 
were liable, individually or collectively, in an amount at least as great as that paid under the 
settlement.  This  therefore  reconfirms  the  approach  that  where  you  have  a  policy  where  the 
clauses lead to exclusions of liability that arises, the insured is and should be entitled to recover 
under two policies. 
 
Templeman  L.  J.  in  National  Employers  Mutual  General  Insurance  Association  Ltd.  v 
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Haydon
100supported the conclusions in Weddell. In Haydon, the Court of Appeal concluded that 
there was in fact no double insurance. This was a case dealing with a firm of solicitors where 
proceedings were brought against them for professional negligence. The solicitors settled the 
claim. There were two policies which were the NEM’s Professional Indemnity Policy (the NEM 
policy)  and  the  Law  Society’s  Professional  Indemnity  Insurance  (the  Master  Policy).  The 
solicitors were insured under the NEM policy which required notification to be given. The NEM 
policy consisted of Clause (i) under the heading General Exceptions to All Sections, and Clause 
3
101  under the heading Conditions. The Master Policy contained two clauses, Clause 2 and 
Clause 5. Clause 2
102 contained an indemnifying provision and Cla use 5
103 which contained a 
provision limiting the insurer’s liability. Neither of the policies contained a rateable proportion 
clause. Stephenson L.J stated that the case turned on the construction of the two policies looked 
at as a whole and the General Exception (i) in the NEM policy and General Exclusion 5(b)(iii) in 
the Master Policy. He discussed the approach taken by the first instance Judge, Lloyd J who was 
of the view that this was a “classic case of double insurance”, which resulted in contribution from 
the defendants on a 50% basis. He also considered that the exclusion clauses in the two policies 
were  of  no  distinction  even  though  the  Master  Policy  was  narrower  than  the  NEM  Policy. 
However he went on to say that both exception clauses or exclusion clauses were drafted in a 
strict sense in form and in substance and that even if the exclusion clause was not drafted in the 
strict sense, it would still be difficult to distinguish them. He went on to apply Weddell’s case on 
this basis and followed the principle that the policies should be looked at independently, the 
                                                            
 
100[1980] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 149, 156,Also see Arnold’s Law of Marine Insurance and Average, 17
th Edition, 2008, 
Sweet & Maxwell 
101 If during the period of insurance the solicitor became aware of and gave notice to, the insurance company of an 
occurrence which might subsequently give rise to a claim, then subsequent claims arising would be deemed to have 
been made during the subsistence of the policy. 
102Clause 2: On the terms and conditions herein contained the insurers shall indemnify the Assured against all loss to 
the Assured whensoever occurring arising from any claim or claims first made against the Assured or the Firm 
during the Period of Insurance in respect of any description of civil liability whatsoever incurred in connection with 
the Practice. 
103Clause 5 sets out the general exclusions, of which (b) is the relevant exclusion:  
“(b) This insurance shall not indemnify the Assured in respect of any loss arising out of any claim:… (iii) in respect 
of any circumstance or occurrence which has been notified under any other insurance attaching prior to the inception 
of this Certificate;” 40 
 
exclusion clause would cancel out each other, resulting in both insurers becoming liable and a 
contribution claim could be made. This would be the position if each policy would be liable but 
for the presence of the exclusion clauses in the policies. He therefore found for the NEM. 
 
However, the two clauses, the Court of Appeal considered, were clearly distinguishable from 
each other and that the claim was only covered by the NEM policy and not by the Master Policy. 
It was of the view that the label given to the clauses was not important and that the policies had 
to be read as a whole. The position is that when notice was given by the solicitors to NEM on 24 
March 1976, NEM bore the risk completely unless indemnity was covered by the other policy. 
This would have been the position if it were not for the presence of the NEM policy. This was 
because the Master Policy only gave cover after 24 March and not before that date which meant 
that “the insured is or would but for the existence of this Policy be entitled to indemnity under 
any other Policy” would not apply. However due to the effect of Clause 3, even though notice 
was given on 24 March, it was deemed to have been made during the existence of the policy 
which meant that the solicitors were not insured under the Master Policy. Although it has been 
commented that the distinction  between clauses prevents  liability  from  arising, and  a clause 
which excludes accrued liability, is too fine to be justified and the approach taken by Lloyd 
should be the correct approach.
104 
 
The above principles have been followed
105 in the courts of Singapore in the case of SHC Capital 
Ltd  v  NTUC  Income  Insurance  Co-operative  Ltd
106where  the  High  Court  had  to  deal  with 
whether there was double insurance, whether or not liability had been properly indemnified and 
whether there was a right to seek contribution or reimbursement by voluntary payment.  The 
court applied the principles as laid down in England such as American Surety Co of New York v 
Wrightson, Bankers & Traders Insurance Co Ltd v National Insurance Co Ltd
107and Weddell v 
Road Transport & General Insurance Co Ltd. The High Court also re-iterated the principles 
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regarding contribution and followed the English provisions
108.However, as can be seen from the 
above discussion, no clear guidance has been given. 
 
2.3 Escape Clause against Excess Clause 
 
It is possible that the two clauses would not be self cancelling due to the existence of the second 
policy which will provide cover unless there is another clause in existence providing cover. If 
not, then the first policy is negative by the existence of the second policy.
109 
 
2.4 Excess Clause against Excess Clause 
 
It is also common for policies to have excess clauses in both policies. In Austin v Zurich General 
Accident and Liability Insurance Company Limited
110 , the court followed similar reasoning as in 
Weddell’s case and concluded that both companies would be held liable. In Austin, Zurich issued 
a motor car insurance policy to A providing for extension of cover to persons driving the car 
with the insured’s permission on the condition that the terms of the policy were observed. As a 
                                                            
 
108 At para [36] where it was stated: “ The right of contribution exists as between co-insurers who have insured the 
same assured against the same risk, in respect of the same subject matter: MacGillivray on Insurance Law Relating 
to All Risks Other Than Marine (Sweet & Maxwell, 11
th ed, 2008) at para 23-001 (“MacGillivray”). Thus, when two 
insurers are liable for the same loss, the insurer called upon to make payment may have the right to seek payment 
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known as reimbursement, save for a slight difference. In the case of contribution, it is essential that both the plaintiff 
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Garrett (1871-1872) LR 7 Ex 101 at 104;  Bonner v Tottenham and Edmonton Permanent Investment Building 
Society [1899] 1 QB 161 (“Bonner”) at 178 and Mitchell, The Law of Contribution and Reimbursement (Oxford, 
2003) (“Mitchell”) at para 1.06. In the case of reimbursement, the plaintiff and defendant do not need to be jointly 
and/or severally liable to the third party in respect of the same debt. It would suffice if the plaintiff is compellable or 
compelled under the law or by necessity to discharge the defendant’s debt and was not acting officiously in so 
doing:  Halsbury’s  Laws  of  England,  4
th  edition  Reissue  vol  40(1)  at  para  63  (“Halsbury’s  Law  of  England, 
vol 40(1)”); cf Goff and Jones, The Law of Restitution (Sweet & Maxwell, 7
th ed, 2007) (“Goff and Jones”) at 
para 15-001 which states that the plaintiff must have been compelled by law to make a payment in order to obtain 
reimbursement. An example of a claim in reimbursement is where a surety who was called upon to pay a sum of 
money on the default of the principal debtor or some other person who is principally liable makes a claim against the 
principal for a full indemnity: Halsbury’s Laws of England, vol 40(1) at para 65. Another example may be found in 
Exall v Partridge (1799) 8 TR 308, where the claimants’ goods which were on land leased to the defendants, were 
seized by the landlords in distress of rent. The claimant, having paid rent to obtain the release of goods, successfully 
obtained recoupment (another word for reimbursement) from the defendants.” 
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result of an accident the plaintiff was sued and his insurers settled the claim. The Plaintiff then 
brought proceedings under his own name for the benefit of the insurers. Liability was denied by 
Zurich who claimed that notification had not been given. The Plaintiff’s policy was insured under 
the Bell policy. The Zurich Policy contained certain limitations. One of them provided that the 
person indemnified would not be entitled to indemnity if there was the existence of any other 
policy. The General Condition in the policy also stated that the company would not be liable 
(except  under  section  6)  to  pay  or  contribute  more  than  its  rateable  proportion  of  any  loss 
damage compensation costs or expense. The Bell policy also provided that if there was other 
indemnity or insurance, the underwriters shall not be liable to pay or to contribute except in 
excess of the sum actually recovered or recoverable under such indemnity or insurance. Tucker 
J
111 considered the facts of the present case to be indistinguishable from the decision in Weddell’s 
case and decided to follow that decision and that liability to indemnify should be shared by the 
companies equally. 
 
2.5 The effect of Rateable Proportion Clauses 
 
Another common clause that can be found in insurance policies
112 is the rateable proportion 
clause and in some cases, there would be a combination of other clauses as well. For the rateable 
proportion clause to have any effect, double insurance must be present, which means that they 
cover the same interest and the same loss. This clause was introduced due to an assured seeking 
contribution from one single insurer even thoug ht there were other insurers to which a claim 
could be made, which then resulted in the insurer seeking contribution from the other insurers
113. 
There have been similar situations to those arising in Weddell’s
114 case where an insurer refused 
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to indemnify due to a breach of the terms and conditions in the policy
115 and as a result the 
assured can only recover a proportion of his claim from the insured in question. Although the 
effect of a rateable proportion clause is his rights may be limited as to which insurer he proceeds 
against, this does not affect his rights to indemnity. The contribution takes place when the claim 
is made and not when contribution is sought by the insurers. The most serious disadvantage to 
the assured when such clauses are present is the risk of the insolvency of any of the insurers will 
be removed from the remaining insurers and imposed upon him.
116 
 
 
2.6 Clauses in combination: Excess or Escape Clauses against Rateable Proportion Clauses 
 
What is the position then when there is a combination of the clauses? An excess clause in a 
policy means that the policy will only have to pay up when another policy in existence have been 
exhausted. If such a clause is present in one policy and the other policy has a rateable proportion 
clause, the effect will be that the rateable proportion clause will not be triggered because there is 
no other policy in effect.  
 
Deputy Judge Gavin Kealy QC, in a recent decision, provided some useful guidance on the 
interpretation  of  such  clauses  and  their  effect  when  in  combination  when  there  was  double 
insurance, even though in that case, he concluded that there was no double insurance. In the 
decision of National Farmers Union Mutual Insurance Society Ltd v HSBC Insurance (UK) 
Ltd
117, the preliminary issues which dealt with the correct interpretation of the policies, were (1) 
whether  on  the  construction  of  the  HSBC  policy  there  was  no  cover  provided  due  to  the 
construction  of  the  NFU  policy  and  cancellation  of  it  due  to  no  conflicting  clause;  and  (2) 
whether the NFU policy contained a general pro rata clause. Here, he held that this was not a 
case of double insurance
118 but still went on to give a thorough review of the cases. There were 
two insurers, National Farmers Union Mutual Insurance Society (‘NFU’), insured the buyers and 
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HSBC Insurance (UK) Ltd (‘HSBC’) insured the sellers. The parties exchanged contracts for the 
sale of The Old Hall, the property which was the subject matter of a trust. A fire broke out 
between the dates of exchange of contracts for sale and completion. The sellers having been paid 
the full purchase price on completion, and having suffered no loss, they did not claim under their 
policy with HSBC. The Buyers made a claim and were indemnified by NFU. NFU then sought a 
contribution from HSBC. The key terms of HSBC’s building policy were set out in Section 
One.
119 The HSBC policy also contained claims applicable to the whole of the insurance.
120 The 
NFU policy contained a number of standard sections of cover for a wide variety of risks, the only 
relevant section provided for building are insured against damage by the following….Fire. There 
were a number of General clauses.
121 The question which arose was whether there was double 
insurance, NFU argued on the basis that HSBC’s policy provided buildings cover to the Buyers 
against the risk of damage to the buildings. HSBC argued that since the buyers were insured by 
another insurance policy for the building, then on the construction of their policy, their liability 
was limited to that of an excess insurer attaching in excess of the cover provided to the buyers by 
the NFU policy. Gavin Kealey QC on an analysis of the construction of the wording of the 
clauses concluded that HSBC policy was subject to the exception that an indemnity would not be 
provided if the Buyers had taken out their own building insurance which covered the same risk 
as the HSBC policy. Here the Buyers did. As a result of this, the NFU policy regarding the 
‘Other insurance’ provision was not triggered, making NFU liable to pay the full extent without 
pro rata apportionment, subject only to the indemnity limit for buildings cover in that policy. 
Kealey QC concluded that there was only one policy covering the buyer for the fire and damage 
to The Old Hall, which therefore did not trigger the “Other insurance policy in the NFU policy. 
                                                            
 
119 The insurance covers the buildings for physical loss or physical damage. It did not pay out if the building was 
insured under any other insurance.  
120 Claims under Condition 2 stated: “OTHER INSURANCE. We will not pay any claim if any loss, damage or 
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The Buyers were not insured at the same time by the NFU and HSBC policies and therefore 
there was no double insurance present.  
 
He first  stated the principles  of double insurance and the  rules  for contribution
122. He went 
further to say that it was the objective contextual background against which the policies which 
were to be construed and not speculate about the real intention of the parties.  He then went on to 
deal with the three main classes of policy insurance (1) escape/ exclusion clauses; (2) rateable 
proportion clauses and (3) excess clauses, and the decided cases. Although he concluded that the 
authorities and well established principles were of limited value in assisting to provide a clear 
consensus of analytical approach, he seems to be limiting that view to the confines of the facts of 
the present case.
123 He did not find the decision in Weddell of much help due to the difference in 
wording of the clauses.
124 Although he did go further and discuss Roche J ’s analysis in Gale v 
Motor Union Insurance Co
125 and Loyst v General Accident, Fire and Life Assurance Corp
126 , 
and discarded the possibility of the penultimate sentence in his analysis of escape provisions in 
each policy as being qualified and explained by the rateable proportion clause, on the condition 
that  the  escape  clause  only  applied  if  there  was  another  clause  policy  present  completely 
indemnifying the insured, as that if there had been no rateable proportion provision this would 
mean  that  the  effect  of  the  escape  clause  in  the  policy  would  have  deprived  the  insured 
completely. The reason being that it would not be consistent with subsequent authorities which 
have concluded that escape policies in both policies cancel out each other making the insured 
liable to pay rateably.  
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He further went on to differentiate the analysis in Gale on the basis that the rateable proportion 
clause in the NFU policy only took effect if there was no other insurance covering the same 
damage which was already covered by the NFU policy.  
 
He then turned his attention to the decision of Tucker J in Austin v Zurich General Accident & 
Liability Insurance Co Ltd
127, which followed Gale and Weddell. In that case analysis, Tucker J 
when dealing with excess and rateable proportion clauses, stated that the facts of the case were 
indistinguishable  from  that  of  Weddell  and  should  be  followed.  Tucker  J  concluded  that 
indemnification of 50% by the company was not applicable. Gavin Kealey QC commented that 
this conclusion was wrong, and the effect of both policies containing escape clauses, meant that 
they cancelled out each other, and each insurer was liable to pay rateably. Since in Weddell one 
of the policies
128 contained an escape clause but the other policy
129 neither contained an escape 
clause or rateable proportion clause. This did not however mean that the latter policy was liable 
to pay out 50% or liable under some rateable proportion.  Gavin Kealy QC seems to think that if 
it were not for the condition precedent, Cornhill would be 100% liable, subject on ly to such 
monetary limit of indemnity as the policy provided. This is the correct approach to be taken.  
 
In Austin, the Bell policy contained an escape clause and the Zurich policy contained a rateable 
proportion clause, after the escape clauses in both polices had been cancelled out. Gavin Kealey 
QC considered it wrong that this would result in both the policies agreeing to pay its insured, if 
covered by other insurance, 50% of the insured’s loss. He considered the correct conclusion 
would be that the Zurich policy would indemnify to the extent of its limit, without contribution 
from the Bell policy, above which excess cover would be made by the Bell policy.
130 
 
Although concluding that as the wording was materially different from the decision of  Austin he 
went further to say that if one were to treat the rateable proportion clause in the NFU clause as 
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same as the excess clause in the HSBC policy, and if they were in competition or conflict, then 
the conclusion would be the same as that reached by Tucker J.
131 
 
As stated above, Gavin Kealey QC said that these authorities provided no guidance to the case at 
hand and went on to cite New Zealand and Australian decisions. Referring to the Australian Law 
Commission Report No. 20 which referred to the English cases w hich lead to the enactment of 
s45 Insurance Contracts Act, he stated what the Reform’s view was on the position of the English 
cases.  It  concluded  that  the  interactions  between  the  clauses  are  difficult  to  follow  and 
impossible to reconcile.
132  He decided that more assistance was to be gained from the New 
Zealand case of  State Fire Insurance v Liverpool  & London Global Insurance
133, where the 
majority judgment was given by Hutchison and Cooke JJ, which was preferred by Gavin Kealey 
QC.  In  State  Fire  the  Court  drew  a  distinction  between  the  clause  in  the  State  Policy  and 
concluded that the rateable proportion clause should be subordinate to the indemnity provision 
and any inconsistency was to decided in favour of granting primacy to the indemnity clause and 
the excess provision within it. Such an approach resulted in coverage operating as excess to the 
Board’s. Hutchinson J stated that the case the court had to deal with was not one where it had to 
reconcile the clause to ensure that an absurd result does not occur, which is what the English 
cases concerned. The Court he said was dealing with resolving the conflict between the clauses 
giving indemnity in the State Policy and the contribution provision in that policy. The answer 
was that the rateable contribution should be subordinate to the clause giving indemnity because 
of  the  endorsement  on  the  State  Policy  which  is  a  special  provision,  unlike  the  rateable 
proportion clause which is a general clause. The State Policy would only be invoked after the 
rights  of  the  Globe  policy  have  been  exhausted.  This  was  due  to  the  State  Policy  being 
considered as an excess policy. Gavin Kealey QC adopted the same approach when deciding 
NFU by concluding that the qualified extension of buildings cover to the Buyers is not itself 
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further qualified by the generally applicable Claims Conditions in HSBC’s policy. The former 
was a special provision taking precedence over the latter to the extent of any conflict between the 
two but also the latter was subordinate to the former so far as the existence of liability was 
concerned. The NFU policy covered the Buyers without qualification for the risk of loss or 
damage to the buildings of The Old Hall by fire. This meant that no buildings insurance covering 
the same risk was extended to cover the Buyers and as a result, no double insurance was present.   
 
CHAPTER 3: Legislative Provisions – Section 45 Insurance Contracts Act 1984 
 
3.1  s45  Insurance  Contracts  Act  1984:  “Other  Insurance”  Clauses  –  The  Australian 
legislation barring double insurance exclusion clauses and whether English law needs the 
same? 
 
 
In Australia there is specific legislation prohibiting double insurance altogether. Any double 
insurance will make the insurance contract void, unless they fall within the exceptions under s45 
(1) or (2).
134 It should be noted that it is the double insurance provision in the policy which is 
void, and not the entire contract.  
 
The  problems  raised  by  double  insurance  were  illustrated  in  the  Australian  Law  Reform 
Commission, Report on Insurance Contracts, Report No 20 (1982).  
 
The Commission dealt with and looked at the issues in 4 stages: (1) before the Contract; (2) 
during the Contract; (3) cancellation and renewal of the Contract; and (4) when a claim is made. 
In particular, what rules should apply where there is double insurance.  
 
The guiding principles that were considered for the proposals were the need to strike an 
appropriate balance between the economic costs and the benefits. This was consistent with the 
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views  of  the  Campbell  Committee  whose  recommendations  were  designed  to  improve  the 
operation of the insurance market by making sure that the insured was provided with sufficient 
information.  There  were  some  major  recommendations.  For  example,  the  assured  should  be 
entitled to a copy of the policy. It was thought that there should be regulations for standard cover 
and any variation should be brought to the attention of the assured. Apart from regulations, the 
laws relating to misleading conduct should also be continued. Another recommendation was 
when determining the insured’s duty to disclose, the test should be what the insured knew or 
what a reasonable person in the insured’s circumstances would have been known, to be relevant 
to the assessment of the risk. A similar approach should be taken for misrepresentation too. At 
present the law requires the disclosure
135 of material facts be made by both the insurer and 
assured, with regard to what the risks covers and whether one would be able to make a claim 
under the policy.
136The court
137went on to say in Banque Keyser Ullman SA v Skandia (UK) 
Insurance Co Ltd, that what would be material would be matters that a prudent insured would 
take into account when deciding whether he should place the risk with that insurer.   
 
Where there were attempts of fraud by the insured the court should ensure that the loss suffered 
by the assured would not be seriously disproportionate to the harm caused by the fraud. Further, 
‘Other Insurance’ Clauses should be ineffective unless they fall within a certain category. It was 
thought that the insured should be entitled to choose whichever insurer he wanted to claim from, 
and it was then up to the insurer to seek contribution from the other insurers.
138  
 
The Report correctly pointed out that if an insured has made a claim in good faith, they should be 
entitled to recover the loss from the insurer. If an insured was to reject the claim, then it would 
be of serious concern. It went on to conclude that a system which persistently disappoints the 
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reasonable expectations
139 of the insured can hardly claim to represent a fair balance between the 
competing interest of the insured and the insurer.
140 It is this approach which should be the 
underlying reasoning when deciding what should be the correct formulations of the principle of 
double insurance.  
 
This paper gave an excellent overview of the problems of ‘Other insurance’ Clauses in insurance 
policies. It was as a result of the discussions in the paper that Australia decided to put in place 
legislation in the form of s45  Insurance Contract Act 1984 to avoid the problems raised by 
double insurance. This could provide a useful framework for the English courts to adopt.   
 
The Draft Legislation was attached to the Report. The present s45 was originally s46 in the Draft 
Legislation. No amendments were made to s45 which was adopted in its entirety. The rational 
141  
was due to the uncertainty caused with the clauses due to the assured receiving nothing at the end 
of the day or only receiving part of it. The balancing of interest between the assu red and the 
insured seemed to be disproportionate. It was thought that the inclusion of a term usually used in 
the policies warning the assured of the consequences of claiming twice under the policy did not 
assist in the reduction of the insured ’s fraudulent intentions. The insurer could include in the 
policy the requirement that the assured to provide details of any other insurance present, so as to 
enable the insurer to claim contribution from the other insurers. This would also allow for the 
insured to obtain more details of the likelihood of over-insurance occurring. Further an insured 
should be permitted to exclude liability where there is a genuine excess policy present.
142 
 
Therefore looking at the Australian position, one may ask, does this legislation actually solve the 
problems caused by double insurance? Should English law follow the Australian position for 
double insurance? If it is followed, should it be adopted in its entirety or with amendments? 
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The Australian Law Reform Commission, Report on Insurance Contracts, Report No.20 (1982) 
looked at  the concerns  that were raised which lead to  the legislation. The Commission  was 
concerned 
143 with the uncertainty caused to the insured. The usual problem that would arise was 
when there were a combination of the clauses, such as exclusion clauses, excess clauses and pro-
rata clauses, which would in some cases, result in the assured not being provided with any form 
of protection on suffering a loss. There was no protection against fraud as such. The Commission 
was of the view that the ‘other insurance’ clauses should be rendered ineffective. The position it 
was thought was that an assured should be able to collect from one insured and it was then for 
the insured to seek contribution from the others. The recommendation that if such a clause was 
ineffective it would not have any effect on layered polices where each policy is for a discrete 
range of the total risk and where no overlap occurs.    
 
The way the earlier cases
144were decided would allow the assured to mak e a claim under the 
second policy, and under the second policy, it was possible that the assured would not have 
sufficient protection or any protection. This would be the case if the requirement of notification 
had not been given where there was other insurance. There have been attempts by the court to get 
around this problem
145, where the cover note, it was said, did not fall within  “other insurance” 
under the first policy. 
146 
 
Another type of problem was the presence of all types of exclusion clauses
147 in the insurance 
contracts. In some cases, there would be a conflict of the clauses. The cases at the time of the 
Commission’s Report
148 were considered 'difficult to follow and impossible to reconcile'. There 
                                                            
 
143p.177 of the Report. In the People’s Republic of China, for example there is statutory requirement for notification 
in Article 41 Order of the President of the People’s Republic of China (No.11) where the insured or the proposer 
may change the beneficiary by written notice to the insurer. The insurer shall endorse the change on the policy or 
other insurance certificate or attach an endorsement slip to the insurance contract or insurance certificate upon 
receipt of the notice. Change of the beneficiary by the proposer is subject to the insured’s consent. 
144Nisner Holdings Pty Ltd v Mercantile Mutual Insurance Co. Ltd [1976] 2 NSWLR 406 
145Steadfast Insurance Co. Ltd v F & B. Trading (1971)125 CLR 578 
146See also  Deaves v C.L.M. Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. (1979) 23 ALR 539 where the principles in 
Steadfast Insurance Co. were followed. 
147Exclusion, Excess and Rateable proportion clauses 
148Gale v Motor Union Insurance Co [1928] 1 KB 359, Weddell v Road Transport and General Insurance Co Ltd 52 
 
were numerous issues and areas of concern which were identified. In any event, the legislature 
was of the view that the proper way to give sufficient protection was in the form of legislation. 
This is a possible solution to the problems as seen in English law. However, problems in the 
wording and interpretation of legislations will become evident after the passage of time when the 
law is able to develop in this area. Ultimately, although a fair balance should be struck between 
the parties, the interest of the assured should be the paramount concern, due to the bargaining 
positions of the parties. It cannot be disputed that insurance companies have the upper hand 
when drafting the wording of the policies. The Australian approach
149 to double insurance should 
be looked at to see if any assistance can be obtained. 
 
3.2 s45 Insurance Contracts Act 1984 –“Other insurance” provisions 
 
It is beneficial to list out the exact wording of the legislation of the Australian Provision, as the 
courts have tried to define what the words in the legislation mean and what effect they have. The 
cases that deal with the section may shed some light as to what type of cases the section would 
apply or if in fact they should have a limited application. 
 
Section 45 of the Insurance Contracts Act 1984
150 is drafted in the following terms:  
 
 (1) where a provision included in a contract of general insurance has the effect of limiting 
or excluding liability of the insurer under the contract by reason that the insured has 
entered into some other insurance, not being a contract required to be effec ted by or 
under a law, including a law of State of Territory, the provision is void. 
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply in relation to a contract that provides insurance cover in 
respect of some or all of so much of a loss as is not covered by a contract of  insurance 
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that is specified in the first-mentioned contract) deals with “Other insurance” provisions.  
 
The wording of Section 45 will only apply to contracts of general insurance. If the effect of that 
provision is to limit or exclude the insurer's liability on the ground that the insured has entered 
into some other contract of insurance, the provision will be void. If at the time an insurance 
contract  is  entered into, there is  other insurance in  existence, then when a claim arises,  the 
section will be triggered. It does not matter whether the other insurance contract was entered into 
before or after the contract of general insurance. The section does not apply to provisions which 
have  been  entered  into by  third  parties on behalf of the insurer or naming the insurer as a 
beneficiary. This would mean that it would be possible to sever the underlying insurance clause 
or it would not allow for the general application of the section. It should be noted that this will 
not  be the position for  all cases. This  was  held in  the decision of  Speno Rail  Maintenance 
Australia Pty Ltd v Metals & Minerals Insurance Pte Ltd
151.   
 
It would be fair for both parties, more so to the assured, if no distinction is made as to when the 
“other insurance” policy was entered into. This is more so where such policies are entered into 
without the assureds’ knowledge by a third party. The issue of severance should be decided on a 
case by case basis. The court should have regard to the intent of the legislation when deciding 
such cases.  Although fairness  should be a factor to  take into consideration, more protection 
should be given to the assured due to the vulnerable position the assured usually finds himself in. 
Although  the  wording  specifically  makes  reference  to  “at  the  time  an  insurance  contract  is 
entered into”, the timing should not matter as the insurer or the assured himself may not even 
know of the existence of other insurance contracts. This will not be a problem if the assured 
knew of the existence of other insurance which he or a third party took out on his behalf.  
 
Further, although one could argue that severance should be open to the courts when dealing with 
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such contracts, it may be difficult for the courts to identify in which type of cases severance 
should be permitted. This may be a difficult task for the courts. It could be said that to allow the 
courts the option of allowing for severance could lead to the law of double insurance becoming 
even more confusing. 
 
In Speno, there was a contract between Speno and Hamersley which provided that Speno would 
be  solely  liable  for  and  had  to  indemnify  Hamersley  against  any  common  law  liability  for 
personal  injury to  Speno’s  employees.  There was  also  a requirement under the contract  that 
Speno  would  arrange  liability  insurance  to  cover  Hamersley’s  interest  as  principal.  This 
insurance policy was taken out with  Zurich. Two employees were injured under the Speno-
Hamersley contract due to the negligence of Hamersley. In the District Court, Speno was held 
liable to indemnify Hamersley, which totalled some $1.26 million. Zurich however indemnified 
Hamersley this amount, and then sought contribution from Hamersley’s own insurers, Metals & 
Minerals  Insurance  Pte  (MMI)  on  the  basis  that  Hamersley  was  doubly  insured.  MMI  then 
commenced proceedings against Speno claiming that it was entitled to rights which were held by 
Hamersley  against  Speno  under  MMI’s  obligation  to  contribute.  Zurich  claimed  that  the 
underlying insurance clause in the Hamersley policy was void due to the operation of s45 (1) 
Insurance Contracts Act. This was defended by MMI on the basis that the underlying insurance 
clause in the Hamersley Policy meant that there was no insurance because it was Speno who 
entered into the policy with Zurich. There were also arguments by MMI that the relief sought 
was not available in equity
152.  
 
The trial judge concluded that because s45 (2) did not save the underlying insurance clause in the 
Hamersley Policy, MMI could not rely upon it because this section does not apply to  ‘other 
insurance’ clauses where such clause has not been effected by the person who has already been 
indemnified by the insurer claiming contribution. The court was of the view that the MMI policy 
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resulted in an excess layer policy where insurance was entered into on Hamersley’s behalf or 
when it entered into insurance on its own behalf. It therefore seems that the courts are not open 
to  attempts  by  an insurer to  seek contribution by subrogating his  rights  under  a contractual 
indemnity owed by a third party, because the third party may not have suffered had the third 
party complied with the requirement to indemnify the insured.  
 
Therefore if the assured is making a claim as beneficiary, s45 does not come into play. The issue 
would then be, if there was co-insurance present, and that policy was named or identified, would 
the  section  apply.  It  seems  that  courts  make  a  distinction  where  you  have  a  situation  of  a 
beneficiary and an assured. However, the legislation does not make such a distinction. To now 
provide such a distinction would lead to the assured, if he was a beneficiary, unable to rely on 
s45 to hold that such clauses were void.  
 
One of the other issues raised in Speno was whether severance was excluded under s45 (1) where 
a provision made the term ineffective by seeking to deny or limit liability where there is the 
existence of double insurance. The court held that severance was permitted as this was what the 
legislature  had  intended.  If  severance  is  permitted  it  would  give  the  courts  flexibility  when 
deciding cases and when balancing the rights and interests of the parties. It therefore could be 
argued that this is what the legislation permitted judges to do, although it could also be argued 
that the legislature had not expressly provided for severance in the legislation. It would be very 
easy for the court to conclude that the clause was void, even though no firm basis for doing so 
had been provided. 
 
3.3 Meaning of “the insured”– any difference from “any insured” or “an insured” 
 
In Transfield Pty Limited v National Vulcan Engineering Insurance Group Limited
153the court 
was dealing with a situation where the sub-contractors themselves were the insured, like the 
principal contractor making the claim for indemnity. The learned judge preferred the approach 
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where each party is to be considered as a separate entity in the same manner as if a separate 
policy had been issued to each of them, as stated in the cross-liability clause. He noted that the 
way the insurers had drafted the policy was to ensure that a claim could not be made under 
Section C where it could not be made under Section B, where the damage was sustained by the 
insured’s own property. He went on to state that if there was a doubt, that should be resolved in 
favour of the insured.
154For the exclusion clause to have the  effect as stated by the insurer, the 
words would have to read either  “any insured” or “an insured” rather than “the insured”. He 
looked at the purpose of the policy and noted the practical difficulties with issuing separate 
policies. It was sufficient to issue one policy which contained a cross-liability clause, and the 
relevant parties could each be insured by a policy which responded to any particular claim made 
by a party.  
 
A policy should be looked at on its own facts. Even if there are authorities which have similar 
wording the courts must look at a case on a case by case basis. The courts must look at the 
exclusion clause together with the indemnity clauses
155. This has been the approach in the case of 
Stolberg v Pearl Assurance Co Ltd
156of the Canadian Supreme Court. The words “the insured” or 
“insured party” used in the policies are immaterial and the correct approach would be that this 
refers to the insured entity who has incurred a liability and who is seeking indemnity under the 
policy.
157 
 
3.4 The meaning of “entered into”- include non-party insured? 
 
In Zurich Australian Insurance Ltd v Metals & Minerals Insurance Pte Ltd (“Zurich”) 
158, the 
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High Court discussed the background to the legislation and the meaning of the term “entered 
into”. The issue which the court focused on was whether the insured had “entered into” a contract 
within the meaning of s45. 
 
In Zurich, there was a contract entered into between Hamersley and Speno. Speno’s insurance 
policy required Speno to indemnify Hamersley and itself against claims made by employees 
involved in an accident, and to name Hamersley as an insured. This policy was taken out with 
Zurich. In addition to this policy, under Hamersley’s own contract with Metals & Minerals there 
was an “other insurance” clause. Under this policy, Speno was named as the beneficiary and not 
as the assured.   
 
In Zurich, there is an interesting discussion on the background of s45 and the intention of the 
legislature.  As  mentioned,  the  term  “entered  into”  was  not  defined  in  the  draft  Insurance 
Contracts Bill proposed by the ALRC. s48
159 which was also recommended by the ALRC to be 
included into the legislation, made it permissible for a non -party to a general contract who is 
specified or referred to in the contract to also be covered and able to recover from the insurer. As 
there was no distinction made in the Report or Explanatory Memorandum between double 
insurance including a non-party and where the insured is named and is relevant to the contract, 
the court was of the view that the word “entered into” did not include a non-party insured. Speno 
therefore had not come under the provision of s45 (1) as having “entered into” the contract. It is 
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interesting to note that although stating that there was no distinguishing, the court went on to rule 
that non-party would not coming within the definition of “entered into”. Further, would there be a 
difference if such a distinction were to be made. There should not be such a distinction. 
 
It is understandable why the definition of “entered into” was not provided for, as to do so would 
place an unnecessary restriction on the courts when deciding whether a case would fall within 
the definition of “entered into”. This is also due to the fact that each case should be dealt with on 
a case by case basis and allow for flexibility. Although the result should be a fair one, a more 
favourable result for the assured should be achieved. 
 
The difficulties faced when interpreting the construction of such clause can also be illustrated in 
the decision of Vero Insurance Limited v QBE Insurance (Australia) Limited 
160. In this case, 
there was the issue of whether a subcontractor who has a contract of insurance with a particular 
insurer meant that the subcontractor had entered into a contract with that insurer. In Vero, an 
employee was injured during work for a contractor, Priceright Construction Pty Ltd (Priceright) 
who worked for Barclay Mowlem Construction (BMC). Vero indemnified BMC and then sought 
contribution from QBE on the basis of double insurance as the same risk was insured. QBE 
claimed that it was not liable to contribute due to the exclusion clause, stating that it would not 
need to indemnify if there existed a more specific insurance cover. The Supreme Court agreed 
with  the  Referee’s  decision  and  concluded  that  BMC  had  not  “entered  into”  a  contract  of 
insurance with Vero. Here Vero’s policy was ‘effected by’ the contractor
161 and the contractor in 
this case was not a party to Vero’s policy. The contractor was treated a s ‘non-party insured’ and 
did not come within the parameters of the definition of ‘Named Insureds’ under Vero’s policy. 
Therefore s45 did not apply and contribution could not be sought. Einstein J pointed out that this 
should be the correct approach and refused to depart from the Referee’s decision, unless the 
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referee had come to his conclusion based on a wrong approach or the parties who appeared did 
not have sufficient opportunity to argue the points. As neither of these factors were present, the 
court concurred with the Referee’s decision. 
 
It  is  unclear  whether  such  principles  apply  only  to  a  subcontractor  situation,  construction 
insurance policies or whether it has a more general application
162. This cases suggests that if the 
insurer specifies wide categories of named assureds in such policies, this would limit their rights 
for contribution, as these insurers can now rely on  “other  insurance”
163  clauses  in  the  other 
policies to limit or exclude liability. It is likely that the insurer will now devise ways to draft the 
insurance policies in terms more favourable to themselves. However, this would now leave the 
assured, who were not parties to the original insurance contract, without protection if the insurer 
confines the category of persons who are treated as assureds in a more restrictive manner. This 
surely cannot have been what the legislature intended. Further the case does not provide any 
assistance as to whether a named insurer would fall within the category of a contracting party 
when you have a situation where there are ‘other insurance’ clauses. 
 
3.5 The term “Other insurance” 
 
The  decision  of  Zurich  Australia  Insurance  Limited  was  revisited  by  the  Supreme  Court  of 
Queensland, which has shed some light on s45 and the use of the words “Other insurance” in 
contracts and whether s45 renders such use void. In Nicholas v Wesfarmers Currangh Pty Ltd
164 
the  plaintiff,  an  employee,  brought  proceedings  against  Wesfarmers  Currangh  Pty  Ltd 
(“Currangh”), the operator of the mine he was working in, and G & S Engineering Services Pty 
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Ltd (“G & S Engineering”), his employer. A liability policy providing indemnity was insured 
with QBE by Currangh. G & S Engineering also had a policy with Brit. Currangh made a claim 
against Brit which was refused on the basis that the “Other Insurance” clause in its policy limited 
its liability, as the QBE policy was not a policy “entered into” by Currangh but by Currangh’s 
parent company whose benefit extended to Currangh. The QBE policy has a similar clause to 
Brit’s.  Brit  stated  that  the  QBE  386  policy  was  “valid  and  collectible  insurance”  and  that 
Condition 5
165 acted as an excess policy above the 386 policy. Further that the QBE 386 policy 
was not a policy “entered into” by Currangh within the definition of s45, but that it was in fact 
entered into by the parent company, Wesfarmers Limited (Wesfarmer), and the benefit of which 
extended to Currangh.
166 
 
Brit placed much emphasis on the  Zurich decision on the basis that Currangh was a non-party 
beneficiary and therefore s45 (1) does not apply. The court however, was of the view that the 
facts in Zurich were slightly different than those in the present case. The question, it was said, 
was of a broad application. McMeekin J said at para [27] as follows: “If a company enters into a 
contract of insurance on behalf of the group of companies, of which it is the parent company and 
the others its wholly owned subsidiaries, does it enter the contract of insurance, at least so far as 
s 45(1) is concerned, on behalf of each company independently, or does it act merely as the 
subsidiaries’ agent, or is it the only party “entering into” the contract? If the characterisation in 
either of the first two alternatives was accepted then the method of entering into the contract of 
insurance would satisfy the precondition triggering the application of s 45(1).” 
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The applicant’s position was preferred, which was the entering into the contract of insurance with 
QBE by Wesfarmers should be seen as an entry into that contract by Currangh within s45 (1)
167. 
It is interesting to note that McMeekinJ, said that his decision was straightforward and based his 
reasoning on two main reasons. The first, was tha t he looked at the characterization of the 
relationship between Wesfarmer and Currangh as being one of principal and agent due to the 
payment by Currangh to Wesfarmer of significant proportion of the premium paid to QBE. If this 
view was wrong, he went on  to state that it would be appropriate to extend, based on the facts 
before him,  the meaning of  “entered  into”  to  cover  Wesfarmers  actions  because  to  do  so 
otherwise, would encourage the mischief which the legislation wanted to prevent. Further, he 
was of the view that Currangh does not become an insured by some form of extended definition 
of insured person, as it is a named insured in the QBE policy. He stated that the legislation 
intended the “commercial convenience and practice” to be taken into account, through the use of 
agents, and that in the long title to the Act, a fair balance should be struck between the interest of 
insurers,  the  insured  and  other  members  of  the  public,  so  as  to  enable  terms  included  into 
contracts to operate fairly. He did not think that it was appropriate to make the working of the 
clause dependent on whether one chooses to act through an agent, or on one’s behalf, when 
effecting insurance.
168 
 
However if the courts were just to look at the characterization of the relationship betw een the 
parties, this may not be sufficient, as this could lead to unjust results. The court was correct to go 
a step further and ensure that the ultimate result should be prevent the parties from trying to 
avoid falling within the confines of s45 (1). 
 
McMeekin J tried to distinguish  Zurich’s  decision
169  on the basis that it was not an agency 
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situation, and that the decision should only be confined to its own facts. 
170 The Supreme Court 
was of the view that a more extended meaning should be given to the words  “enter into” taking 
into consideration the mischief that the legislation was trying to prevent. This was due to the 
relationship between Wesfarmer and Currangh was one of principal and agent. Even if this was 
not  the  case,  the  Court  was  still  willing  to  conclude  that  due  to  the  relationship  between 
Currangh and Wesfarmer, the entering into the policy by the head company on behalf of itself 
and one of its subsidiaries, is an entering into the contract of insurance by the subsidiary.  
 
It may look as if there is a departure from the decision in Zurich, to now cover beneficial third 
parties,  but  it  seems  that  the  court  in  Zurich,  Currangh  and  Wesfarmer,  had  left  open  the 
possibility of extending the meaning “enter into” to include cases where there exists at the time 
some  sort  of  close  relationship,  such  as  a  parent  and  subsidiary,  or  one  where  there  is  a 
relationship of agent and principal, between the beneficiary and the party effecting the contract, 
which would treat the beneficiary as having “entered into” the contract itself. The Court rejected 
the argument put forward by Brit that two-preconditions would have to be satisfied for s45 to 
operate:  (1)  that  Currangh  had  entered  into  the  QBE  386  policy  and  (2)  Currangh  was  a 
contracting party to the Brit policy.  
 
As Currangh was an existing subsidiary and ascertainable, the existing relationship would not be 
altered by the situation where Wesfarmers purported to act for others who were not ascertainable 
and could not at the time have given authority.
171 He went on to say that Wesfarmers’ actions in 
entering into the QBE 386 policy was undertaken as agent for Currangh, so far as the policy put 
QBE on risk for Currangh’s potential claims, and therefore Currangh has, for the present case, 
“entered into” the QBE 386 policy.
172 
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The approach adopted by McMeerkin J is to try and avoid a situation where the insurer could try 
and get around the situation that s45 was trying to prevent. He therefore adopted a very wide 
analysis to come to the chosen conclusion as to what would fall under “entered into”. However, 
Meerkin  J’s  analysis  is  based  more  on  the  principles  of  whether  there  is  the  existence  of 
agency
173 and whether there is consent or not, despite the lack of direct evidence, such as an 
agency agreement.
174He considered that it was sufficient, and it was a fundamental point, that 
Currangh  paid  for  the  insurance  and  payment  to  Wesfarmers  indicated  strongly  towards 
Wesfarmers not acting on its own behalf in obtaining the insurance but, acting on behalf of 
Currangh
175. Further, there was an arrangement of mutual consent in effecting the QBE policy
176. 
There would be no need for the court to decide the point of double insurance where there is no 
agency, and where no consent is given.
177The wide approach adopted is more in keeping with the 
intention of s45. Although he was of the view that all parties interest should be balanced. It is 
submitted that the insured’s rights should be given more protection.   
 
Again, it can be seen that the cases in this area are inconsistent as fine distinctions are being 
drawn by the courts, and therefore no firm guidance can be obtained from the cases. Here the 
court was dealing with a parent company situation, and in the other cases that were looked at, the 
court was dealing with an employer and employee situation. However, it could be argued that the 
position  of  an  employee  and  employer  situation  should  be  the  same  as  a  contractor,  parent 
company,  subsidiary  and  agency  situation.  This  approach  on  its  surface  would  provide 
consistency  and  be  of  commercial  convenience  and  practice.  However,  for  a  parent  and 
subsidiary situation it will be, in some cases, if not most cases, very difficult to ascertain the 
exact relationship, due to the way the companies are structured. Such uncertainty will lead to 
parties trying to avoid the application and effects of s45. 
 
The courts  role when deciding such  cases should be to  ensure that  a  balanced approach be 
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adopted but that ultimately the assured protection should take precedence over the insurers’. 
Further, the courts should come to a conclusion, based on the facts of each case, which would 
result in the prevention of the mischief of the legislation.  
 
Another  decision  which  touched  upon  s45(1),  was  the  decision  of  Australasian  Medical 
Insurance Ltd &Anor v CGU Insurance Ltd
178, where the insurers issued a policy which covered 
risks of QML, a partnership of pathologists, who were insured under a professional indemnity 
with AMIL. CGU were insurers who had at the time issued a policy risk which covered certain 
risks associated with the conduct of QML’s pathology practice. AMIL indemnified QML when a 
claim was made against the partners and stated that CGU’s policy covered the same risk. AMIL 
claimed contribution as between co-insurers. AMIL claimed that the special condition excluding 
liability was void due to the effects of s45. The court considered that as QML suffered no loss 
due to indemnification by AMIL who did not seek to structure the claim as one of subrogation 
but instead in its own right as co-insurer, it was therefore an unnecessary party to the action. The 
court held that s45 did not apply as the policies covered different risks. The parties had no 
intention the court found, for CGU’s policy to cover the practitioners at QML because they had 
their own policies which covered them. There was therefore no double insurance.  
 
It  is  therefore  easy  for  the  court  to  conclude  that  the  case  is  not  one  of  double  insurance. 
However, although it can be said that the courts are again trying to differentiate the cases using 
the “different risk” criteria, this is in fact one of the basic criteria for establish whether there is 
double insurance or not.  Therefore this case does not add much to the discussion of s45 as such.  
 
It can be seen from the courts’ approach in the above cases, that the courts will apply a more 
expansive  interpretation  when  it  comes  to  the  meaning  of  “enter  into”  under  s45.  This  is 
consistent with the intention of the ALRC and when s45 came into effect, which is to ensure that 
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the assured is provided with some sort of protection when making a claim. If parties do not want 
s45 to apply, such exclusion clauses would have to be drafted carefully. Parties must make sure 
that the contract has to be clearly drafted if the contracting party is effecting the contracts for the 
benefit of other parties. In the ALRC it did however provide two exceptions where the protection 
does not apply. The first is where the other insurance is compulsory, either by or under law, 
including the law of the State or Territory.
179 The second situation is where primary and excess 
layers are involved.  
 
3.6 s45: The Exceptions 
 
3.6.1 Exception 1: Not being a contract of insurance required to be effected by or under a 
law, including the law of a State or Territory 
 
The wording of s45(1) clearly states that an insurer is allowed to exclude or limit its liability, 
where the contract is a contract of general insurance, if the contract is required to be effected by 
or under a law, such as the law of a State or Territory. If this is the case, the contract will not be 
void.  
 
The  issue  in  WorkCover  Queensland
180  was  whether  the  insurers,  Royal  &  Sun  Alliance 
Insurance Australia Limited, under a public liability insurance policy were liable to indemnify 
the  head  contractor,  Barclays  Mowlem  Construction  Pty  Ltd  (Barclay  Mowlem)  against  its 
liability where an employee of a sub-contractor was injured. The employee claimed against the 
subcontractor  and  the  construction  company.  WorkCover  contended  that  there  was  double 
insurance and that both it and the lead insurer should be liable to indemnify Barclay Mowlem, 
admitting that it was liable to pay Barclay Mowlem under the policy issued under s46(1) of the 
Workers’  Compensation  Act  1990  (Qld).
181  At the time there were three policies that were 
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issued. The argument put forward by the lead insurer was that its policy, under clause 8 (Other 
Insurance), only provides excess over and above that which is recoverable under the other valid 
and collectible insurance. Wilson J was of the view that Barclay Mowlem, as an employer was 
required to effect the policy, to which WorkCover had agreed to provide indemnity under that 
policy. It was a policy that Barclay Mowlem was “required to be effected by or under a law”. The 
intention of the ALRC was that an insurer would be allowed to exclude liability where there was 
in existence workers’ compensation insurance or compensation for death or injury arising out of 
the use of a motor vehicle.  This was consistent with s9 of the Insurance Contracts Act 1984.
182 
Therefore the court concluded that the Royal policy, due to its exclusion clause
183, did not need 
to indemnify Barclay Mowlem and if this was not correct, liability would only be excess cover 
only
184 by not being found void by s45(1). 
 
3.6.2 Exception 2: s45 (2)  Subsection (1) does not apply where some or all of the loss is not 
covered by a contract of insurance that is specified in the first-mentioned contract. 
 
This subsection raises interesting issues about situations where there is excess layers of cover 
and the court’s approach when deciding the approach, application and construction of s45 (2). 
This can commonly be found where there are principal controlled policies and where there are 
contractors’ covers, such as in the construction industry.  
 
It would be beneficial to look at the background and the intention of the ALRC, as a starting 
point.  The ALRC discussed the effects of “Other Insurance” Clauses which predominantly fall 
into three categories. These were excess, exclusion and rateable proportion clauses. It was of the 
view that all three such clauses should be held to be ineffective as they had no purpose to serve. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
work for which the worker’s labour is being so used.” 
182that it did not apply to a contract entered into for the purpose of a State  law relating to workers’ compensation or 
compensation for death or injury arising out of the use of a motor vehicle. See para [14] and [15] of Judgment. Also 
see para 54 the ALRC Summary of Recommendation. 
183clause 3(a) 
184in accordance with clause 7, clause 8 and endorsement 3 of the policy 67 
 
Instead, where the assured has insured his risk with numerous insurers he should be able to 
recover the whole loss from whichever insurer he wants to. It is then for that insurer to seek 
contribution from the other insurers. In this way, the assured has more protection, which is what 
was intended by the ALRC.
185 
 
When discussing the exceptions to the legislation, the Summary of Recommendations
186 clearly 
emphasized that a true excess liability policy to cover an insured ’s liability which is over and 
above  that  covered  by  another  insurer,  which  has  been  specifically  identified  in  the  excess 
policy, will not be void under the section.
187 The section therefore does not apply to a  layered 
policy covering certain, more specific types of total risk and where there is no overlapping of 
such risks. 
 
3.7 The meaning of “Specifically” under s45 (2)  
 
Therefore what does the word “specifically” in s45 (2) mean? The Recommendation itself does 
not provide any definition.
188 Some guidance can however be found in the decision of  HIH 
Casualty and General Insurance Co v Pluim Construction Pty Ltd
189where reliance was placed 
on the decision of Austress- PSC Pty Ltd and Carlingford Australia General Insurance Ltd v 
Zurich Australian Insurance Ltd
190.  
 
In  HIH  Casualty  &  General  Insurance  Ltd,  HIH’s  argued  that  the  CU  Construction  Policy 
responded to Constructions ' claim for indemnity on the basis that the HIH policy was dealing 
with principal-arranged insurance
191 which permitted HIH to escape its liability under its own 
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policy provided that CU was impaled under the CU policy; and further, HIH argued that there 
was double insurance which gave rise to contribution between the insurers.
192HIH’s argument 
was rejected. CU and Construction accepted the claim for indemnity,
193and argued that they were 
not liable by referring to the exclusion clause provided for under Clause 6(b). The trial judge 
agreed that  CU’s  Construction Policy did  not  respond  because Construction’s claim  did  fall 
within exclusion clause 6(b), and also held that HIH could not place reliance upon Condition 7 of 
its own policy due to it being rendered void under s45(2). This was because the CU Construction 
Policy was not specified in the HIH Policy. Mason P was of the view that there was no basis for 
reading unexpressed words to expand the exclusion. He read the words "in respect of which 
insurance is required by virtue of any legislation relating to motor vehicles" as qualifying the 
words "any Vehicle or any attachment to any Vehicle" at the opening of sub-clause (b). It was 
"perfectly understandable" why the drafter of the clause did not pay attention in identification of 
the  persons  upon  whom  such  requirement  lay.
194  Although agreeing  with the trial j udge's 
conclusion  which  led  to  the  result  that  the  CU  Construction  Policy  did  not  respond  to 
Construction’s claim, the Judge still went on to deal with the significance of Condition 7. The 
issue  which  would  have  to  be  determined  was  whether  the  words  "the  policy  of  insurance 
provided by the Principal" in Condition 7 was sufficient to "specify" the CU policies within s45 
(2). Manson P agreed with the trial judge having held that it was too general and not of sufficient 
specificity to satisfy s45 (2).  
 
Mason P also dealt with the decision of Austress-PSC Pty Ltd and Carlingford Australia General 
Insurance Ltd v Zurich Australian Insurance Ltd
195 where he looked at the decision of Robyn 
QC DCJ where the relevant provision was stated as " any other Policy of Indemnity or Insurance 
in favour of or effected by or on behalf of the Insured applicable to such Occurrence". He went 
on to state:  
 
".....to be construed as requiring reference to `other insurance' to be specific, as opposed to a 
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description in general words capable of extending to the other insurance, if the provision under 
examination is to survive being struck down by sub-s.(1). It seems to me the underlying notion is 
that the insured and the insurer have tailored their own bargain to take account of the impact of 
other contracts"  
 
Although Mason P went on to state that he thought that it was unnecessary to seek a definitive 
meaning of the sub-section, he was of the view that the exception in sub (2) should be construed 
narrowly.  
 
On the facts
196 of the case before him, Mason P went on to say that the wording did not identify 
any particular policy with any particular insurer. Further that the type of insurance that the 
proprietor had to take out was described in the building contract in the broadest generali ty with 
no reference being made to conditions or exclusions. It is interesting to note that he concluded 
that the HIH policy was not in form or in substance a type of layered policy or excess insurance. 
The use of the words "a policy of insurance" that was stated to be "principal-arranged" only went 
further to emphasise the "futurity, contingency and lack of relevant specificity". The use of the 
words "a policy of insurance" it was held, lacked the requirements for it to fall within the 
exceptions of s45 (2), as " specified
197". Reliance was placed on Professor Sutton's interpretation 
of what would be sufficient for there to be compliance with s45 (2)
198, who suggested as follows:  
 
"...refers to the situation where contract A provides cover in relation to a loss that is not covered 
by contract B and contract B is specified in contract A. In that case, the section has no 
application to contract A. What constitutes specification is not defined but it must mean that 
contract B need not be precisely named but must be sufficiently described so as to be capable of 
identification, and the requirement of specification makes it clear that only true excess liability 
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PRINCIPAL-ARRANGED INSURANCE 
In the event of the named Insured entering into an agreement with any other party (who for the pu rpose of this 
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policies are intended to be exempted from the operation of s45(1)." 
 
 
He then went on to refer to further academic text which is worth repeating here, which was at 
paragraphs 40 and 41 of his judgment: 
 
“ 40 Derrington and Ashton, The Law of Liability Insurance, (1990) take a slightly narrower 
view of s45(2), stating (at p378) that: 
 
"The position under the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 is that a provision of this type which 
has the effect of limiting or excluding the liability of the insurer is void, except for an 
"excess" policy in respect of another policy which is specified in the policy containing the 
condition. Accordingly, even that form of condition which made the policy containing it an 
excess policy in the event of other insurance, and which was so effective in the past, is 
ineffective unless it specified the other insurance. 
 
Because of the purpose of s45, it is most probable that the specification of the policy to 
which it is to be an excess is so general that it would not meet the requirement of sub-s(2) 
which would except it from the general avoidance which sub-s(1) visits upon conditions 
relating to other insurance. (sic) Otherwise, the scope of the section is obviously intended to 
be far-reaching by its reference to the result, so that it may well be found to apply to all such 
conditions and provisos except those in an excess policy that is related to a specific and 
named policy. 
 
41  Kelly  and  Ball,  Insurance  Legislation  Manual  3rd  ed  (1995)  suggest  at  p132  that 
"specified" means that the actual contract must be identified in the excess policy - otherwise 
the excess policy would not be a "true excess policy"." 
 
After applying this to the wording of the CU Construction Policy, he considered that it would not 
satisfy the requirement of being "specified". He did go on to say, "that it could be possible that a 
clearly defined class of insurance such as "X's standard Construction Policy with an excess of Y" 71 
 
would suffice, although he reserved his position on the likely possibilities.  
 
Although he does not go further to discuss this, it would seem that for the policy not to fall foul 
of s45 (1), it has to be “specified” in the other insurance for it to be a true excess clause.  A 
narrow approach would afford more protection to the assured and it is such an approach which 
should be considered. A similar approach was followed in Zurich Australian Insurance Ltd v 
Metals & Minerals Insurance Pty Ltd
199 where the court found that the clause in the Hamersley 
policy was not saved by s45(2) due to the Zurich policy not being specified as required by 
s45(2). 
200 
 
The comment made by Mason P that wording used in the policy l acked specificity. However 
what wording should be used when dealing with a “principal- arrangement” was not specified. It 
would  be  difficult  to  do  so,  as  issue  that  arises  in  future  is  case  specific.  There  must  be 
flexibility. It has been suggested that these cases and the courts restrictive approach should not 
be taken too far and that the contractual intention of the parties is a factor that should also be 
taken into account
201. This approach is correct. Further, due to the way companies are structured, 
it may be a requirement that the subsidiary obtains local cover while the parent company takes 
out a “top and drop” policy.
202 A Head contractor may also adopt a similar approach. As of now, 
the courts still have not been able to provide clear guidance as to wh at would be  “specific” 
enough  to  fall  within  the  exception  of  s45  (2).  It  seems  that  the  underlying  objective  of 
protecting an assured seems to be achieved as a more strict approach is taken by the courts. 
However, this may have the opposite effect as the insurer may use other methods to try and get 
around  this  problem.
203Although,  some  may  argue  that  some  protection  is  better  than  no 
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200Also see Speno Rail Maintenance Australia Pty Ltd v Metals & Minerals Insurance Pte Ltd where the court came 
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protection at all.  
 
There are two main types of policy which deal with other insurance. The first one is where the 
insured  places  an  obligation  on  the  assured  to  notify  the  insurer  of  existing  or  subsequent 
insurances covering the same risk. The second is where there is no such obligation on the assured 
but where it will exclude or qualify liability of the insurer in the event of other insurance.
204 
 
3.8 The Requirement for an assured to Notify the Assured: Validity of s45 (1) 
 
Therefore, one issue that has to be resolved is does inclusion of a notification clause in the policy 
have the effect of making the clause void under s45 (1)?  Further, whether the saving provision 
under s45 (2) will be triggered? In Nisner Holdings Pty Ltd v Mercantile Mutual Insurance Co. 
Ltd 
205 the courts held that where there is a failure to notify, the most that the assured can recover 
in terms of losses is only the amount that is insured under the second policy. The second policy 
was additional cover which would only, if effected, cover an insured up to the increased value of 
the premises over and above the first policy. Both policies required that notifi cation be made 
where there was other insurance in effect. The assured however failed to notify the first insurer 
of the second policy, the court held that the second policy was not an excess policy and as a 
result, the first policy could be avoided. The Su preme Court concluded that there was double 
insurance in this case. Therefore the assured was only able to recover the amount provided for in 
the second policy.  
 
Apart from this, an insurer may adopt other ways of trying to limit an assureds ’  chance of 
successfully claiming under the policy. This is usually done by utilizing three main types of 
clauses. The first is by way of an escape clause, excess clause and rateable proportion clause. 
This  is  the  mechanism  that  is  still  used  in  English  law  as  well  as  in  other  common  law 
jurisdictions. Questions that have to be considered include: How are these clauses affected by the 
provision of s45? Will the application of s45 (1) result in the clauses being held void by the 
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court? What is the position if there is a combination of the different type of clauses? 
 
Where there are two policies in place and there is a notification requirement one has to see how 
such provisions are drafted. Although the court in general will apply a much more stringent 
approach and will in most cases find against the insurer.
206 The cases are consistent with the 
intention of the ALRC that the assured should be protected.  In  Steadfast Insurance Co Ltd v F 
&B Trading Co Pty
207 the High Court of Australia was dealing with a forfeiture provision in a 
policy where there was a condition that notice had to be given of other insurance, which was a 
requirement in both policies. The Court was of the view that the mere fact that a policy providing 
for conditions upon breach which results in the company escaping liability does not mean that no 
insurance has been effected. In Steadfast, a policy which covered loss for damage to property 
was renewed by Steadfast. The policy contained a clause which required that notice be given if 
any Insurance or Insurances had been effected, if not, all benefit under the policy would be 
forfeited. A cover note was obtained before loss had occurred with Queensland. No notice of this 
cover  note  was  given  to  Steadfast.  The  court  reaffirmed  the  Supreme  Court’s  view  that  no 
forfeiture was permitted due to the failure to notify as the cover not did not fall within the 
meaning of Steadfast’s policy that the insurance with Queensland had been “effected”. What had 
to be taken into account was the nature and operation of the condition which was not fulfilled. 
Therefore the second policy did not attach, which meant that there was no breach of the first 
policy requiring notice. It could be argued that this is the correct approach where there is clear 
evidence that the policy has not been effected.  
 
The  wording  of  s45
208  would  cover  cases  where  there  is  “other  insurance”  present  and 
notification of such policies should be made by the assured. In Steadfast Insurance Co Ltd v F & 
B Trading Co Pty, Menzies J correctly pointed out the well established principle that where there 
is  a  term  of  an  insurance  policy  which  has  provisions  for  forfeiture  of  benefits,  it  shall  be 
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construed strictly against the insurer.
209 Also, that insurance will only be effected when what has 
been done attaches risk of loss   to another insurer.
210Menzie J referred to the Privy Council 
decision Equitable Fire and Accident Office Ltd and The Ching Wo Hong
211where the appellant 
denied liability on the basis that the policies that were entered into had become null and void due 
to the failure on the part of the respondents to give the company notice of an additional insurance 
which was taken out by the respondents with Western Assurance Company, without the consent 
required under the wording of the policy. This was one of the conditions indorsed on the policies. 
However, prior to the fire a policy has been executed by the director of Western Company in 
favour of the respondents. The premium was never paid under this policy. The court stated that 
the issue that had to be decided was whether the premium having not been paid either wholly or 
partially, the policy executed by the Western Assurance Company ever became effective
212. Lord 
Davey looked at the plain language of the condition and decided that it would apply as well to 
the first premium as to any renewal premium, or in fact it applied primarily to the first premium. 
The instrument it was said must be looked at as a whole for the purpose of ascertaining the 
intention of the parties and the effect of the document, so far as possible, must be given to every 
part of it.
213 Therefore the condition qualifies and restricted the engagement of the company and 
as a result converted what would have otherwise have been an absolute engagement into a 
conditional one. The words “having paid” which was used in the policy is usually expressed as 
the consideration for the company’s engagement which would have become accurate when the 
engagement became effective. The court was of the view that consideration must be actually be 
paid and not just expressed to be paid. The clause was clearly expressed in the instrument that 
notice was required, and it was made clear that no liability would attach until the premium had 
been paid. The court was of the view that it was not conditional execution, but of what was 
executed which was important. 
 
It could be said that the requirement for notice would give protection to the insurer. However, the 
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assured may still face the problem of not being aware of other insurance in place. This again 
does not give protection to the assured. The court must therefore give more protection to the 
assured, especially where the assured is facing the likelihood of not having any protection. 
 
Another case which was referred to in Steadfast Insurance Co Ltd v F & B Trading Co Pty was 
Home  Insurance  Co  of  New  York  v  Gavel
214  a  Canadian  decision  which  also  deals  with  a 
statutory condition in the policy, which was the 9
th statutory condition in the first schedule to The 
Fire Insurance Policies’ Act R.S.N.S, 1923 c.211. Although the wording differs from s45
215, and 
specifically deals with fire insurance, the underlying intention of the legislation is similar. The 
statutory condition states as follows: 
 
“The insurer is not liable for loss if any prior insurance with any other insurer, unless the 
insurer’s assent to such prior insurance appears in the policy or is endorsed thereon, nor if 
any subsequent insurance is effected with any other insurer, unless and until the insurer 
assents thereto, or unless the insurer does not dissent in writing two weeks after receiving 
written notice of the intention or desire to effect the subsequent insurance, or does not 
dissent in writing after that time before the subsequent or further insurance is effected.” 
 
The issue on the appeal was whether any such subsequent insurance had been effected within the 
meaning of the condition. It had been argued by the respondents that the policy never attached 
and as a result there was no insurance which was effected. To support this argument the decision 
in Equitable Fire and Accident Office Limited v The Ching Wo Hong. The appellant on the other 
hand relied on the Canadian case of  Manitoba Assurance Co v  Whitla
216  where Mr. Justice 
Sedgwick was of the view that where there was effecting of new insurance without the assent 
required,  would  permit  the  insurance  company  to  exercise  its  right  to  void  the  policy.  He 
reaffirmed the previous cases as to whether the new insurance was in the first event valid or 
                                                            
 
214 [1927] S.C.R. 481 
215 Insurance Contracts Act 1984 
216(1903) 34 Can S.C.R. 191 at p.206. 76 
 
invalid, if there was a new contract of insurance in fact, the de facto second insurance made void 
the first. The Supreme Court of Canada on reviewing and considering the cases concluded that 
Mr. Justice Sedgwick’s conclusion and the Canadian cases were no longer binding and chose to 
follow the English decision of Equitable Fire and Accident Office Limited v The Ching Wo 
Hong. The issue was whether, within the meaning of the statutory condition, “any subsequent 
insurance was effected with any other insurer”.
217 Here the policy with North Company, who was 
the appellant never attached. He went on to say that due to the express wording in the statutory 
condition, i.e  “the insurer is not liable for loss if there is any prior insurance with any other 
insurer”, meant that if there was such prior insurance, the condition applied, and no insurance 
under the policy was effected.
218 The condition of the policy did not contemplate a subsequent 
contract of insurance in fact, but a subsequent insurance which was effective. 
219 He stated that 
the attempt now to vivify the contract so as to relieve the appellant from liability must fail.
220 
 
As s45
221 also deals with situation where “other insurance” has been effected and notification is 
required, it may be helpful to see how the above principles could be applied in English law. Both 
s45 and the statutory provision under the 9
th statutory condition in the first schedule to the First 
Insurance Policies’ Act, R.S.N.S, 1923, c 211 both have provisions where there will be a voiding 
of the policy. The Canadian provision expressly states that the insurer is not liable if there is 
prior insurance with another insurer, unless certain requirements are present, in general, consent 
has to be obtained. The Canadian courts were of the view that where the was another policy 
which was taken out but it was not considered by the courts to be effective, and where there was 
a requirement in the policy to notify of subsequent insurance, as the risk never attached, the 
subsequent insurance without consent had not been breached.  
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According to Home Insurance Co of New York v Gavel the second policy would be “abortive”. If 
this was the case, then there would not be the need to consider the issue of whether there was 
double insurance. The position would have been different had there been a situation where there 
were two policies and the latter policy gave notice and the other did not.
222 
 
Therefore the subsequent insurance policy must be effective. It would seem correct to say that it 
would not be sufficient to void the first insurance policy on the basis that the previous insurer 
had not been notified.  
 
The wording in s45 Insurance Contracts Act 1984 would, it seems, cover situations where 
notification is required, as the phrase  “by reason that the insured has entered into some other 
insurance” was used. It has been suggested that a notification clause would not “survive” due to 
s45 (1) and would not be assisted by s45(2) unless specific reference to them are made in the 
first-mentioned contract.
223 However the wording in the legislation indicates that such clauses 
would make the clause in the contract completely void. Some may argue that it would be a very 
drastic approach for the courts to hold that the clause would be considered void. Instead, a less 
drastic approach should be adopted. The position would be better if English law were to 
implement similar but a more practical approach to the issue and the legislation were to be read 
and worded as follows: 
   
(1) Where a provision included in a contract of general insurance has the effect of limiting 
or excluding the liability of the insurer under the contract by reason that the insured has 
entered into some other contract of insurance, not being a contract required to be 
effected by or under a law, including a law of a State or Territory, all benefit under the 
policy shall be forfeited, unless the insurer assent is provided for in the policy for any 
previous insurance or is endorsed thereon by the insurer; and  
(2) where the subsequent policy is an effective policy at the time the previous policy is 
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entered into. 
 
This would lead to a more balanced approach when balancing out the interests of the assured 
against the insurer. In any event the court should look at the contractual intention between the 
parties. How much regulation should be in place? Why is it that the insurer has to bear the brunt 
of the burden? However, the alternate proposed legislation could see a wider interpretation of the 
use of the words “all benefit under this policy shall be forfeited” being applied as was indicated 
by the court in Steadfast Insurance Co Ltd v F & B Trading Co Pty. Menzie’s J was of the view 
that although literally speaking, they related to forfeiture of exiting benefits, to prevent any risk 
from attaching, the company could be held not liable for the loss upon the happening of the risk. 
Therefore the courts could, on the facts before it, conclude that such forfeiture would apply to 
any loss whether present or future.  
 
Gibbs J in Deaves v CML Fire & General Insurance Co
224 moved away from the decision in 
Steadfast and concluded that failure to give notice under the second policy, by either stating or 
indorsing the particulars in or on the C.M.L policy, subject to the question waiver, resulted in the 
second insurer not being liable to pay out under the policy, due to the condition on which its 
liability attached had not been fulfilled. Therefore here the second insurer could rely on the 
forfeiture provision. In Deaves v CML Fire  & General Insurance Co the insured had a fire 
insurance policy with the Queensland State Government Insurance Office. They then tried to 
cancel the policy.  Later they arranged for further insurance with the respondents, CML did not 
notify them when asked by the respondent’s representatives, of the other insurance which was 
still in place. Further there was no endorsement made on any policy of other insurance in place. 
The majority
225 decision of the High Court agreed that there was a breach of the requirement 
under the policy that notification be given in writing. He went on to accept the argument put 
forward by the appellants that the fact that a c over note only was issued raised an additional 
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question of whether the cover note itself was to be covered under the requirement of Condition 3, 
or at least to that part of the condition which required written notice to be given. Further that 
once the question was answered in the affirmative the fact that the second contract was in the 
form of a cover note was immaterial
226. He went on to say that Steadfast’s decision was authority 
for the proposition that unless Queensland State Government Insurance Office insurance had 
been cancelled, the failure to give notice in writing of that insurance to the respondents, and to 
state or endorse the particulars in or on the CML policy, entitled the consequence, subject to any 
question of waiver, that CML did not become liable under its policy.
227 Further that this would 
mean that no insurance had been subsequently effected. This was the distinguishing feature from 
Steadfast’s case.
228 
 
If the insurer knows that the assured has not disclosed certain information which is within  his 
knowledge, the insurer cannot take advantage of it.
229 The usual problem that occurs frequently 
in double insurance cases is that the assured may not himself be aware that other insurance is in 
existence. For example, an insured may take out travel insurance himself for a trip he is about to 
go on. Without his knowledge, his employer may then take out insurance for him. The assured 
when he opens a bank account may have the benefit of an insurance policy being taken out on his 
behalf under some promotion  the bank provides. Here you have a situation where the assured 
would not be in a position to notify of the other policies. The cases
230 have clearly established an 
assured is only required to notify of the existence of other insurance only if he is aware of  it. If 
the policy has been renewed without him knowing or if it was not reasonable for him to be aware 
that it has been renewed, then there is no breach for the failure of the notification condition. 
Therefore s45 (1) will apply to  “other insurance ”clauses which has the effect of making such 
clauses void. However, if the insurer is to seek to exclude such provision from applying, he must 
make sure that there it has been “specifically” referred to in the policy. This will be narrowly 
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applied which again, gives protection to the assured, by requiring the insurer to pay up where 
there is double insurance and allows the assured to choose who to seek recovery from and in 
which order. If legislation such as s45 were to be passed in English law, the original purpose to 
which “Other insurance” clauses was first adopted for, which was to detect fraud and allow for 
contribution amongst insurers
231 can still be achieved.   
 
Further, another provision which goes hand in hand with s45 of the Act is s76
232 which was also 
recommended by the Australian Law Reform Commission. The provision does not permit an 
assured receiving an indemnity above that which he is entitled to under the policy
233. The insurer 
will have to indemnify the assured fully but only up to the extent of the los s he has suffered. 
234This has also been the position at Common Law.
235 Further, if it is later realized that the 
assured received an amount which is over that to which he is in fact actually entitled to under the 
policy, he shall be treated as holding the sum  that he has received in excess on trust for the 
insurers.
236 Section 76(1) will only apply where there is a case of double insurance, where the 
loss arises out of the same risk covering the same interest on the same subject matter.
237 The 
liability has to be actual and not potential.
238 
 
As the ALRC suggested, with the implementation of s45, the assured will be protected as he will 
be paid immediately
239. The section specifically provides that the assured is entitled to immediate 
recovery from any one or more of those insurers. Therefore this will mean that once a claim has 
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been made against one insurer, the insurer will then have to go on to seek contribution from the 
other insurers.  
 
3.9  s45  and  its  impact  on  Excess  Clauses,  Exclusion  Clauses  and  Rateable  Proportion 
Clauses and when the clauses work in combination 
 
From the above discussion on the clauses, it can be seen how an insurer limits his liability by 
utilizing such clauses. These clauses are commonly found as standard wordings in insurance 
contracts. It is usually the case that an assured is oblivious to such wording until a claim arises 
and the assured is then informed that the insurer will not be liable to indemnify or if he is, then 
the amount would be of a limited sum, due to one of these clauses being present in the insurance 
policy.  
 
It  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  Australian  Law  Reform  Commission,  Report  on  Insurance 
Contracts, Report No.20 (1982) under its heading, “Conclusion”, in paragraph 289 put forward its 
recommendations.  It  is  stated  that  the  Commission  was  concerned  with  the  effect  of  ‘other 
insurance’ clauses on the ‘interests of the insured’. The Commission was focused on the insured’s 
perspective and how the clause working individually and/or in combination affected the assured. 
The law as it stood at the time the Australian Law Reform Commission, Report on Insurance 
Contracts,  Report  No.20  (1982)  came  out,  was  considered  as  lacking  in  protection  for  the 
assured. England has not carried out a similar review of the law but it can be said that if they 
were to do a similar exercise, the same considerations would be looked at. Protection of the 
assured should be what is considered paramount.  
 
The Commission was of the view that the methods used by the insurers to try and limit their 
liability through by using the clauses either standing alone or in combination to do so. The 
original use of such clauses was to prevent fraud by the assured by taking out numerous policies. 
The use of such clauses to prevent such fraud has not been successful.
240 If fraud is detected, 
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then this will not bar the insurer from refusing to pay out under the policy. The Commission 
went on to say that at most, the effect of all the clauses were to act as a disincentive. The 
suggested solutions which the Commission thought would achieve the same result was to ask 
appropriate questions in the proposal form or claim forms. It was considered that a request in the 
proposal form for details of other insurance would allow the insurer to see if there was any over-
insurance. This would then give the insurer a chance to decide whether they wanted to accept the 
policy  or  not.
241However, the insurer is likely to have a better bargaining position than the 
assured. 
 
It is interesting to note that the suggested Draft legislation proposed  by the Commission was 
adopted whole without changes or discussion, although the original section was under s46.  
Although the Commission made the following recommendation, none of these suggestions 
appear in the Draft legislation. There is no provision in  the legislation which states what the 
wording in the proposal or form should be. This may not be necessary, as s45 is drafted to void 
such clauses, although certain exceptions are provided for.  
 
However, would adding such wordings in the proposal and clai ms form actually solve the 
problem that arises with double insurance? The problem still remains, for the assured himself 
may not have been aware of the presence of such  ‘other insurance’. Further the failure to notify 
under policy could lead to different results depending on the type policy which has been taken 
out and the wording used in the policy, for example, whether it is a bare condition or a condition 
precedent.  The insurer will still then be able to look at the policy and point to the wording to say 
that  according  to  the  clause  or  clauses  in  the  policy  that  their  liability  will  be  completely 
excluded or it will be limited.  
 
The Commission stated in the report that there was no substantial justification for the inclusion 
in the policy of such ‘other insurance’ clauses. Although the wording in the report states that 
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there  is  no  ‘substantial’  justification
242,  one  has  to  consider  whether it  would  have  to  be 
substantial or if, as long as there was some justification, it would be sufficient for such clauses to 
be  included  in  the  insurance  policy.  The  Commission  further  stated  that  the  “reasonable 
expectation”  of  the  assured  would  be  defeated.  The  interest  of  the  parties  to  the  insurance 
contract should be looked at. The insurers should also have some sort of protection.  
 
3.10 True Excess Liability in a Policy 
 
In  paragraph  290  of  the  Report,  under  the  heading  “Limits  on  Recommendations”,  the 
Commission stated that the recommendations would have no effect on layered policies when 
dealing with co-insurance where each policy is for a discrete range of the total risk and where no 
overlap occurs. This will have no effect on the policy as it will not be considered to be double 
insurance.  
 
There were certain exceptions discussed which were as follows: “First, it should be made clear 
that the issue of a true excess liability policy to cover the insured’s liability over and above that 
covered by another insurance which is specifically identified in the excess policy is not effected. 
Secondly, insurers should be able to restrict the scope of the cover afforded by a policy in order 
to excluded liability which is also covered by an insurance (whether or not then in existence) 
which is made compulsory by statute such as workers compensation insurance or motor vehicle 
third party insurance.” 
 
Although the first exception was considered, the words were not specifically included in the 
wording of the legislation under s45. Therefore if legislation were to be devised for England 
which is based on the Australian model, the wording of the first exception could be by included. 
The legislation could read and be worded as follows: 
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(1)Where a provision included in a contract of general insurance has the effect of limiting 
or excluding the liability of the insurer under the contract by reason that the insured has 
entered into some other contract of insurance, not being a contract required to be effected 
by or under a law, the provision is void, unless it is a true excess liability policy. 
 
This  would  seem  to  give  priority  to  excess  clauses,  although  the  wording  used  by  the 
Commission was “true excess clause”. This would seem to suggest that priority should be given 
to excess clauses. This will still cause problems however when you have a situation where there 
would be a combination of clauses. There will be situations where you have a combination of 
excess clauses or there will be combination of all the clauses.   
 
The Commission did not consider or deal with the situation where there were rateable proportion 
clauses or escape clauses, in the way they dealt with true excess clauses.   
 
It is worth looking at the decision in National Employers’ Mutual General Insurance Association 
Ltd v Haydon
243in deciding what would be considered a “true excess” clause. The analysis by 
Lloyd J was that as there were many different kinds of exclusion clauses, there was “no sensible 
distinction” between the two exclusion clauses. It did not matter how wide the wording of the 
policies were drafted. In the present case he was of the view that the Master Policy was drafted 
in a much narrower way than the NEM policy even though both were exclusion clauses. He 
seemed to be satisfied that as long as the clause limited cover then it should and would be treated 
as an exclusion clause, even though by looking at the wording in the policy, it could not be 
treated as such in a “strict sense”. He preferred to look at the substance rather than the form of the 
clauses.  He  then  went  on  to  interpret  the  wording  of  the  NEM  policy  by  using  the  natural 
construction of the language in the clause.  
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Although the Court of Appeal reversed the decision of Lloyd J, his analysis is useful to see what 
the  Court  of  Appeal  considered  as  relevant  factors  to  take  into  consideration.  Stephenson  J 
stated
244 that the principles in Weddell v Road Transport and General Insurance Co. Ltd
245 were 
to be applied. Although he did not agree that there was double insurance on the facts of the case, 
he did go on to say that if those two were indistinguishable in their effect as was stated by Lloyd 
J, the Court should invoke the equitable principle of contribution between co-insurers
246. The 
reason for this was to avoid the absurdity and injustice of holding that a person who has paid 
premiums for cover by two insurers should be left without insurance cover because each insurer 
has excluded liability for the risk against which the other has indemnified him
247. He correctly 
went on to say
248 that it did not matter whether the clauses were rightly labelled exceptions or 
exclusions. What had to be asked was what in each case was covered by the policies when they 
were read as a whole, which included the clauses.
249 Bridge LJ also agreed that the principles of 
Weddell should be applied as this produces the only just and sensible result.
250 He went on to 
agree with Rowlatt J’s observation that an absurd result would occur if one were allowed to say 
that in such circumstances that whichever policy one looks at it is always the other which is 
effective. To adopt such an approach would mean that insurers would use this method to escape 
liability and the assured would be left without cover.
251 It did not according to him depend upon 
any general principle of law, but upon the true construction of the policies applied to the relevant 
circumstances.
252 
 
The decision is interesting for the eff ect it would play in a s45 situation when dealing with a 
claims based policy
253. The analysis and interpretation of Clause 5(b)(ii) of the Master policy, 
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according to the Court of Appeal, was that the clause did not try to exclude liability,  where the 
risk which was being excluded, was covered by some other policy being in existence but that it 
excluded  liability  absolutely  for  claims  which  arose  from  past  occurrences  which  had  been 
notified under any other assurances and that as a result there was no reason why the exclusion of 
the claim covered by the clause should not be effective.
254 
 
He then went on to deal with the point on contribution and concluded the policies should be 
looked at independently and that as a result, the clauses would cancel out each oth er and each 
insurer would then be liable to pay out for the loss suffered. Contribution should therefore be 
permitted.    
 
s45 Insurance Contracts Act 1984 clearly states that provisions that have the effect of “limiting or 
excluding the liability” of the insurer clearly relates to the clauses in the insurance which have 
been used by the insurers to either prevent the assured from recovering completely or permitting 
recovery by the assured but the amount that can be recovered would be limited.  
 
The Supreme Court of Western Australia dealt in some detail with the wordings and effect of s45 
in Zurich Australian Insurance Ltd v Metals & Minerals Insurance Pte Ltd
255 which is very 
useful. Zurich brought proceedings to claim contribution from Metals & Minerals Insurance Pte 
Ltd (MMI) on a rateable proportion for monies paid out by Zurich, due to MMI being liable to 
indemnify  Hamersley  for  liability  owed  to  Nolan  and  Oatway
256  (employees of Speno who 
entered into an agreement with Hamersley) under Hamersley ’s policy.  The liability owed by 
MMI  is  the  same  as  the  liability  under  Zurich’s  Policy  to  which  Zurich  has  indemnified 
Hamersley, Hamersley was therefore doubly insured, which means that Zurich could claim for 
contribution.  This was to be calculated on either a maximum liability method or the independent 
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actual liability method.  
 
MMI denied liability arguing that the “Special Clause” in the Hamersley policy which provided 
that  where  Hamersley  was  indemnified  under  insurance  coverage  which  was  effected  on 
Hamersley’s behalf by third party, the Hamersley policy will then be treated as excess insurance 
over  the  applicable  limit  of  indemnity  of  the  underlying  insurance  policy.  Further,  that 
Hamersley is not doubly insured and as a result Zurich is not entitled to contribution. Zurich 
pleaded that due to s45, the “Special Clause” relied on was void and could not be relied upon. 
 
The discussion and analysis by the Supreme Court of Western Australia 
257and the parties may 
be useful in trying to analyse how s45 works, before dealing with the High Court's analysis.  
 
As to whether injury to the employees occurred, that was not disputed. There would have to be 
presence of the insurance covering the same risk and for the  parties’ liabilities to co-ordinate. If 
this is present then the issue of whether there is contribution will arise. Obviously MMI did not 
want to make contribution and tried to argue that due to the Hamersley policy and its wording, 
the Hamersley policy only acted as an excess policy over the limit of indemnity under the Speno 
policy and therefore there was no co-ordinate liability as originally argued.     
 
Zurich tried to  argue and relied on the established principles in  Albion Insurance Co Ltd  v 
Government Office of NSW
258 that where the principle that an assured can insure his interests 
doubly but that the assured was only entitled to receive the amount of his loss. To do so, the 
assured may seek to insure his interest and risk with two independent insurers. Once it could be 
established that the independent insurers were liable then the doctrine of contribution would 
arise. The comment made by the majority in Albion Insurance Co Ltd is correct and is stated as 
follows: 
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"It seems to us that it is not the principle but the application of the principle which has given rise 
to the problems that now falls for decision." 
 
This in fact is the problem that falls on most, if not all, double insurance cases. The principles 
seem  straight  forward  but  when  applied  lead  to  very  different  results.  However,  what  these 
“principles” are, and if they are in fact principles, is unclear 
 
The Supreme Court agreed with MMI's argument that if there was no obligation for MMI and 
Zurich to indemnify Hamersley, then there can be no entitlement to contribution.
259 MMI asked 
the court to look at the effect of the underlying insurance clause.  
 
The  "Underlying  Clause"  provided  that  if  the  insured  was  indemnified  under  such  other 
Insurance effected by or on behalf of the Insured, which was not an Insurance specifically 
effected as Insurance excess of this Policy, where indemnity is available for a claim, then such 
other insurance, which is referred to as the Underlying Cause, would then be treated as Excess 
Insurance over the applicable Limit of Indemnity of the Underlying Insurance, but that it woul d 
be subject to terms and conditions of the Policy.  This in effect meant that the Hamersley Policy 
operated as an excess policy over the limit of indemnity which had been provide for under the 
Speno Policy. Hamersley's policy would only be called upon unt il the limit of Zurich's liability 
of $2mill had been reached. This situation would not arise because the amount that would have 
to be indemnified would only be below $2 million. Therefore no contribution has to be made 
from MMI.  
 
The Supreme Court went on to look at the decision in Australian Eagle Insurance Ltd v Mutual 
Acceptance (Insurance) Pty Ltd
260which was headed "General Exclusion" and not "Underlying 
Insurance", although it had similar wordings as the Hamerseley policy.  In  Australian Eagle 
Insurance Ltd, the decision in State Fire Insurance General Manager v Liverpool and London 
and Globe Insurance Co Ltd
261, Hutchinson and Cooke JJ looked at what would fall within the 
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definition of "excess" clause, and looked at the clause according to its terms, rather than how it 
was described because of the difficulty in reconciling the principles on double insurance where 
there were such "excess" clauses.  So, the correct approach would therefore be that an excess 
policy would only be called upon once the insured's own insurer paid out first for the loss that 
had been suffered by the insured. Only then would the "excess" clause be under an "obligation" 
to indemnify.  
 
The  principles  in  the  New  Zealand  decision  were  viewed  more  favorably  than  the  English 
authorities, which were more of a guide and it seems, as a mechanism to assist in the reaching of 
a conclusion different from that of the English cases.  
 
However,  does  this  really  provide  assistance?  By  giving  labels  to  the  clauses,  such  as 
“Underlying Clauses” may not be enough. The true intent would also have to be looked at. It will 
be unlikely that the wording of the clauses in the policies will be exactly the same. This was 
noted in Zurich where the case of Re Calf & Sun Insurance Office
262was discussed and where 
Johnson J although admitting that the relevant wording of the underlying insurance clause in the 
Hamerseley Policy, even though not exact, were "sufficiently similar" to the wording of the 
"excess" clause in State Fire Insurance General Manager, and this would allow the court to reach 
the same conclusion as  to "its effects".  He went on to say that the natural meaning of the 
wording of the underlying insurance clause in the Hamersley Policy would lead to the same 
effect.  This  would  seem  to  be  a  convenient  way  of  reaching  a  conclusion  without  actually 
providing any guidance. Further, would it be sufficient that the wording was sufficiently similar.  
 
In deciding whether the Hamersley policy is a "true excess" of liability policy, would depend , 
according to Johnson J, on whether the underlying insurance clause offends s45(1) and if it did, 
whether it would fall within the saving provision under s45(2). MMI argued that the Hamersley 
Policy was not a true excess of loss policy because of the general wording used, which resulted 
in it lacking definition, and failing to avoid the mischief that was provided for under s45. The 
court did not agree with the suggestion by Zurich that the meaning and purpose of s45 was plain.  
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The words "the insured has entered into some other contract of insurance" raised considerations 
as to the way in which an insured can be covered by another insurance contract and whether it 
could be said that in all cases that the insured "entered into" the other contract of insurance. 
263The court looked at the history behind the legislation. Johnson J after having looked at the 
history was of the view that where the doctrine of contribution was developed to prohibit an 
insured from obtaining or retaining a double benefit, and that overcoming the po tential for 
double insurance by way of an "excess" clause was a solution, although the adverse effects of 
which almost wholly outweigh the adverse effects of an insured insuring himself against the 
same risk twice
264. She went on to say that she appreciated that in some situation that the fact of 
double insurance may be unknown but that this point remained valid. Further, that in any event, 
there were less potentially onerous methods of overcoming the risk of double insurance arising.  
 
3.11 Clauses: Achieving the Aims of the ALRC 
 
Another matter that had to be considered was whether the clause as drafted achieved the aim as 
envisaged  by  ALRC  and  whether  the  clause  was  capable  of  being  construed  as  creating  a  
prohibition on all "other insurance" provisions.
265 
 
In deciding this, the case of  Austress- PSC Pty and Carlingford Australia General Insurance 
Ltd
266, was dealt with as it was a case which dealt with s45 in some detail. In Austress- PSC, 
Robin DCJ was of the view
267 that s45 (2) did not apply on the facts of the case, as s45 (2) must 
be construed as requiring the reference to "other insurance" to be specific, as opposed to a 
description of general words which were capable of extending to the other insurance, to ensure 
that the clause is not struck down by s45(1). 
 
 It is worth looking at the facts of  Austress- PSC and the analysis of Robin DCJ. Austress-PSC 
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was a case where you had numerous parties. The second Plaintiff entered into a CIC Policy 
where by the terms were that it would indemnify AW Edwards Prt Ltd (AW) and its subsidiaries. 
This included the first plaintiff, Austress, who was a contractor and entered into an agreement to 
supply and install rock anchors with Remm Pty Ltd, regarding the construction of the Myer 
Centre.  However,  the  defendant  (Zurich)  had  also  issued  a  policy  of  insurance  for  the 
construction of the Myer Centre (Zurich Policy). Under a sub-contract, Austress became legally 
obligated to  indemnify  Remm and legally liable to  the Council for damage and the cost  of 
rectification works. The first Plaintiff made payment to Remm and the Council. No contribution 
was made by Zurich which covered Remm only and which liability was only covered for an 
amount in excess of $100000. There was an excess clause in the CIC policy
268. Zurich claimed 
that s45 (1) came into play and so the clause was to be treated as void. Robin DCJ concluded that 
the policy came within the confines of s45
269but limited the liability by the words "indemnity or 
insurance....effected  by  or  on  behalf  of  the  Insured."  Further,
270  that  reference  to  "other 
insurance" must be specific and not a description in general words. He went on to say that he did 
not agree that the suggestion that an insured who benefits in some way from, but is not named in 
the policy, would mean that the policy could be said to have "entered into some other contract of 
insurance".     
 
Reliance was place on the case of  Stretch v State Insurance General  Manager
271 where the 
language used was looked at and it was noted that it would have been a simple matter for the 
draftsman to have included the words "by whomsoever effected". These words have not been 
included in the legislation and should not be read as having been included when interpreting the 
wording of the legislation. Interestingly enough Johnson J did not agree with the analysis that 
s11 (9) when applied to the words" the entering into of a contract of insurance" was limited to 
those entered into by the parties to that contract. Instead, an extended meaning should apply to 
include agreements to extend or vary the contract in the case of life insurance contracts and to 
extend the meaning of any other contract of insurance to making an agreement to renew, extend 
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or vary the contract. Further, reinstatement of any previous contract of insurance was included as 
well. 
272 
 
Surely  if  the  legislature  had  intended  to  include  such  a  broad  definition  to  include  "by 
whomsoever effected" and to widened it in such a way suggested by Johnson J in paragraph [58], 
the legislature would have expressly done so. However, one has to al ways look at the mischief 
the legislation was trying to prevent. The wording in the legislation is specific to "the contract by 
reason that the insured has entered into some other contract of insurance". "Insured" must be read 
as referring to the insured under the policy. Johnson J's approach of a much wider interpretation 
would definitely give more protection to the insured. This is how the legislation should be read if 
in the end the assured would be unable to recover anything or only permitted to recover a certain 
amount from the insurer when a claim is made.   
 
However whether Johnson J is correct in saying that when a policy is arranged into by a third 
party that authorisation by the insured of the other insurance policy was a pre -requisite for there 
to be double insurance is correct, is doubtful.   One of the problems of double insurance which 
the legislation attempted to stop was where you had a situation where a third party may have 
entered  into  an  insurance  contract  with  an  insurer  without  the  assure d  knowing.  This  as 
mentioned before was a common occurrence.  If no authorisation had been obtained, then to hold 
that there is no double insurance would leave the assured without any protection and he would 
then be unable to recover anything. This would b e out of no fault on the part of the assured. 
Surely, this cannot be what the legislature intended.   
 
Similar wording was used in the Claims policy which was dealt with by Robin DCJ
273, where he 
was of the view that what was void was "the provision" which h ad the defined effect. He 
concluded that the provision was void but interestingly went on to say that the way in which the 
insured might have saved the situation was by replacing the words "or effected by or on behalf 
of" by "not being a Policy effected by  or on behalf of". However, this would not be necessary 
when it would have the same effect without those words. Robin DCJ was correct in concluding 
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that one did not have to look to what was necessary to implement the policy of the Act in 
circumstances of a particular claim. 
274 
 
Although disagreeing with the analysis taken by Robin DCJ, the conclusion of Johnson J he 
considered was not flawed. Johnson J agreed with Zurich's argument 
275that when one looks at 
the ALRC Report and considers what is sought to be ac hieved by prohibiting underlying 
insurance clauses, nothing could be plainer than that all of these kinds of provisions were to be 
avoided, including those created an excess policy where the insured benefited from a policy 
taken out or entered into by another. This was so where the insured was unaware of such policy. 
This would seem to be the intent of the legislature when reading the wording used. Another one 
of Zurich's arguments was that one should also look at the wide -raging changes to the law of 
insurance in sections which can be found in the legislation: such as  s 21 with non-disclosure; s 
13 by implying a term into contracts of insurance whereas previously it had operated as a 
principle of law; s 76 with respect to contribution between insurers; and  s 48, third party 
beneficiary right to recover.
276 
 
When discussing what would be 'specific' enough to fall within the exception of s45 (2), Johnson 
J stated that the following clause and wording would be an example of the level of specification 
needed:  
 
"Insuring  Agreement  A  -  Combined  Public  and  Products  Liability",  in  particular  to  the 
"Exclusions" which include the following paragraph: 
 
"Notwithstanding this Exclusion (1) this Insuring Agreement (A) shall indemnify the Insured in 
accordance with the terms, conditions and endorsements of the Overseas Employers' Liability 
Insurance issued by American Home Assurance Company Policy Number MG69898 Limit of 
Indemnity  A$5,000,000  (the  Underlying  Insurance)  with  which  this  Policy  shall  run 
concurrently; 
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PROVIDED THAT 
 
Underwriters shall be liable only for sums in excess of the Limit of Indemnity provided by the 
Underlying Insurance." 
 
However Johnson J did not accept that an underlying insurance clause which did not specify the 
other  insurance  to  that  degree  would  not  come  within  s45(2),  therefore  allowing  for  some 
flexibility  on  the  part  of  the  insurer.
277  This should not be the correct approach. The more 
stringent the compliance with s45(2), would result in better protection to the assured which must 
have be the intention of the legislature.  
 
Zurich in submission asked the court to look at the decision of  HIH  Casualty  &  General 
Insurance Ltd v Pluim Construction Pty Ltd & Anor
278 where although the wording of the policy 
was different in form, the similar intention, it was suggested was something the courts should 
look at. This was due to the similarity of the business structure where you had many and varied 
sub-contractor with which they were required to arrange public liability insurance to include the 
Principal's interest and indemnify the Principal against personal injury claims which were made 
by the sub-contractor's employees
279. Therefore would similar intention be sufficient.  
In HIH Casualty & General Insurance Ltd the effect of s45(1) was to void Condition 7 as it was 
too general and not sufficient enough to fall within s45(2). Mason P commented that there was 
no substantial justification for such "other insurance" clauses, after listing the clauses out, on the 
basis that all of these types of clauses would have the effect of, as the ALRC stated, defeating the 
reasonable  expectations  of  the  assured.  Further,  that  all  such  clause  should  be  rendered 
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Insured for such liability not covered by the policy of insurance provided by the Principal." 95 
 
ineffective. 
280It was argued by Zurich that there was no difference "in substance" between the 
clauses that MMI relied on and that which was found in the HIH policy. Emphasis was placed on 
"futurity, contingency and lack of specificity", and it was argued that the Hamersley Policy did 
not have specificity or identification "sufficient" to avoid the mischief that Parliament wanted to 
avoid. 
It was also argued by MMI that the s45, due to the wording used, such as “by reason that the 
insured has entered into some other contract of insurance” had the effect of limiting or excluding 
the liability of the insurer. This was based on (1) the express wording used in s45 (1); (2) the 
distinction between a party to an insurance contract and a person who benefits from a contract; 
(3) the distinction of the provision in s48 of the Insurance Contracts Act and (4) the rational of 
the ALRC recommendations.
281 
MMI stated that s45 only applied to certain contract. This was evident from the wording of s45 
where it stated that it covered general insurance. It was further argued that the term "liability" 
was a "key" word and there were two ways of looking at the word: (1) it means a potential or 
contingent liability, on the first issuing of the insurance contract by the insurer; and (2) it refers 
to "actual liability", which is incurred when the event it has been insured against occurs, and the 
insurer then has to be called upon to satisfy that obligation to indemnify
282. Professor Sutton's 
view which stated that one looks at the potential liability as opposed to the actual liability, was 
said to be wrong. Rather actual liability was what one looked at, as it would be more practical to 
do so. Further, reliance was placed on the structure of the provision which used “...limiting or 
excluding the liability of the insurer under the contract by reason that the insured has entered into 
some other contract of insurance". The use of past tense "has entered into" and not "or may enter 
into" was used as justification for this.  Also, the words "has the effect of limiting or excluding" 
and not the use of "limit or excludes" suggests that the one looks at the effect of the provision in 
the circumstances which have accrued or in the circumstances which have occurred. Further, the 
use of the words “by reason that” are words of causation, which means that they are questions of 
fact to be dealt with in retrospect.  
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It seems highly unlikely that the legislature had intended the legislation to be read in such a 
complicated fashion. The approach taken by Johnson J was that defining liability in such a way 
would assist in the proper construction of the provision.  She went on to say that if the validity of 
the provision were under consideration when a claim was made on the policy or the claim was 
the subject of litigation, then the words "or may enter into" would not be needed. This was 
because at the time of consideration of the provision, the "other contract of insurance" would 
have been entered into. The section would apply to "other contracts" entered into both before and 
after  the  contract  with  the  "other  insurance". 
283This can only be what the legislature had 
intended if it was to afford more protection to the insured. To distinguish between liability before 
and or after would limit the scope of s45.  
 
Johnson J commented, correctly, that a more natural meaning of the words should be adopted 
and the fact that, when it came to legislative drafting, there could be different ways of saying the 
same thing.
284It would have to be emphasised that the main intent of the legislature should and 
must not be overlooked. 
 
Further  her  Honour  was  content  on  applying  a  more  technical  approa ch  in  reaching  her 
conclusion. This was as a result of MMI arguing that the underlying insurance clause could be 
read in a distributive sense which was looking at a clause which related to contracts entered into 
by the insured and a clause relating to cont racts which have been entered into on behalf of the 
insured. MMI  argued that the clause was drafted in an economic  expression, where both 
situations should and could be read in the Insurance Contracts Act.
285 
 
Her Honour then went on to say that read in this  way the provision was void in so far as it 
concerned contracts effected by the insured, not in so far as it concerned contracts entered into 
on behalf of the insured. This approach is difficult to understand due to the precise wording of 
the legislation. However, she agreed that the clause could be read distributively. The Hamersley 
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Policy operated as  an  excess  policy in  two situations: (1) where  Hamersley had effected or 
entered into another insurance policy covering the same risk and (2) where another insurance 
policy covering the same area of risk had been effected by Hamersley. The appropriate approach 
to the interpretation of s45(2) should be to give the words of the section their natural meaning 
where an insured has either entered into another contract of insurance covering the same risk or 
where the insured has the benefit of a third party which covers the same risk. These situations 
clearly have the effect of limiting or excluding the liability of the insurer under the policy due to 
its effect of converting a policy which indemnifies the insured for the whole of the loss to a 
policy which insurers for any excess over the applicable limit of indemnity of the underlying 
insurance policy.  Such policies would be void if they were entered into by the insured.
286 
 
Although  her  Honour  correctly  identified  the  effect,  approach  and  intent  of  the  Act  and 
legislation
287, she still went on to say at para 142 as follows: 
 
“142 .Nevertheless, in my view, the only way in which to achieve that result is to give to the 
expression "the insured has entered into" and the words of which it is comprised, a meaning they 
simply do not have; that is, I believe I can achieve that interpretation only by manipulating the 
English language to confer a meaning that is inconsistent with the natural and proper meaning. 
The  Concise  Oxford  Dictionary  definition  of  "enter  into"  is  to  "engage  in  (conversation, 
agreement,  inquiry  etc);  to  bind  oneself  by  (recognizances,  treaty,  contract)".  When  one 
considers the words "enter into" in the phrase "the insured has entered into", it is evident that it 
involves the insured himself carrying out the activity and, in the relevant context, being the party 
to the insurance policy. I do not accept that the particular words employed are consistent with the 
arrangement involved in the Speno Policy, notwithstanding the status of Hamersley under that 
agreement as an insured. Further, I am not persuaded that it is appropriate to adopt any of the 
"devices"  suggested  by  either  party  to  achieve  the  particular  result.  Therefore,  I  accept  the 
construction  determined  by  Robin  DCJ  in  Austress-PSC  Pty  Ltd  and  Carlingford  Australia 
General Insurance Ltd (supra) although for different reasons.  
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143. The final issue with respect to subsection (1) is whether, as MMI submits, the underlying 
insurance clause can be read in a distributive sense with the result that so much of the clause 
which does not offend s 45(1) remains valid. For the reasons to which I have already referred, 
while I accept that the underlying insurance clause does address two different circumstances, it is 
the case that, as Robin DCJ noted, the clear words of s 45(1) is that it is the provision which is 
void; the provision being the underlying insurance clause in the Hamersley Policy. As I have 
already noted, I accept that this is a technical result which arises simply because of economical 
drafting. However, it remains the case, as I have noted, that the available material indicates that it 
was  the  ALRC's  recommendation,  which  to  all  intents  and  purposes  appears  to  have  been 
accepted by the legislature (although it does not appear to have been successfully translated into 
legislation)  that  all  types  of  "other  insurance"  clauses  should  be  prohibited.  On  that  basis, 
although the result is technical, it is not necessarily inconsistent with the intention behind the 
implementation of s 54. 
 
144. Essentially, I believe that s 45(1) requires amendment to achieve the purpose which I accept 
was intended by the legislature acting on the recommendation of the ALRC." 
 
As correctly pointed out the interpretation of the words by the courts should be according to the 
natural rules of interpretation. However, it could be said that the courts should interpret the 
wording of the legislation which would lead to a more favourable result to the assured. This is 
consistent with the intent behind the recommendations of the ALRC.  
 
3.12 Severance of void parts in clauses 
 
The  second  issue  which  was  discussed  was  whether  there  should  be  severance  due  to  the 
structure of the way s45 (1) is worded. That is whether the whole clause should be found void or 
whether that part should be severed. This was looked at in terms of the term “provision”. Her 
Honour concluded in her analysis that “provision” was within the meaning of the section and 
ruled that the whole clause was void.  
 
The analysis of her Honour, with respect, is confusing. After concluding that the provision is 99 
 
void where the insured himself has entered into the "underlying insurance policy", she then goes 
on to say that the only way to reach this conclusion was to give the phrase "the insured has 
entered into” a meaning it did not have and that s45 had to be amended so it could have the effect 
that she intended.  
 
When one reads the Explanatory Memorandum (Insurance Contracts Bill 1984), it lists the 5 
situations where double insurance may arise, namely (1) to increase an insured's cover; (2) the 
insured may not realize that the policies overlap; (3) the insured may forget to cancel the first 
policy; (4) the insured may be protecting himself from first insurer's insolvency and (5) to make 
a profit by claiming twice for the same loss but under the different contracts of insurance.  There 
are two main types of policy provisions which deal with "the insurance" which were stated as 
follows
288  :(1)  imposes  on  the  insured  an  obligation  to  notify  the  insurer  of  existing  or 
subsequent insurances affecting the same risk; and (2) where the policy does not place any 
obligation on the insured but excludes or qualifies the liability of the insurer in the event of other 
insurance. If the insured fails to notify the insurer then the insurer may deny liability, in the event 
there is a loss which the insured suffers to the extent that the second insurance is inadequate to 
cover the loss. 
 
Clearly, the first type allows the insurer to exclude liability for a potential claim completely for 
losses flowing from a particular event. The second type shifts the cover from one insurer to  
another insurer.  
 
The clauses that are used fall into three main categories . The first one is where the provision 
purports to exclude liability altogether in the event of other insurance. The second one limits the 
insurer's liability to a rateable proportion of the loss. The insured then has to bring two actions, 
which may still result in the insured suffering an overall loss if the other insurance is insufficient 
or if the claim against the other insurer is defective. The third type covers provisions which limit 
the liability of the insurer to any amount by which the loss exceeds the amount recoverable from 
the insurer. This will then convert a policy into an excess policy without appropriate reduction in 
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the premium. 
289 
 
There is no need for her Honour to reach her conclusion by such a tedious analysis. No matter 
which way you look at the clauses, either in isolation or in combination, the ultimate result will 
be to limit or exclude the indemnity which the insured is entitled to obtain after paying high 
premiums. The whole point of the legislation is to prevent all such clauses fro m taking effect, 
and as a result should be void. The legislation itself has catered for situations where there may be 
a saving provision of such clauses under s45 (2). It is only where there is a genuine or true excess 
clause would the clause be held not to be void. Whether there is a true excess clause is what the 
courts should be focusing on. 
 
Further, the use of the words in  s45 (1) which make specific reference to "not being a contract 
required to be effected by or under a law, including a law of a Stat e or Territory" as situations 
where such limitations or exclusions would not be void,
290 would seem to suggest that in general, 
the whole clause will be void unless they fall within this exception. 
 
3.12 Is there sufficient protection for the Insurer?  
 
Although it may seem unfair on the part of the insurer, the Explanatory Memorandum considered 
that there were certain mechanisms in place which the insurer could use to assist themselves. 
This shows that the interests of the insurer were also taken into account. These were listed in 
paragraph 147 which was stated as follows: (1) that the provision of informing the assured that 
he may not recover anything or that he would be only allowed to recover a portion of his loss 
could be, at most a mechanism to warn the assured against making a claim for the same loss 
twice; the same effect could be achieved by including a warning to that effect in the proposal; (2) 
more details could be asked for in the proposal and claims form, so the insurer will be aware of 
the likely insurers from which he would be able to claim contribution from and (3) that the 
requirement of requesting for more detail in the proposal or claims form would allow an insurer 
to  consider  whether  there  was  any  significant  degree  of  over-insurance  and  to  later  decide 
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whether he wants to accept the risk or not.  This should be sufficient protection for the insurer, 
although it could be said that this again would not provide much help, as an assured may not 
know of the existence of another policy, and such details cannot be provided for. However, the 
insurer should not be allowed to use this against the assured, if the assured has honestly and to 
the best of his knowledge filled out the forms.  
 
3.13 Zurich Australian Insurance Ltd v Metals & Minerals Insurance Pty Ltd: The Appeal  
 
Zurich Australian Insurance Ltd v Metals & Minerals Insurance Pty Ltd
291 decision went on 
appeal to the Court of Appeal and then onto the High Court of Australia
292. The issue which had 
to be decided was whether the Court of Appeal err ed in failing to find that section 45(1) of the 
Insurance Contracts Act 1984, on its true construction, renders void the whole of the relevant 
provision of the First Respondent's policy of insurance and not just the offending element of it. 
The Court of Appeal it was considered wrongly held that the 'other insurance' or 'underlying 
insurance' provision in the First Respondent's policy of insurance was capable of being, and 
should  be,  read  distributively  so  as  to  sever  elements  from  that  provision  and  thereb y 
misconstrued, or alternatively misapplied, section 45(1) of the Insurance Contracts Act 1984.
293 
 
However, on appeal the decision by her Honour that, s45(1) did not avoid an "other insurance" 
provision in an insurance policy where such provision relates to  another insurance to which the 
insured is not a party but where he is a named non -party beneficiary , was not challenged. The 
High Court considered that this was a question of law which was central to the determination of 
the appeal.
294 It was further argued that the Appeal should be upheld on the ground that section 
45(1) of the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 operated in such a way that the phrase 'the insured has 
entered into some other contract of insurance' applied to the situation where a person had the 
benefit of a contract of insurance even though not a party to that contract of insurance himself or 
herself.
295 
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The High Court went through the legislative history of s45. Identifying that before the legislation 
had been enacted, there were a variety of bewildering variety of laws which governed insurance 
contracts. These were Common law and Imperial, State and Commonwealth statutes (this was 
repealed when the Act came into effect.) This was similar to the position in England, where the 
law is still in a state where Australia was prior to the implementation of legislation in Australia. 
This is another reason why legislation may lead to clear guidance when dealing with double 
insurance.  
 
The High Court then went on to deal with the statutory framework of s45, by referring to other 
legislation
296 within the Act and cases.   The expression "entered into" was considered to be 
critical to the constructional question raised by the appeal
297. s11 (9) of the Insurance Contracts 
Act provided a non-exhaustive definition
298. No specific definition of what would fall within 
"entered into" was provided for under the ALRC. The Australian, Senate, Insurance Bill 1983, 
stated that the intent of the Bill was to impose on the insurer and insured such obligations before 
the contract is entered into and would also apply to situations where they renew, extend, vary or 
reinstate an existing contract and where they were to make a new contract. s11(11) Insurance 
Contracts Act also suggests that it is anything which is done before a particular contract has been 
entered into and this would include that which is done at the time when the contract is entered 
into.   s48 was also looked at which covered the position where a party who is not party to the 
contract of general insurance that has been  specified or referred to in the contract as a person 
which the insurance policy has extended to cover, has the right to recover the amount of loss 
suffered under the contract. 
299 
 
The question of construction was whether the words "entered into" had the effect of limiting the 
application of s45 to "other insurance" provisions which affected contracts of insurance to which 
the insured was a party. The ordinary meaning, that is "take upon oneself (a commitment, duty, 
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relationship, etc), bind oneself by, or subscribe to, an agreement”
300 was used which the court 
said was reflected in s11 (9) and other sections. They then went on to look at s48 and concluded 
that it did not deem a non-party insured as a party to the contract and therefore could not receive 
the benefits either contractually or in equity on him.   
 
As a result of this analysis the court did not accept the provision suggested of amending s45 by 
Zurich which was as follows:  
 
"Where a provision ... has the effect of limiting or excluding the liability of the insurer under the 
contract by reason that the insured [including a person entitled under s 48] has entered into [an 
arrangement giving it cover under] some other contract of insurance ... the provision is void." 
 
This approach should not be the proper one to be adopted. If the legislature had intended for such 
a construction, it would have been included. This would clearly narrow the intent and extent to 
which s45 was to operate. There would be situations where the insured may not be aware of the 
fact that he is a non-party to a contract but may benefit in some way under the contract. Again, 
the insured will be left in a position where he may receive limited indemnity or be completely 
excluded from recovery for the loss that he has sustained.  It is interesting to note that the High 
Court was  aware of the mischief of s45, as  French CJ, Gummow and Crennan JJ stated as 
follows: 
 
"The text of the provisions of the Act with which s 45 must be read points inexorably to the 
conclusion  that  s  45  is  only  concerned  with  "other  insurance"  provisions  affecting  double 
insurance where the insured is a party to the relevant contracts of insurance. It does not allow 
room for a construction which would include a non-party insured among the ranks of those who 
have "entered into" the relevant contract. The inclusion of persons not parties to the relevant 
contract would be inconsistent with the ordinary or any plausibly extended meaning of "entered 
into" in relation to contracts. In so saying, it must be acknowledged that the purpose of s 45 as 
appears from the ALRC Report and the relevant Explanatory Memorandum is not so confined as 
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to indicate such a construction. There is no distinction made in the Report or the Explanatory 
Memorandum between "other insurance" provisions purporting to affect double insurance which 
includes non-party insurance, and double insurance where the insured is a party to the relevant 
contract.  The  most  that  can  be  said  is  that  the  Report  seems  to  have  proceeded  upon  the 
assumption that the problem of "other insurance" clauses arose in cases in which the insured was 
a party to both contracts. However, notwithstanding the generality of the mischief to which s 45 
was directed, the words "entered into" are not capable of encompassing a non-party insured." 
However, even though noting the lack of distinction made in the Explanatory Memorandum and 
the ALRC, and acknowledging the way the ALRC proceeded in its analysis, the High Court still 
chose to conclude that the words were not capable of including a non-party insured.  
 
The High Court was of the view that only part of the clause would be found void. This approach 
has to be wrong and the view as expressed by Johnson J
301 is the correct one to be adopted.    In 
her analysis she took into consideration what would be a fair balance between the interests of the 
insurers, insured’s and other members of the public even though it may not fully overcome the 
ills identified by the ALRC, but would in any event strike a fair balance between competing 
interest. 
302 
 
What implications will this decision have and will this decision provided sufficient guidance of 
the mechanism of s45? The decision of the High Court suggests that where you have a situation 
where a non-party, for example a principal, is named in an insurance policy but is not a party to 
the contract with the insurer, and assuming that no consideration has passed between them, the 
"other insurance" contract will not be void. However, if the principal is actually named in the 
policy, then s45 will take effect and be held to be void.  
 
Does this mean that the insured will now be protected from the mischief that the legislature had 
intended? Again, it will be easy for an insurer to devise ways to get around the working of s45, 
so as to enable them to argue that s45 d id not apply to the contract. The insured will not be 
protected.  
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The  next  issue  which  the  High  Court  dealt  with  was  the  Zurich  policy  and  whether  it  was 
sufficiently specified so as to fall within s45 (2). The argument put forward by MMI was that the 
parties can specify something in numerous ways.
303 MMI’s argument, interestingly enough, was 
that s45 (2) effectively leaves it up to the parties to choose their own expression. Her Honour 
agreed with the whole range of ways in which parties in a given contract might choose to specify 
something.
304 
 
However, in light of the legislative effect of the section, her Honour, considered that it was 
important to look at the term “specified”, which would have to identify a specific contract of 
insurance or class of contract rather than talk about terms as was the case in the Hamersley 
Policy, as it is too general, and as it simply referred to “insurance coverage” which had been 
effected by the Insured or other parties who are involved, though unspecified, in the projects.  
 
It is helpful to look at the literature which was relied on to define what would come under 
“specified” as stated, but undefined in the legislation itself, under s45(2). Reliance was place on 
HIH Casualty & General Insurance Ltd and the analysis of Mason P, where reference was made 
to the academic literature.
305 
 
When dealing with the issue of specificity as required under s45(2), her Honour, although 
accepting that there were a whole range of ways in which parties in a given contract might 
choose to specify something, if one were to look at the purpose of the section and at the term 
"specified", it would identify a specific contract of insurance or class of contract rather than 
talking about a contract in the sort of terms that are used in the underlying insurance clause in the 
Hamersley Policy, which was particularly general due to the use of the words "insurance 
coverage" effected by the insured or other parties  involved though unspecified projects.
306 
 
Her Honour then concluded that one would not be able t o specify a contract which had not yet 
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come into existence, and as a result precise details could not be provided. However, she went on 
to say that one could go beyond just speaking in general terms of the clauses being considered. 
What is required is the need to specify the other policy in such a way that it is clearly understood 
which policy or which group of policies are being referred to and the purpose of the policy. This 
would  have  to  be  sufficiently  clear  so  as  to  easily  identify  that  the  policy  which  is  under 
consideration  was  indeed  intended  to  be  a  true  excess  of  liability  under  those  particular 
circumstances.
307 She accepted the argument put forward MMI that although the form of class 
referred to in the decision of  HIH Casualty & General Insurance Ltd was more precise, the 
decision could still be relied upon to suggest that specification by class would be sufficient. 
Further, that if a contract could not be clearly specified then the class of contract would be 
sufficient.
308 
 
Dictionary
309  definitions were  looked  at  to  define  the  words  “specific”
310, “specify
311” and 
“specified
312”. The argument put forward by MMI was that one should look at the natural 
meaning of the term “specify”, and suggested three methods where specification could be 
identified. These were: (1) specified by name, policy number, parties; (2) by class (according to 
that of HIH Casualty & General Insurance Ltd); and (3) specified by description. It went on to 
argue that it was sufficient for one to accept that a contract maybe specified by class, which was 
sufficiently  described in the Hamersley Policy,  which satisfied the requirement under 45(2). 
Further that since the underling insurance policy was effected by that party for the benefit of the 
insured as an identified entity and not just as a member of an unascertained class, as it was 
reference made to a particular principal, and not just any principal. Also, reference to “not being 
affected as insurance excess of this policy” narrowed the class. Her Honour although accepting 
that this proposition would remove one type of “other insurance”, it did not particularly, or 
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sufficiently, narrow the field.
313 
 
An argument which she thought was of considerable force was that of situation where you were 
dealing with a small builder and a situation where  you were dealing with an entire worldwide 
organization where there were subsidiaries. In the later it would be difficult to clearly identify the 
specific policy. This would be more so where if, to satisfy the requirement under s 45(2) the 
name, number, insurer or something more specific would be required. This would be unduly 
onerous, if not impossible due to the constant change of contractual arrangements. In this 
situation what would be required would be to specify the policy, to the extent that it could  be 
ascertained whether the policy with the underlying insurance clause was indeed intended to be an 
“excess” policy.
314 
 
MMI suggested that a more practical approach be taken and that certain factors should be taken 
into account. MMI argued that there should be a various degrees of specification such as: (1) the 
number  of  “primary”  insureds  named  in  the  policy;  (2)  the  nature  and  size  of  the  business 
conducted by those insureds; (3) the territorial application of the policy; (4) the extent to which 
the  primary  insureds  may  be  expected  to  enter  into  arrangements  which  provide  alternative 
insurance cover; and (5) the practical difficulties of identifying by name and policy number (i.e 
the extent to which it is reasonable to specify a second policy by reference to class).
315 Her 
Honour conceded that it would be difficult to identify with any greater specificity than when 
compared to class. In such a situation it would be necessary to consider the specification to also 
consider the acknowledgement in the underlying insurance clause and concluded that Hamersley 
policy had insufficiently specified the other insurance contract for it to fall with the provisions of 
s45(2)
316.   Although agreeing with the analysis of Mason P in  HIH  Casualty  &  General 
Insurance Ltd, that such wording would be broad and as a result it would be inadequate, she did 
not go further than that and said that what was required for it to be specified, was that the policy 
must  be  by  name,  policy  number  or  insurer.  However  a  necessary  requirement  to  provide 
sufficient information concerning the class so that one would be able to identify the policy within 
                                                            
 
313 para 161 
314 para 162 
315 para 163 
316 para 164 108 
 
that class as providing primary cover, and the policy with the “excess” clause providing cover for 
loss over and above the limit of the other policy. 
317 
 
She went on to say that the extensive and varied nature of Hamersley’s interest  were the very 
factors which would require some greater level of specificity other than the fact that Hamersley 
entered into arrangements which included joint ventures, sub-contracts and other commercial 
arrangements which it was, as put, “customary” for insurance coverage to be taken out by other 
parties. Her Honour was of the view that this added absolutely nothing about the nature of the 
insurance to be provided by MMI under the Hamersley Policy. 
318 
 
Interestingly, her Honour did not actually identify what she would consider to have been 
sufficient information for it to fall within the saving provision in  s45 (2), as she did not find it 
necessary to do so. Although, she did not consider that it was particularly difficult to consider the 
various classes of contracts requiring the other party to obtain insurance to Hamersley’s benefit, 
to specify the criteria in relation to each class of contract.  
 
As a result of her analysis, her Honour concluded that, the clause was void and that MMI could 
not place reliance on s45.
319 
 
On appeal to the High Court her Honour’s analysis regarding s45 (2) was not part of the matters 
the High Court had to deal with. However looking at her analysis, it is clear that although she 
does not agree with too broad a wording, it is not necessary either to identify a particular policy. 
She suggested a half way point, where it would be enough to provide sufficient information 
concerning the class so as to be able to identify the policies within the class as providing the 
primary cover.   
 
This approach again, sheds no light on how one is to interpret and approach the workings of s45 
(2). If her analysis is to be followed, this would still leave the assured and the insurer in an 
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uncertain position, because it is unclear what  would be considered to be “provide sufficient 
information”.  Further,  how  is  one  to  characterize  in  what  types  of  situation  what  particular 
information  would have to  be provided. The words  “customary” in  the underlying policy is 
extremely wide.   
 
3.14 Review of the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 
 
Although this  Review  was  conducted in  2004, and there have been decisions  since, but  the 
problems as stated above remain. One of the main issues would be whose interest takes priority, 
the insurer or the insured’s. As mentioned above, the “stakeholders” look at the section in terms 
of the discrimination to the insurers. Reading the section in narrower fashion would ensure more 
protection for the insured which was surely what the legislature had intended.  
 
In June 2004, there was a Review of the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (CTH) which was headed 
the  Final  Report  on  Second  Stage:  Provisions  other  than  Section  54
320.  Chapter  8  dealt 
specifically with limiting the ability to exclude or limit liability because of another contract of 
insurance. After stating what the legislation was, it went on to deal with the concerns of the 
stakeholders who were of the view that subsection (2) should be clarified due to the uncertainties 
which have been discussed above, i.e how much specificity is needed when naming the other 
insurance covers. The case of HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd v Pluim Constructions 
Pty Ltd
321was referred to. The Law Council of Australia then requested that the law needed to be 
clarified, “in particular it is necessary to signify whether a reference in an excess of loss policy to 
the underlying insurance solely by reference to a class of insurance is sufficient to invoke section 
45(2).”
322 
 
The Review Panel was of the view that a narrower approach to subsection 45(2) was consistent 
with the “policy intent.” Reliance was placed on the decision of Mason P
323. Submissions
324 were 
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made which argued that the way the legislation was currently drafted, section 45 discriminated 
against Australian insurers. Paragraph 8.24 stated as follows, “The argument is that insurers not 
subject to the IC Act are able to include valid ‘other insurance’ clauses in their contracts, but 
Australian insurers cannot due to section 45 (unless they can fall within the subsection 45(2) 
exception).
325”  
 
3.15 Analysis of the cases 
 
The main issue that the Supreme Court, Court of Appeal and the High Court were focused on 
what was the underlying policy rather than deciding what would be a "true excess" and under 
what situation would there be a "true excess" layer. In a layered policy the underlying policy was 
to be treated as a primary layer. There was no need for the courts to spend time discussing the 
need to identify the underlying policy  as being a member of a class of policies itself being 
capable of identification.   This is already the primary layer. Focus should be placed on the 
wording  of  s45(1)(b)  which  clearly  states,  "  Subsection  (1)  does  not  apply  in  relation  to  a 
contract that provides insurance cover in respect of some or all of so much of a loss as is not 
covered by a contract of insurance...". As can be seen from the analysis of Johnson J, she was of 
the view that when deciding whether the Hamersley policy was a "true excess", that it would 
depend on whether the underlying insurance clause offended s45 (1), and if so, whether s45(2) 
would save it.  Emphasis was placed on the second part of the wording of s45 (2) which states, 
"...that is specified in the first-mentioned contract."  
 
The issue that has to be decided is simple, that is, whether the clause is to fall within the saving 
provision of s45 (2), and whether that clause is in fact a "true excess" clause. A "true excess 
clause" which has been defined as a policy which had the effect of the policy being excess and 
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325 Reference was made to submissions by the Insurance Council of Australia Limited dated 2004; Law Council of 
Australia dated 27 April 2004; Phillips Fox dated 21 April 2004; Australian Medical Association of Australia 
Limited dated 21 April 2004; and Issues Paper from Consumers’ Federation of Australia. The Review Panel was of 
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treated as over and above any other valid and insurance policy, which would only respond to any 
loss sustained until such time as the limit of liability under the such primary and valid insurance 
has been totally exhausted first.  
 
The tests that have been laid down by the courts are too complicated and confusing. It is surely 
not the intention that the legislation should be read in this manner. There is no need to actually 
provide sufficient information as to enable the parties to identify the policies within that class as 
providing  primary  cover.  In  most  cases,  if  not  all  cases,  the  excess  layer  policy  will  make 
absolutely no reference to the underlying policy, the reason being that, the underlying policy, 
which is the primary layer, may not have been in place at the time, because the assured may not 
have decided what policy to take out or whether such policies should be taken out. This must be 
the case especially if one was to look at the position and relationship of parent and subsidiary 
companies and how policies are to be taken out in such situations. In these situations, we could 
be looking at a large number policies. It could be the case that the parent company takes out a 
policy which has the effect of being a  global policy. The parent  company then requires the 
subsidiary to take out a primary layered policy (i.e the underlying policy) which is to be treated 
as a local policy. One then has a situation where the parent company's policy will act as an 
excess  layered  policy  and  only  respond  once  the  local  policy  of  the  subsidiary  company  is 
exhausted. This has been referred to as a "top and drop" policy.  
326 It has been said that top and 
drop insurers are taking only a residual risk and are charging premium according ly.
327The 
requirement that such a system be in place is usually contractual in nature.  
 
It would be almost impossible for a smooth operation of a company if there was a specific 
requirement that the primary policy be stated in specific terms, only general t erms would be 
practical. 
328  Although it could be argued that a more balanced approach be taken, more 
protection should be given to the insured. In such situations, again like other such excess clause 
arrangements, the main issue is whether the excess policy is in fact a "true excess" policy. The 
focus should not be on the primary layer, but must be on the excess layer.  
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It could be said that s45 should only cover situations where the effect of the clause in the policy 
was to completely refuse to pay out anything, such as “escape clauses”. Further, clauses such as 
“excess clauses”, where the insurer will state that his liability would only be above that of any 
other policy which is effective at the time, so his liability will only take effect when all the other 
policies respond, and “rateable proportion clauses”, where the insurer will state that the assured 
can only get a certain proportion of the loss
329 should not come within s45 because the insurer is 
still required to make payment for the loss to the assured and does not completely deny liability, 
which could be said would leave the assured without any protection. Further, if there is an excess 
clause it would be difficult to try to get around s45(1) by specifying the subsequent policy in the 
first- mentioned contract.  
 
From the discussion of the above cases and the analysis of the courts’ interpretation, s45 may 
look complex, but the way the courts went about doing this was unnecessary. The advantage of 
s45 Insurance Contracts Act being applied in England would have the effect of holding excess, 
rateable proportion and exclusion clauses void, unless “specified”.  Further, the exception should 
only apply if it is one of a true excess clause. If that were the case, then the problems which arose 
regarding the clauses and the effect of the clauses under the English cases will not occur. This 
would be the position where you have similar types of clauses.     
 
If that is the case, then the authorities suggest that the proper approach would then be for the 
assured to choose whichever insurer he wants to make recovery from and then it will then be for 
the insured to seek contribution from the other insurers.
330 
 
3.16 The Effect of the “Other Insurance” Clause- the American View 
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Although the American position did not provide any guidance to Deputy Judge Kealey, it may be 
worthwhile to briefly mention what the position in the United States of America relating to 
double insurance is and whether these principals can be used in s45. The problems created by 
“other insurance” provisions
331 and the ensuing litigation were extensively covered in many law 
review journals during the fifties and sixties on this topic. It is incredible and somewhat 
disconcerting that some thirty years later the circular riddle of  “other insurance” continues to 
plague  insureds  and  the  courts. 
332  For  ‘other  insurance’  clauses  to  apply,  there  must  be 
concurrent policies over the same interest. Its origins stem from policies dealing with property 
insurance in response to the supposed moral hazard of fraud and carelessness inherent when 
one’s property is overinsured.
333 Such clauses are also present in automobile liability insurance. 
 
It is interesting to note that after some 60 years this issue has still not been resolved by the 
courts. In America, it seems that reason for this is due to the circular reasoning by the courts in 
trying to provide a solution, which ultimately stems from the wording of the policies by the 
insurance industry.
334 An example of this can be found in the leading case of Lamb-Weston Inc. v 
Oregon Auto. Ins. Co.,
335 where the plaintiff, Lamb-Weston, Inc leased a truck which was driven 
by its driver on its way to have the brakes repaired and crashed into the warehouse. The plaintiff 
settled its claim with the warehouse owner through a loan recei pt fund arrangement with its 
carrier, St. Paul. Oregon Motor Insurance Company (Oregon), the defendant which insured the 
truck refused to pay the Plaintiff’s claim, even though not disputing the payout by St. Paul. The 
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court on appeal held that both the Defendant and St. Paul must share the liability equally. There 
the court stated that regardless of the nature of the clause used, i.e either escape, excess or pro 
rata, these were repugnant and each should be rejected in toto. Justice Perry stated the absurdity 
of attempting to provide a difference between primary and secondary insurance, and suggested 
that one must look at the insurance policies to see if they are conflicting ‘other insurance’. If so, 
then the court will nullify them. It seems that this would solve the problem of the conflicting 
clauses, and at the same time safeguards the rights of the policy holder.
336 
 
The main approaches used by the courts to resolve the problem of the conflicting  “other 
insurance” clauses are firstly, holding the more specific insurer liable to the exclusion of the 
more general insurer. The courts determine the extent of liability of two concurrent liability 
insurers by assuming that they are in fact not double insurers at all because of the more specific 
coverage provided by one. The latter is deemed the primary insurer and the other insurance is 
secondary only. This approach was criticised as ignoring the ‘other insurance’ clauses of the 
respective policies and the courts have resorted to other approaches rather than determining who 
is  the  ‘specific’  insurer.
337Secondly,  holding  the  insurer  of  the  primary  tortfeasor  primarily 
liable
338.  Thirdly,  applying  the  “other  insurance”  clauses  contained  in  that  policy  issued 
subsequent to the other policy. It has been suggested that this approach is ill-fitted as a rational 
basis for determining liability in automobile cases and was born as a result of convenience as 
oppose to reason. It lacks logical foundation and as a result the courts have ignored its use, as it 
is considered immaterial which policy was written first since its vital only that each was in effect 
at the time of the accident
339. Fourthly, interpreting the clauses respective policies.
340 
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When dealing with combination clauses, in Viger v Geographical Services Inc.
341 where there 
were two policies, a liability policy which contained a pro-rata clause and a P & I policy which 
contained an escape clause. The court gave effect to the escape clause over the pro -rata which 
resulted in the P & I policy not having to respond to the loss.
342 However in other parts of the 
United States the courts have not given priority to escape clauses
343. It would therefore be 
advisable that insurers to avoid liability should include escape clauses.  
 
Some principles are similar to the English approach and t he Australian approach. The use of 
exclusion clauses were not looked upon favourably and the courts were open to the idea of 
nullifying such provisions, which is similar to s45, which voids such clauses. Further, they were 
in favour of providing more protection to the assured. Therefore the suggestion by the courts in 
Lamb-Weston Inc. would be consistent with the Australian position of s45 (1).  
 
3.17 The Canadian Position on Double Insurance 
 
The  American  position  due  to  the  uncertainty  of  the  decisions  has  been  criticized  by  the 
Canadian courts as well. The approach in Canada is slightly different, although there are no cases 
in Canada which have decided the issue of escape clauses and excess or pro-rata clause. Where 
there are two clauses which are in conflict, the court will first approach it in terms of the intent of 
the insurers which can be evidenced by looking at the contents of the policies.
344 This was the 
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case in Simcoe & Erie General Insurance Co. v Kansa General Insurance Co.
345. The Canadian 
court have tried on numerous occasions
346 to avoid the circular reasoning adopted where the 
insurer would argue that to see if the particular insurer was liable what had to be looked at was 
whether the other insurance would function as the primary policy if the oth er policy was not in 
existence. The other insurer would then argue that its policy was excess to the other policy in 
place. This argument does not resolve the problem of which policy provides primary coverage
347. 
McEwan J
348 stated, “Beyond a certain point I do not think it makes much sense to arbitrate what 
amounts to a kind of drafting ‘tag’. The clauses are irreconcilable. Applying the principles set out 
in the cases the excess clauses are inoperative.” The courts tend to hold that where there is “Other 
insurance” clauses they tend to cancel out each other, and because the cancel out each other, both 
the policies provide primary coverage which results in both insures paying out equally to the 
applicable limits of each policy or until none of the loss remains
349. The intention which the 
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349McGeough v Stay N’ Save Motor Inns Inc. 116 D.L.R. (4
th) and Dominion of Canada General Insurance Co. v 
Wawanesa Mutual Insurance. (1985), 64 B.C.L.R. 122(S.C). In Dominion of Canada General Insurance Co v 
Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Co, the court was of the view that the insurance companies would share the liability. 
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His liability was insured by a driver’s policy and also under the terms of the policy of the owner of the vehicle. Each 
policy contained a clause denying liability if the risk was covered by other insurance. Rowlatt J considered that ‘it is 
unreasonable to suppose that it was intended that clauses such as these should cancel each  other….with the result 
that, on the ground in each case that the loss is covered elsewhere, it is covered nowhere’. Accordingly, the judge 
held that as a matter of construction the category of co-existing cover contemplated by each clause did not include 
cover ‘which is expresses to be itself cancelled by such co-existence.’ the result was that each insurer contributed 
half the amount of loss as if neither policy contained a double insurance provision. This is a sensible approach.”  In 
Family Insurance Corp v Lombard Canada Ltd, 1999 CanLII 6253 (BC SC), where there were two policies were 
not identical and the first question the court stated was whether the clauses could be reconciled. This would be done 
by determining by the intent of the two insurers as revealed by the content of the policies which were issued by 
them. Reference was made to Simcoe & Erie General Insurance Co v Kansa General Insurance Co (1994) 93 
B.C.L.R (2d) 1 (B.C.C.A) per Hinds J at p.9., and it was concluded that the clauses were irreconcilable and the 
excess clauses then became inoperative. The above principles were applied in Lumbermen’s Underwriting alliance v 
Axa Pacific Insurance Co 57 BCLR (4
th) 293, at [49] and [50].  117 
 
court seeks to determine is found by looking at the means by and extent to which each insurer 
has sought to limit its liability to the insured when the insured has purchased other policies 
covering the same risk. The interpretation exercise is concerned with determining the intentions 
of the insurers vis-à-vis the insured.
350 In Family Insurance Corp. v. Lombard Canada Ltd.
351, 
the Supreme Court of Canada, in the judgment of Bastarache J, agreed that although it was 
correct that the intentions of the insurers prevail, the inquiry was of necessity limited to the 
insurers’  intentions  vis-à-vis  the  insured.  When  dealing  with  insurance  contracts  the  entire 
agreement was found within the policy itself and evidence of the intention between the parties 
must be sought in the words they choose. Where there is a dispute between insurer and insured 
on the other hand, where the provisions are unambiguous then reference needs to be made to the 
surrounding circumstances. Where the dispute is then between insurers, then there is no reason to 
look outside the policy. If there was no privity of contract between the parties, the unilateral and 
subjective intentions of the insurers, who were not aware of the existence was irrelevant. In 
Family Insurance Corp, the insurers tried to utilise provisions in their respective policies which 
contained clauses limiting their own liabilities. The Court
352 raised concerns about this area of 
law and stated that  “the  reconciliation  of  competing  and  apparently  irreconcilable  insurance 
policy provisions has plagued the Court”.  Here the owner of a stable and owner of the horse was 
sued by Patterson who was injured when he fell from a horse. His claim was settled by the 
insurers  of  the  owner  of  the  stable,  Family  Insurance  Corporation,  under  a 
homeowner/residential insurance policy. The owner was also at the time insured by Lombard 
Canada Ltd. under a Commercial General Liability Policy. The wording of the policies were 
different but both contained “other insurance” clause which claimed to be “excess coverage” to 
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any other insurance coverage held by the insured. 
 
It can be seen that the Canadian courts tend to follow the so called principles in England where 
there would be a cancelling out
353 of the policies which would result in  an equal payment out 
from the insurers. This would be a less drastic approach, as opposed to holding that such 
exclusion clauses would be completely void, like the position in Australia. It is interesting to 
note that the Canadian courts draw a distinction between the insured and the insurer and insurers 
between themselves, when deciding what factors should be looked at when interpreting the 
clauses and intent. This distinction would suggest that the courts by allowing surrounding 
circumstance to be looked at, would allow for better protection of an assureds’ right.   
3.18 Possible Alternatives   
 
The first step is to ascertain whether there is double insurance or not. If there is, then one will 
have to look at the wording in the policy to see what effect it has on contribution. If the clauses 
are identical in nature, the courts are more likely to conclude that such clauses cancel out each 
other. This will enable the assured to seek indemnity for the loss suffered from whichever insurer 
he wants to claim from. Clauses which limit or exclude liability in one policy and provide for a 
rateable proportion clause in another will have the effect of the former clauses trumping the 
latter. If there is an escape clause with an excess clause, then the excess clause will have to 
provide cover unless another clause is present to provide cover. Although it may be suggested 
that the courts’ approach still affords protection to the assured, where there is double insurance, 
the question is, does this provide sufficient protection to the assured who has paid out large 
amounts on premiums? Due to the problems caused by these clauses on their own or when in 
combination, it may also be suggested that an easy way out for the courts is to conclude that 
there is no double insurance.  
 
The NFU case does not provided any new principles on the law of double insurance but has 
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provided  some  clarification  on  the  existing  law.  However,  the  NFU  decision  still  does  not 
resolve the problems in relation to the wordings and combination of the clauses. 
 
Therefore the possible solutions to the problem of double insurance could be as follows: 
 
If there is double insurance, then regardless of the type of clause used and its wording, if 
there is double insurance, all insurers have to indemnify the assured equally; or 
 
Follow  the  Australian  position  under  s45  of  the  Insurance  Contracts  Act  1984  and 
conclude  that  all  such  clauses  will  be  void,  and  provide  for  exceptions  according  to 
s45(2), but that it only apply to true excess clauses. 
 
It seems that the better option to solve this problem, is to enact legislation similar to that in 
Australia. As a result of s45(1)
354 the Common Law position where you have a policy with an 
excess or escape clause and another policy with a rateable proportion clause,  and the escape and 
excess clause prevailing over the rateable proportion clause are no longer effective
355. The 
assured can now choose to seek indemnity from whichever insurer he wants to and it will then be 
for the insurers to seek contribution amongst themselves. This is not the concern of the assured.  
This would have the effect of making clauses which limit liability if there is other insurance 
present to be void. This will set out to achieve what the legislature had intended to do which was 
to provide certainty to an assured. This is exactly what would be beneficial to the assured.
356 The 
insurer on the other hand is protected as they receive premiums. Australia has already had the 
legislation in place since 1984, after a detailed Report was commissioned by the Law  Reform 
Committee, which puts England in a better position to make changes or amendments to potential 
legislation in England if similar legislation is implemented. 
 
3.19 Possible Solutions to the Clauses: Is there a solution? 
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355 s76 Insurance Contracts Acts 1984 
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As can be seen from the above discussion, the courts have tried to provide solutions to the likely 
effects of the clauses when looked at in isolation or when looked at together, in combination.  
 
The question is whether one can actually find a solution to the complexity of the issues  the 
clauses create. Although I have suggested that England should follow the legislative provisions 
of Australia by implementing similar legislation, with modification, when dealing with the issue 
of true excess clauses, there are some who will argue that Parliament would be slow to do so. 
Further it could be said that the law should not move away from the years of parties being free to 
enter into contractual agreements and for the parties themselves to decide the terms that have and 
should be included in such contracts. This would mean that if the parties choose to include a 
clause  which  excludes  liability  completely,  then  they  should  be  permitted  to  do  so  without 
restrictions being placed by the courts
357 or legislature.  
 
This argument may be correct but ultimately the interests of the parties and in particular, whose 
interests, should protection be given to, has to be considered. For insurance contracts, they at 
present do not fall under the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 and cannot therefore receive the 
protection afforded under it.  
 
There has been a lot of discussion as to whether the unfair consumer contract terms principles 
have a role to play in the insurance market. One would have to look at the historical effect of the 
insurance market and the attempts made to give protection to consumers. The Bubble Act 1720 
was the first steps towards a legislative framework to give some consistency to the insurance 
market.  This  however  only  dealt  with  commercial  transactions  and  the  main  concern  of 
consumers was the likelihood of the insurance company closing down or payments of policies 
not  being honoured. Workmen’s  Compensation was  introduced in  1897, but  there were still 
problems with the regulation and the development of a consistent structure regarding consumer 
insurance  matters.  Discussion  and  the  proposed  recommendations  can  be  found  in  the  Law 
Reform Committee’s Report in 1957
358, but again these did not go through. More resistance was 
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also seen when proposals were put forward in 1980.
359However, there was some change in the 
form of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. Further protection was found in the formation of 
the  Insurance  Ombudsman  Bureau  who  followed  the  guiding  principle  of  good  insurance 
practice. Another piece of legislative initiative to provide prote ction was the Financial Services 
and Markets Act 2000, however, this was catered more towards giving recognition to bodies 
such as the ombudsman.  
 
Due  to  the  numerous  bodies  and  societies  that  were  set  up,  this  led  to  decisions  being 
inconsistent, which led to uncertainty. Guidelines then developed in the 1986 Statement of 
Practice, Insurance Conduct of Business Rulebook and then the Insurance Conduct of Business 
Sourcebook.  
 
The Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 did not cover insurance,  unlike 
consumer contracts which were covered. However, the decisions of the Office of Fair Trading 
and the Financial Services Authority have played a significant role in the insurance market, 
where the impact of the Regulation is evident. When dealing wit h consumer contracts, one can 
see that a common thread is one of fairness, which the Regulation sets out. The principle 
encapsulates good faith, the rights of the parties and the detriment to the consumer. It has been 
argued that the Regulations have littl e application in insurance contracts.
360Further it has been 
seen from the cases
361 that the courts will look towards the law established in insurance cases and 
the Regulations in place in the industry. The exceptions to the 1999 Regulations
362 are also of no 
relevance in England, even though the question to be asked is whether the terms are core or 
ancillary. This is unclear and is of no guidance, and has no more application due to the principle 
that ambiguity removes the privilege exception conferred upon the former.
363 However, it would 
seem that the law of general insurance and the establishment of regulatory bodies are sufficient 
to give protection to consumers. 
 
                                                            
 
359 Law Com No 104 
360 Unfair Terms In Insurance Contracts: A Solution In Search of A Problem (2012) 23 Ins LJ 272 
361 Bankers Insurance Co v South [2003] EWHC 380 (QB); Parker v National Farmers Union Mutual Insurance 
Society Ltd [2012] EHWC 2156 (Comm); Direct Line Insurance plc v Fox [2009] EHWC 389 (QB) 
362For example Reg 6 and Reg 8. 
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The legislation in Australia does control the policy terms, for example like that in s45 Insurance 
Contracts  Act  1984, not to  mention other sections.
364The regulative structure consists of the 
Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority, which derives its powers from statutes such as the 
Australian Securities and Investment Commission Act 2001 and Corporati ons Act 2001. Later 
the  establishment  of  the  Financial  Ombudsman  Service  was  formed.  There  was  also  the 
development of the General Code of Insurance Practice which required openness, fairness, and 
honesty when dealing with customers.
365 
 
Therefore it is clear that Australia has the benefit of the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 and 
consumers are protected under the Unfair Contract Terms Regulations 1999, but it does not 
apply and provides no assistance to insurance contracts. In 2009 there was discussion regardi ng 
consumer protection laws and whether a more general consumer based protection should be 
introduced. This was seen in the Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Act 
2010
366. As can be seen from the case of  Jetstar Airways Ptd Ltd v Free
367that there has been a 
diversion from the test of unfairness. One now has to look at the statutory requirements under 
s12BG(1)
368. It seems that emphasis is placed on the balances between the parties, their rights 
and obligations. Another further requirement is tha t the term is one that is not reasonably 
necessary to give sufficient protection to the party, the insurer, who would have the benefit 
provided by the term and thirdly, the likely detriment that the term would cause. However, after 
extensive discussion, it was concluded by the Unfair Terms in Insurance Contracts DRAFT 
Regulation Impact Statement for consultation that the unfair contract terms legislation was 
difficult to apply in insurance contracts.
369  The reason for this is that it does not provide 
protection when one is dealing with regulated policy terms, insuring clauses and exclusions. It 
had been suggested that failure to read insurance contracts are not problems of unfairness.
370 
Therefore it would be more beneficial if separate legislation was imposed s imilar to that of s45, 
rather than relying on unfair contract term provisions. However, it should be noted that the 
                                                            
 
364 For example s8,13,14,34-36,37A-37E,37,42,43,44,45,53,60 and 52 Insurance Contracts Act 1984. 
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366 Section 12BF to 12BM 
367 [2008] VSC 539 
368 Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Act 2010 
369 See Report dated March 2012 
370 (2012) 23 Ins LJ 272,286 
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proposals  as  suggested  in  Australia  lapsed  when  the  Australians  announced  their  general 
elections in 2013. 
 
At present, since similar legislation to s45 has not been considered in England, based on the law 
as it stands, one then has to consider whether there is another solution possible when considering 
the clauses.  
 
Ultimately, the interest  of the assured should be looked at  and considered more favourably.  
First, the elements of the requirement of double insurance must be present before one can start to 
consider the likely or possible formula that could be applicable. The main consideration when 
devising a formula would be the protection of an assured.  
 
Therefore where you have similar clauses of one specific type in the insurance contract and 
Policy A provides for a non-contribution clause and Policy B does not, then the assured can then 
seek contribution from the insurer that provides for cover, namely Policy B. When there is a 
situation where Policy A and Policy B both have a clause which are both in the form of exclusion 
clauses, which are identical, then they cancel out each other and this would mean that both 
Policy A and Policy B are and should be held liable to pay the assured.  To hold otherwise, 
would result in the assured without any form of protection.  
 
Where you have a situation where you have more than one clause in the insurance policies, then 
where the clause is one of rateable proportion clause, the rateable proportion clause should take 
priority and both policies have to pay out equally. However, in such situations where there are 
also present excess clauses, then only if it is a true excess clause, will the excess clause take 
priority over the rateable proportion clause.   If the clause is a true excess clause, then it takes 
priority. 
371 
 
This would ensure protection of the assured, who if double insurance arise, must get the benefit 
of being paid out for the loss he has suffe red. It would then be up to the insurers themselves to 
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seek contribution from one another.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART B 
CHAPTER 4 THE MEANING OF CONTRIBUTION 
  
4.1 When does contribution arise?  
 
Before the issue of contribution arises, all the elements of double insurance must be present. 
There has to be certain factors present for there to be double insurance. The long established 
principles are as follows: the policies must cover (1) the same subject matter, (2) same assured, 
(3)  same  risk,  (4)  same  period  of  cover  and  (5)  same  scope.  Apart  from  this,  there  is  a 
requirement that the policies which are in existence at the time must respond to the loss when a 
loss arises.  Further, that the insurer is  not  paying out  as  a volunteer,  but  due to  their legal 125 
 
relationship, is required to pay out on a loss
372 when an event happens. In practice when dealing 
with non-marine insurance policies, the assureds’ rights are more often than not circumscribed 
by the terms of the polices which will have provisions against double insurance excluding, or 
limiting the insurers liability if other insurers are involved in the same risk. This means that the 
assured will have generally little choice but to go to all the insurers to recover his loss.
373 
 
In England, there have been numerous occasions where the court has concluded that there is no 
double insurance.  However there have been situations where the trial court may conclude that 
there is no double insurance but on appeal, the appellant courts conclude that there is in fact 
double insurance. Therefore the defining line by application of the above principles may not be 
as clear as one expects or hopes them to be.  
 
Contribution affects insurers, in terms of whether an insurer has to pay out under an insurance 
policy and if so, to what  extent.  Contribution does not apply to an assured. Another important 
issue is whether the insurer who has paid out under a claim can then seek contribution from other 
insurers, and in what order.  The principles in  Newby v Reed
374 which were laid down by Lord 
Mansfield
375, have been approved and followed. 
 
4.2 Balancing the Interest of the Insurer and the Assured 
 
When balancing the interest  between the insurer and the assured, it could  be said  that both 
interests are balanced. From the assureds’ point of view, the benefit of double insurance is the 
ability to take out numerous insurance policies
376, and then make a claim against any one of the 
insurers, on the happening of a loss. From the insurers ’ point of view once payment has been 
                                                            
 
372 It has been suggested that where there is a rateable proportion clause which limits the plaintiff’s liability to 50% 
of the loss this would be considered as voluntary: see Double Insurance and payment of another’s debt (1993) 109 
LQR 51 
373 See Insurable Disputes (3
rd Edition) - Double Insurance John Dunt and Wayne Jones Chapter 10 
374 (1763) 1 Wm B1 416 
375 The course of practice was that upon a double insurance, though the insured is not entitled to two satisfactions; 
upon the first action, he may recover the whole sum insured, and may leave the d efendant therein to recover a 
rateable satisfaction from the other insurers.   
376Of course assuming the criteria of double insurance is satisfied i.e the policy cover the same assured, the same 
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made out to the assured, the insurer can then go on to claim contribution from a particular insurer 
or all insurers.
377 However, methods have been devised that ultimately lead to the insurer not 
paying out or only having to pay out to a minimum extent. This is always done by including  in 
the contracts polices clauses or wordings.
378 The result of this was to deprive the insured of the 
only potential advantage of double insurance acquired by paying additional premium (i.e that of 
having the choice against which insurer to proceed) and sec ondly, eliminating the multiple 
debtor situation. 
379 The “other insurance” exclusion will allow the insured with the choice of 
only one insurer, as opposed to two or more insures.
380 For “rateable proportion” clauses the 
amount that has to be contributed will be the proportion as stated in the policy.  The two insurers 
remain liable, but there is no overlapping liability, and the assured must seek indemnity from 
both of them.
381 
 
It could be said that if this was the result of such clauses, then the courts or the law should permit 
the use of such clauses. However, to do so would leave the assured with no protection in 
situations where he has insured the interest with just one insurer who subsequently becomes 
insolvent, which was why double insurance was permitted  in the first place
382. In an article 
entitled, Double Insurance and Payment of Another’s Debt
383an interesting question was raised. 
This was as follows,  “Why should the risk of insolvency of one insurer be imposed on the 
insured when the premium which the other insurer received was calculated on a full liability 
basis and when the insurer had no right to expect that another party would share the obligation?” 
 
                                                            
 
377 Support has been found in North British & Merchantile Insurance Co v London, Liverpool and Globe Insurance 
Company (1877) 5 Ch D 569; Commercial Assurance Co Ltd v Hayden [1977] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 1, Bovis Construction 
Ltd v Commercial Union Assurance Co Plc [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 416 and American Surety Co of New York v 
Wrightson (1910) 16 Com Cas 37 (although this was a case dealing with fidelity guarantee). The Australian decision 
of Albion Insurance Co Ltd v Government Insurance Office of New South Wales (1969) 121 CLR 342 
378 These include “other insurance” clauses or excess clause, rateable proportion clauses and exclusion clauses.  
379 Double Insurance and Payment of Another’s Debt (1993) 109 LQR 51 
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It could be argued that the three clauses, (1) “other clauses”, (2) “ratable proportion clause” and 
(3) “excess clause” should be done away with. An insurer already has the benefit of seeking 
contribution from other insures who the assured has insured with. The insurer should then not be 
permitted to have the added benefit of, by inclusion of such clauses, limiting the assured right of 
recovery. The assured should still be entitled to choose whichever insurer he wishes to claim 
from, as the assured is in any event paying such high premiums. A possible solution could be to 
exclude all such clauses from the insurance policies and permit the assured to take out as many 
insurance policy he wishes, pay high premiums as required and then choose whichever insurer he 
wants to claim from.  
 
This will then alleviate the need to wait for a resolution of the disputes, if one occurs, between 
the insurers if one of the insurers claims that he is not liable to pay out under the policy, say for 
example where there is a situation where the assured fails to notify under the terms of the policy 
of an accident. The assured will not have to worry about the potential litigation between the 
insurers, and as to who is liable, although, there could arise a situation where both insures claim 
that neither is liable, unlike the usual situation where one of the insurer is liable, or free from 
liability or where liability is proportionally reduced. In Legal &General v Drake Insurance Co. 
Ltd
384, the court refused to allow for contribution on the basis of the rateable proportion clause. 
 
4.3 Contribution: Common Law or Statutory? 
 
Generally contribution can be sought where there are numerous insurers who state that they will 
be liable for the loss suffered by the assured for the same loss. However, the issue still remains, 
from which angle should one be focusing on – the assureds or the insurers. There has been 
discussion in the case of Bovis Construction Ltd v Commercial Union Insurance Co Ltd
385as to 
whether contribution was permitted on (1) the basis of the contractual relationship between the 
parties or (2) whether it should be permitted due to the equitable principle or (3) was it permitted 
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under some statutory provisions. Steel J concluded that it was based on equitable principles and 
the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 did not apply. This was crucial to prevent the assured 
from receiving more than he was entitled to be indemnified for. Therefore it cannot be said that 
as the assured has agreed to the terms of the insurance policy, so he must be satisfied with the 
final  result  due  to  the  policy  wordings.  If  one  were  to  look  at  it  on  the  basis  of  equitable 
principles, then this would include the issue of fairness. 
 
In Austin v Zurich General Accident and Liability Insurance Co Ltd
386MacKinnon L.J dealt with 
a technical point, which was, who was the correct party to bring a claim under double insurance. 
He was of view that as the claim of Bell, the insurer of the Plaintiff, was one of contribution 
against the Zurich company on the principle of double insurance, and that such a claim ought to 
be brought in the name of the underwriters against the defendant company and that it could not 
be pursued in the name of the assured under the guise of a claim by way of subrogation.  Here 
the  courts  were  emphasizing  the  distinction  between  subrogation  and  double 
insurance.
387Confusion can arise when there are two or more policies involved. The principles of 
subrogation ensure that the assured will not receive more than the indemnity that he is entitled to. 
Contribution on the other prevents any injustice arising between insurers. However there have 
been occasions which have arisen where contribution and subrogation happen at the same 
time.
388 
 
There is a summary in Caledonia North Sea v London Bridge Engineering and Others
389 where 
Lord  Caplan  stated  that  the  principle  behind  contribution  was  succinctly  put  by  Professor 
Gloag
390 where he stated as follows: 
 
“It is a general principle, dependent on equity, that where several persons are liable for the same 
debt, each, though he may be liable in solidum to the creditor, is liable only for a proportionate 
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share in a question with his co-debtors, and, if he is forced to pay more, has a right of relief 
against them. This  principle, though it has  been chiefly illustrated in  questions  between co-
cautioners and insurance companies who have undertaken the same risk, does not depend on any 
specialty in the law of cautionary obligations or insurance, but proceeds upon a principle of law 
which must be applicable to all countries, that where several persons are debtors, all shall be 
equal.” 
 
He went on to say that an important factor is that the parties should have undertaken the same 
risk to the same common creditor. Although noting the distinction between an ordinary contract 
and a contract of insurance, he concluded that it was clear from the authorities that the contracts 
which give rise to the joint debt need not be identical. The question was whether in relation to 
the creditors, had the debtors obliged themselves for the same debt? Insurance, whatever its 
special features, is basically an indemnity to cover losses arising from a particular event. It is 
difficult to argue that any alternative position should apply. 
   
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 WHEN THE RIGHT OF CONTIBUTION ARISES 
 
5.1 Factors which have to be present for Contribution 
 
As stated above the right of contribution will only arise if certain conditions are present and 
satisfied: (a) there is double insurance, in that the two policies cover the same assured, the same 
interest and the same period and are more or less of the same scope; (b) both policies respond to 
the loss; and (c) the paying insurer has paid under legal liability and not as a volunteer.
391 
 
5.2 Same Subject Matter Common to Both Policies and Each Policy must cover the Same 
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Interest in the Same Subject Matter 
 
In the  case of  North  British  and Mercantile  Insurance Co  v  London, Liverpool and Global 
Insurance Co
392Messel J dealt with the condition of double insurance. There were two policies in 
effect and problems arose due to the drafting of the clauses in the policies which stated that they 
would not be liable to contribute more than their rateable proportions where other insurance was 
present. There was a fire which broke out destroying some grain which was stored with Barnett 
& Co which belonged to Rodocanachi & Co., who had similar policies covering grains stored at 
different  locations.    When  reading  the  condition,  Messel  J  stated  that  as  the  wharfinger’s 
conditions were not just insuring the assured’s property but the property which they were holding 
on trust or on commission, for which they were responsible, this was an important consideration 
when construing the conditions. The word “property” which was used in the conditions does not 
mean the actual chattel  but  the interest  of the assured person. According to  him, the words 
“covering the same property” in Condition 9 could not mean the actual chattel, as an absurd result 
would occur. He concluded that such words were included where the same property, that is the 
subject-matter of the insurance, and the interests are the same
393.  It is interesting to note that he 
was of the view that the condition must be read in a sensible way and that one should not assume 
that these, “great companies” as he called them, intended to entrap their policyholders and to 
destroy the value of the contract of indemnity by reason of the accidental contract of somebody 
                                                            
 
392(1877) 5 ChD 569, CA per Jessel MR at 577. In this case, there was a floating policy by the wharfingers (Barnett 
& Co) which insured against loss and damage by fire of large am ounts of grain and seed which was owned by 
Rodocanachi & Co who were merchants (they issued a merchants’ policy) and stored with Barnett & Co. The 
floating policy was subject to the conditions of average with conditions. The material conditions on the back of the 
policy were as follows: “ 9. If, at the time of any loss or damage by fire happening to any property hereby insured, 
there be any other subsisting insurance or insurances, whether effected by the insured or by any other person, 
covering the same property, this company shall not be liable to pay or contribute more than its rateable proportion of 
such loss or damage. 10. In all cases where any other subsisting or insurances, whether effected by the insured or by 
any other person, covering any other property hereby insured, either exclusively or together with any other property 
on such property in and subject to the same risk only, shall be subject to average, the insurance on such property 
under this policy shall be subject to average in like manner.” The Supreme Court of Singapore has followed these 
principles in China Insurance Co (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Liberty Insurance Pte Ltd (formerly known as Liberty 
Citystate Insurance Pte Ltd) [2005] 2 SLR 509, at para [9] to [17] of the decision. 
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else, which had no connection with the subject matter of the contract, or with the price paid for 
the insurance.  
 
That may have been his view of how insurers should behave, but when dealing with insurance 
contracts the insurer will always have a much stronger bargaining power. This can be seen from 
the cases that have developed
394. Insurers will rely on such clauses to try and exclude liability or 
at least limit the amounts they have to pay out. Messel J went on to say that it was hi s duty to 
make the instrument rational, and to make it a contract such as a person in the city of London 
would be likely to enter into, and not one which would be utter absurdity. To argue that whether 
the clauses in the instrument would lead to an absurd  result should be something left to the 
judges, would not be helpful. From the cases
395, it can be seen that judges themselves may not be 
in any better position in providing a solution, which has resulted in conflicting decisions by the 
judges and authorities over the years.   
 
However, what first has to be established is the policy must cover the same assured and just 
because the policies relate to the same object which has been insured is not sufficient. 
396 The 
rule will not apply where you have a situation w here there are different interest although the 
subject matter that has been insured with numerous insurers.
397It is essential that each policy 
must identify the same assured in respect of the same loss.
398  In  GIO  General  Limited  v 
Insurance Australia Limited t/as NRMA Insurance
399, Master Harper looked beyond the manner 
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in which the original claim by the injured person was framed
400 and stated that this was not 
capable of being determinative of whether or not dual insurance applied. Generally, the wording 
of the policy is usually looked at by the courts. It seems that just because a particular wording is 
used should not be automatically assumed that this would be all the courts would look at in 
deciding the intentions between the parties. The circumstances of the ca se which lead to the 
wordings should also be looked at. This is the approach in Canada.  
 
Although the distinction between insurable interests in the same subject matter
401 seems easy to 
comprehend
402, it is not that clear. For example in Boag v Economic Insurance Co Ltd
403, there 
was in place a Lloyd’s all risk transit policy which was issued to cover tobacco and cigarettes 
which were on transit by motor vehicle from the time of taking over until delivery, including 
loading and unloading anywhere in England and whilst temporarily off-loaded in the course of 
transit. There was a fire at the assured’s premises where the lorry was driven to. There was a fire 
policy which was also in place which covered the premises where the goods were driven to. The 
issue was whether the all risk transit policy came within the definition of the assured’s own 
stock-in-trade at the insured’s premises. The court held that it did not, and it was not covered by 
the fire policy. Therefore the issue of contribution did not arise. 
 
In the Australian case of Davjoyda Estates Pty Ltd v National Insurance Co of New Zealand 
Ltd
404, where the court
405, when dealing with a trustee and beneficiary situation, concluded that 
                                                            
 
400 Here whether as a claim by an employee against an employer or as a claim against the owner or driver of a motor 
vehicle.  
401 In American Surety Co. of New York v Wrightson (1910) 27 T.L.R 91, where it was stated that the principle of the 
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there would be double insurance even though there was what seemed to be different rights, 
which according to the judge was “precisely the same thing”. It has been commented
406 that this 
obiter statement is incorrect. This is because there was a significant difference in the interest 
between that held by the trustee and that held by the  beneficiary. The burden to insure will be 
provided for in the trust deed or the will creating the relationship, but problems may arise if the 
beneficiary sought to become the registered proprietor of the real property subject to the trust. 
407 
 
In Tip Top v State Insurance
408there were two policies, the first covered property of the assured 
or any property where the assured was in some way responsible for and the other policy was in 
the form of a loan receipt which was issued by the bailor’s own insurer and which covered the 
same property. The court held that the same subject matter was covered.  
 
Here again, the problem of whether there is double insurance or not, in terms of insurable interest 
in the same subject matter is not clear in all cases.  
 
 
 
 
5.3 Each Policy must cover the Same Risk 
 
Another factor which must be satisfied is that both policies must cover the same risks
409. The 
cases such as  Bovis  Construction  Ltd  v  Government  Insurance  Office  of  New  South  Wales 
(1967)
410 and Albion Insurance Co Ltd v Government Insurance Office of New South Wales
411  
state that if the policy covers the risk that has given rise to the claim in more than one policy, that 
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would be sufficient.
412 Again, as can be seen, the cases are not clear. It would seem that whether 
the policies cover the same risk bears more heavily on the insurer. If it is not present, this would 
mean that the insurer may not be able to seek contribution from the other insurers. 
 
Further, the cases
413 seem to suggest that there has been a development of the test  which has 
been used to ascertain whether the risk has been covered in both policies. The courts do not place 
much emphasis on whether there is temporary or partial overlap under policies which cover 
different classes of business, as long as the insured subject matter in question came within each 
of them. 
414 
 
Looking  at  the  early  case  of  Australian  Agricultural  Co.  v  Saunders
415,  the  court
416  was 
concerned with whether there was double insurance and whether on the construction of the 
policy, the goods were  “insured elsewhere”. The assured insured some 3000 pounds of wool 
which were in  bales. The wording of the policy  stated that the insurance  covered the wool 
against fire, “in any shed, or store, or station, or in transit to Sydney by land only, or in any shed 
or store, or on any wharf in Sydney, until placed on board ship.” Once this policy was taken out, 
at a later stage another policy, which was a marine insurance policy
417, was taken out as well. 
Under this policy, the subject matter that was covered was a shipm ent of wool which was 
transported from Newcastle in New South Wales to Sydney and then to London. This however, 
also included  “trans-shipment  or  landing  or  reshipment  at  Sydney”.    The  defendants’  policy 
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provided that it was a condition of the policy that if wool was “insured elsewhere”, notice of such 
insurance was to be given to them, if not, then this would lead to the policy becoming void. The 
Plaintiffs did not notify the defendants of this new policy. There was a fire at the warehouse 
where the wool was stored in Sydney for reshipment. There was a claim made by the Plaintiffs 
under the first policy for the loss suffered. The court agreed with the Court of Common Pleas 
that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover. The court was of the view that the latter policy would 
not cover the goods which were kept on land, but it only covered marine risks. This meant that 
the goods did not fall within the meaning of “transshipment, landing, and reshipment at Sydney”, 
while it was being stored in the warehouse and this resulted in no double insurance. This in turn 
meant that the goods were not “insured elsewhere
418” which would then require notice
419 to be 
given of the second policy
420. In some cases, notification of subsequent policies may be a 
condition precedent, as was  in the case of  Kempton v National Fire Insurance Co.
421 This as 
mentioned above could be problematic for an assured who is unaware of the existence of such 
insurance. 
 
It has been commented
422 that the effect of the judgment was that if there was insurance provided 
for in other policies it did not mean that they would cover insurances of a different nature which 
overlapped in part, and that the phrase should be limited to policies covering the same class of 
business and the same subject matter.
423 
                                                            
 
418 this was held to mean “a specific insurance of the sane risks, and that the words were not satisfied in the case of 
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However it can be seen that again the law in this area is also not certain. The case of American 
Surety Co of New York v Wrightson
424 was such a case. In American Surety the Plaintiffs were an 
American insurance company which issued a policy
425 agreeing to pay an American bank for any 
loss or damage which occurred out of any loss or damage which was caused by the dishonesty of 
any of the employees which came within the amount which was attached to the schedule. 
Another policy at Lloyd’s
426 was taken where the underwriters were liable for loss caused by the 
dishonesty of employees and also for loss sustained by the loss or destruction on the owners ’ 
premises  of  bonds,  banknotes  and  owing  to  fire  or  burglary.”  The  employee  who  had  been 
insured had misappropriated a sum of $2869 and the bank claimed for full indemnity from the 
bank of $2500. The balance of $180 was then claimed under the Lloyd’s policy. Both these sums 
were paid and it was agreed that under the policies the loss was covered. The only issue was the 
amount of contribution that was to be apportioned between the insurers. It is interesting to note 
that he was of the view that there was no double insurance present.  
 
Hamilton J first looked at the wording of the policies and compared them. He concluded that on 
reading the instrument there was great dissimilarity between their scope and their capital. He 
looked at the headings given under the policy, one was called a security ship bond and the other 
was  called  a  guarantee.  However  both  policies  were  insurances  and  they  both  indemnified 
National Park Bank of New York against losses to its property caused by certain perils insured 
against. He looked at what was covered under the policy and the time period. He noted that the 
policies covered different items and different periods. The plaintiffs’ policy insured against the 
bad faith and dishonesty of the scheduled employees, and no other risks, and the insurance for a 
period of twelve months, commencing 1
st June in each year. The other policy on the other hand 
covered periods of commencement with 18
th November in each year and covered not only the 
loss to the assureds’ property by bad faith and dishonesty but in addition loss by their negligence, 
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and in addition loss by the dishonesty addition losses by fire, and covered them locally not 
merely on their own premises, but if the documents were in transit in their own hands, or in the 
hands of their clerk or servants throughout the limits of Greater New York. The Lloyd’s policy 
contained self-renewing clause which clearly stated that any loss happening, subject to a further 
premium of so much per cent. Looking at these factors he concluded that although the common 
elements  of  insuring  against  loss  by  dishonesty  and  bad  faith  of  the  employers  differ 
considerably in scope, in terms of the hazard covered and the persons and things bringing those 
hazards into operation.  
 
This  view  is  interesting  as  it  would  suggest  that  it  would  not  matter  whether  the  policy  is 
accidentally  overlapping.  However  why  should  this  be  any  different.  If  there  is  incidental 
overlapping  then  there  should  be  double  insurance,  and  contribution  should  be  permitted. 
Further, if the insurers themselves are of the view that there is an overlapping of cover, then why 
should  this  not  be  the  case.  However,  consideration  must  be  given  to  the  law  of  double 
insurance. The court has to conclude that there is the presence of double insurance before the 
matter of contribution thorough apportionment can be decided.  It would of course be different if 
there was a dispute as to whether the policies covered the same risk and then for the court to 
decide on the matter. Further, one may argue, why should the scope of coverage be identical in 
the policy or the financial scope or the requirement that the scope of the policy has to be the 
same. A possible reason could be because it would not be possible to apportion any specific part 
of the premium paid under the wider policy to the subject-matter in question.
427 
 
The courts
428 in Zurich Insurance Company v Shield Insurance Company Limited
429had to deal 
with the issue of whether the same risk was covered by both policies. The two policies were a 
motor insurance policy and an employers’ liability policy. Under the motor insurance policy the 
plaintiff had to indemnify Q for any negligent driving of Q’s motor car and had to indemnify the 
driver if a person who was driving the motor car was doing so with Q’s authority. The defendant 
on the other hand under an employers’ liability policy was liable to indemnify Q against liability 
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to pay compensation for injury, accident or disease sustained by any employee of Q, arising out 
of and in the course of his employment with Q. S, an employee was seriously injured when his 
motor car, which was owned by Q and, in which he was a passenger, collided with a bus. D was 
driving.  D  and  S  were  both  travelling  in  the  course  of  their  employment.  S  recovered  a 
substantial sum and Q could claim indemnity from D for the full award. The court held that 
while the liability to afford indemnity under each of the policies could arise on the happening of 
the same event, neither the interest of the insured under those policies nor the risks assumed by 
the plaintiff and defendant respectively were the same. The liability covered by the motor policy 
was Q’s vicarious liability as the owner of the motor car, for the breach by the driver of a duty 
owed to the public in general and not for any breach of a duty which was owed by Q to S as his 
employer. The employers’ liability policy covered the liability of Q for breach of its duty to take 
care in relation to S’s safety in the performance of his duties due to his employment. As a result, 
the right to contribution did not arise. 
 
In Elf Enterprise (Caledonia) Ltd v London Bridge Engineering Ltd and Others
430 the courts 
again came to the same conclusion on incidental overlaps. The claim was for death and personal 
injuries on the Piper Alpha platform in 1988, where the insured had no right to be indemnified by 
third parties who had granted the insured the contractual indemnities which was covered by the 
insurance policy. If such a claim was advanced by the insurers it would have to be done by way 
of a right to contribution from the indemnifier. The defenders asked to make good to the pursuers 
any loss which had resulted through the death or injury of any of the defenders’ employees. The 
action was brought on indemnities. Elf Enterprise (Caledonia) Ltd (formerly OPCAL) seeking 
reimbursement of some £130,000,000 which was paid to the families of the men killed in the 
explosion and fire on Piper Alpha off-shore platform in 1988, and to survivors form contractors 
who had been engaged by them when operating the platform. 
431 The insurance covered the 
liabilities of Piper Alpha oil platform for the death or personal injuries to persons employed on 
platform. There was also a contractual obligation by the contractors to indemnify operators 
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against death or injury to contractors’ employees unless caused solely by negligence or willful 
misconduct of the operators. The wording of the indemnities varied as between the contracts. 
The general principle was that a party could only recover under the indemnity for the loss which 
was incurred. It was argued by the defenders that the plaintiff could not seek compensation twice 
as they had already been indemnified twice. This was on the basis that the losses which were 
covered and the beneficiaries of the insurance and the indemnities were the same.  Lord Caplan 
stated that two indemnifiers were jointly and severally liable, and if one had paid out more than 
his share he is entitled to seek relief from his co-obligants of a pro-rata share
432 . The court went 
on to say that the right of subrogation was different as the right of relief laid with the co-obligant 
directly
433. On the facts of the present case, the court concluded t hat their obligations had been 
different but that both the insurers and contractors were pledged to have covered the same loss. 
Further there was nothing on the terms of the policy in Parr’s Bank where the insurers have been 
obliged by their sureties to contribute towards any payment made by the sureties. The court 
correctly pointed out that the issue in the case was whether the parties had undertaken the same 
risk to the same common debtor. He agreed that the contracts which gave rise to the debts did not 
have to be identical in nature and once a party had recovered the whole loss under two or more 
indemnities covering the same loss, then the party would not be entitled to enforce his indemnity 
against the non-paying indemnifier as he had already satisfied his loss. The insurers of OPCAL 
and the participants did not have any right of subrogation in respect of the indemnities granted by 
the defenders. The reason was that they had no title or interest to sue. The only way open to the 
insurer was to recover by way of a separate action under contribution.  
 
It has been commented that the above reasoning is flawed.
434This is because it overlooks (a) the 
different nature of the two contracts, which would of itself preclude contribution (their insurable 
interests were also different); (b) the consequences that had the contractor paid out first, they 
could have sought contribution from the insurers even though they were not parties to the 
insurance contract and had paid no premium for protection under it; and (c) the lo ng standing 
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rule applicable to subrogation, namely, that payment by the insurers entitles them to the rights of 
the assured against any third party who is not an insurer covering the same risk by way of double 
insurance. The House of Lords reversed the decision of Lord Caplan, and they held that the 
insurers were entitled to exercise rights of subrogation, as the law was settled that where an 
insurer had paid in full to an assured for loss that was covered by a contract of insurance between 
them, he could enforce in his own name, any right which was present to the insured. 
 
Lord  Bingham  in  the  House  of  Lords  stated  that  the  issue  was  whether,  as  the  operator 
contended, a subrogated claim properly made in its name by its insurer, who has indemnified it 
under a policy of insurance, to enforce a contractual right of the operator against the contractor 
or was it, as the contractor contended, a claim for contribution by one part liable to indemnify the 
operator against another? He preferred the view of the operator. 
435 
 
It is interesting to look at the Australian position
436 to see what factors the courts will look at to 
see if the policies cover the same risks. In  Albion Insurance Co Ltd v Government Insurance 
Office of New South Wales
437, the court re-affirmed that there was double insurance when an 
assured is insured against the same risk with two independent insurers and that to insure with two 
insurers was lawful but that the assured could not receive more than the loss he has suffered and 
for which there is indemnity under each of the policies. The insured can then choose which 
insurer he wished to seek contribution from. Although it has to be noted that both insurers had to 
be liable, and if that is the case, then the doctrine of contribution will come into effect. Although 
the principles as laid down by Lord Mansfield’s decision applied to marine insurance it is agreed 
that  this  principle  now  extends  generally  to  insurance  which  provides  the  insured  with  an 
indemnity.   
 
The High Court of Australia dealt with this in Albion Insurance Co Ltd v Government Insurance 
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Australia Insurance Ltd v Territory Insurance Office (2008) 23 NTLR 186; GIO General Ltd v Insurance Australia 
Ltd (t/as NRMA Insurance) [2008] ACTSC 38.  
437 [1969] CLR 342 141 
 
Office (NSW)
438where Street J in the lower courts applied the principles as laid down in the 
decision of Government Insurance Office of New South Wales v Royal Exchange Assurance of 
London
439. In the present case, the Plaintiff was the insurer of A & V Bence Pty Ltd under an 
employees’ indemnity principle where liability to employees was covered under the Workers’ 
Compensation Act under an Endorsement for Common Law Liability.
440 The Defendant also had 
insured the same company but this was under the Motor Vehicles (Third Party Insurance) Act. 
Under the Motor Vehicles (Third Party Insurance) Regulations , the third party policy provides 
as follows: “Such insurer hereby agrees that during the period commencing and terminating as 
shown above, and during any period for which the insurer may renew this policy, the insurer 
shall insure the owner and any other person who drives the motor vehicle, whether with or 
without the authority of the owner, against all liability (except a liability referred to in subsection 
two of section ten of the said Act) incurred by the owner and/or the driver in respect of death of  
or bodily injury to any person caused by or arising out of the use of the motor vehicle in any part 
of the Commonwealth of Australia.” 
 
At the time of the accident, both policies were current and enforceable. According to Street J he 
was of the view that none of the exceptions which were available under the policies applied on 
the facts of the present case, Therefore he was of the view that both the employers indemnity 
policy which was issued by the Plaintiff and the third party policy issued by the Defendant 
contained provisions providing indemnity to A & V Bence Pty Ltd in respect of liability on its 
part to pay damages to the employee for his injuries. The three member court
441agreed that the 
doctrine of contribution applied to insurance against liability to third parties and went further to 
say that it only applies, however, when each insurer insures against the same  risk and that it is 
not necessary that they be identical. They provided an example where one insurer insures 
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properties A and B against fire and the other insurer may only insure property A against fire. One 
policy may be for a limited amount and the other may be for an unlimited amount. One policy 
may cover the risk of a whole voyage and the other may cover only part of the voyage. These 
differences may only cover the amount of contribution recoverable but do not bear upon the 
question of whether or not each insurer has insured against the same risk so as to give rise to 
some contribution. This is the correct approach to be followed, even if there is only an incidental 
overlap. The court correctly pointed out the essential element for contribution, that whatever else 
may be covered by either of the policies, each must cover the risk which has given rise to the 
claim. The court went on to say that there was no double insurance unless each insurer is liable 
under his policy to indemnify the inured in whole part or in part against the happening which has 
given rise to the insured’s loss or liability.  The court departed from the views of Myers J and 
concluded that the insured company insured against the same risk with both the plaintiff and the 
defendant.    The  court  was  of  the  view  that  the  matter  could  be  easily  resolved  by  making 
enquiries whether payment by one insurer of the policy holder’s claim for indemnity would 
provide the other insurer with a defence to a like claim against it. The answer was that it did, on 
the basis that the policy holder had been indemnified once payment was made to him. The reason 
for this was that as he had already received all that he was entitled to receive under both policies 
so that payment by one insurer would discharge both. As payment made by one of the insurer 
was  beneficial  to  both  of  them,  and  the  fact  that  contribution  is  equity.
442  The  three 
judges’
443approach is correct. This approach should be adopted by the English Courts.  
 
In Australian Insurance Law (2
nd Edition)(1991) by A.A. Tarr, Kwai-Lian Liew and W. Holligan 
it  was  illustrated  how  this  approach  was  applied  to  the  decision  in  the  case  of  Australian 
Agricultural Co. v Saunders
444 and it was concluded that if the test as laid down in  Albion 
Insurance Co Ltd v G.I.O
445 (N.S.W) was to be applied in Saunders, the conclusion that there 
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was double insurance present would be “inevitable”. The authors went on to say that the fire and 
marine insurance policies  when applying their ordinary meaning of  applying to  wool in  the 
warehouse awaiting transfer onto a ship and that the payment by the insurer would have provided 
a defence to the fire insurer.  
 
In Sutton’s Law of Insurance in Australia (1999) (3
rd Edition) it was commented that when 
looking at Saunder’s decision that the issue arose in the context of a policy term, and the issue 
was not one of whether there was contribution or not. It was said that the two situations should 
not be treated in the same way and that the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 which removed the 
effect  of  the  policy  terms  which  although  restricting  coverage  preserving  the  contributions 
claims, meant that there was no reason for the rules of contribution to apply in such actions. 
 
However,  if  one  looks  at  the  decision  in  Nisner  Holdings  Pty  Ltd  v  Merchantile  Mutual 
Insurance Co Ltd
446the English view was followed in concluding that where there was incidental 
overlap it would not automatically mean that there was double insurance. 
447 The Australian 
position is that contribution will exist between different types of  policy even if the overlap 
between the policies is incidental. All that is necessary is that both insurers are liable for the 
same loss.
448This seems to be the correct approach that should be taken. This allows for more 
flexibility.  
 
In New Zealand Municipalities Co-operative Insurance Company Ltd v South British Insurance 
Co Ltd
449 the High Court held that the same risk was not covered where one of the polices 
covered the negligent act of the employees who were on board and the other policy, this was not 
provided for , although covering vicarious liability. 
 
5.4 The Policies Must be in force and valid 
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When insurance policies are taken out by the assured, each of those policies must be legal
450 at 
the time when the loss has happened
451 and should not have lapsed
452. This is another crucial 
requirement for double insurance to be present.  Sickness  &  Accident  Assurance  Association 
Limited  v  The  General  Accident  Assurance  Corporation
453dealt  with  the  issue  of  double 
insurance and contribution. In this case, the court had to deal with the policy which was effective 
when  the  premium  had  not  been  paid.  Here  the  claim  had  been  paid  for  by  the  insurance 
company to the tramway company for the loss that had been suffered. The insurance company 
then  decided  to  bring  an  action  under  the  right  of  contribution  against  another  insurance 
company for the money that had been paid out. This was done on the basis that the risk covered 
was identical. Lord Low held that the pursuers had the right to sue. It is interesting to look at the 
facts of the case. The agreement that was entered into clearly stated that the policy covered a 
tramway against accidents which were caused by their vehicles to third parties for a period of 12 
months from 24
th November 1888 inclusive. This was however subject to the condition that there 
could be no insurance effected until the premium had been paid. There was an accident however, 
which happened on 24 November, before the premium had been paid under the terms of the 
contract. The court held that as there was no attachment to the second policy, as the requirement 
that the premium had to be paid had not been complied with, then there was no double insurance.  
Further, the decision of Monksfield v Vehicle and General Insurance Co Ltd
454 had clearly stated 
that where there is a clause which provides the insurer with the right to repudiate its liability 
under the policy, as a result of the breach of a condition which was included therein, there will be 
no right for contribution. 
455 
 
The same principles can be found in Australia where the courts have said that it would be unfair 
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451 See cases such as Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd v Provincial Insurance Plc [1994] 1 AC 130; Sickness & Accident 
Assurance Association Ltd v General Accident Assurance Corp Ltd (1892) 19 R 977; North British & Merchantile 
Insurance Co Ltd v Public Mutual Insurance Co (NZ) (1935) 54 NZLR 678; Monksfield v Vehicle & General 
Insurance Co Ltd [1971] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 139; QBE Insurance Ltd v Fortis Insurance Ltd (1999) [1999] VSC 212 
452 Ocean Accident and Guarantee Corporation v Williams (1915) 34 NZLR 924,927-929, per Denniston J 
453 (1892) 19 R 977 
454 [1971] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 139 
455 A similar approach can be seen in the decision of Eagle Star Insurance co Ltd v Provincial Insurance plc [1993] 
2 Lloyd’s Rep 143. 145 
 
to the insured where you had a situation where the assured had no knowledge of the existence of 
other  insurance.
456In New Zealand, the Supreme Court in the decision of  North  British  & 
Mercantile  Insurance  Co  Ltd  v  Public  Mutual  Insurance  Co  of  NZ
457applied  the  English 
authorities
458 to adopt a broad view. The court stated that the subject matter of the insurance 
included that which was common to both the contracts, that is, the use of the trailer with a motor-
car and the use of the motor-car with a trailer.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6  THE  RIGHTS  OF  AN  INSURER  TO  SEEK  CONTRIBUTION  AND 
ENFORCEMENT 
 
6.1 The rights of an insurer to seek contribution 
 
When an insurable interest is insured by numerous insurers, problems as to the proportion of 
each insurer’s contribution may arise. The basic principles of equity, that is one of reason, justice 
                                                            
 
456Commercial Union Assurance Co New Zealand Ltd v Murphy [1989] 1 NZLR 687; Western Australia Bank v 
Royal Insurance Co (1908) 5 CLR 533 
457 [1935] NZLR 678, 683-684 
458 Godin v London Assurance Co (marine insurance), North British and Merchantile Insurance Co v London, 
Liverpool, and Globe Insurance Co (fire insurance); and Welford and Otter -Barry’s Fire Insurance, 3
rd Ed.362 and 
Welford’s Accident Insurance, 2
nd Ed.323. These cases were referred to at p.683 146 
 
and fairness, are usually applicable
459. The Court should and will take into consideration all 
matters which go towards ensuring a just result
460.  An insured cannot seek to recover more than 
the loss sustained by him. An insured can choose to recover his loss from any insurer, and it is 
then for that insurer to seek contribution from the other insurers
461. The issue then arises as to 
how then should the proportion be divided? Usually this will be dependent on the terms of the 
policy itself. If the policy provides for the method of apportionment, that will be followed, and if 
no such provision exists, then it will be divided according to a pro rata basis. There was analysis 
as to whether there was a need for a rateable proportion clause.
462  It was considered that 
previously due to the equitable right of contribution in all circumstances, this would usually 
result in finding or obtaining payment from co-insurers. However, where the clause was different 
from that in Hayden’s case, and similar to that in Weddell v Road Transport, the conclusion 
reached would be different where if there is double insurance, one insurer’s liability would be 
reduced due to either a breach of condition or because he is insolvent
463. In some cases the policy 
may provide for an ‘other insurance’ clause where similar principles apply. In some cases there 
will be combination of the clauses. 
 
                                                            
 
459Albion Insurance Co. Ltd v G.I.O.(N.S.W.)(1969) 121 CLR 342 , GRE Insurance Ltd v QBE Insurance Ltd [1985] 
VR 83 and Albion Insurance v GIO (N.S.W) (1969) 121 CLR 342. Kitto J stated how he considered the principle 
should be applied as follows: “What attracts the right of contribution between insurers, then, is not any similarity 
between the relevant insurance contracts as regards their general nature or purpose or the extent of the rights and 
obligations they create, but simply the fact that each contract is a contract of indemnity and covers the identical loss 
that  the  identical  insured  has  sustained;  for  that  is  the  situation  in  which  ‘the  insured  is  to  receive  but  one 
satisfaction’…and  accordingly  all  that  insurances  are  ‘regarded  as  truly  one  insurance’:  Sickness  and  Accident 
Assurance Association Ltd v General Accident Assurance Corporation Ltd (1892) 29 ScLr836 at 837].” Further see 
Accident Compensation Commission and Another v Baltica General Insurance Co Ltd and Others [1993] 1 VR 467, 
480 
460Government Insurance Office of New South Wales v Crowley (1975) 2 NSWLR 78 (S Ct NSW/Helsham CJ in 
Eq.); GRE v QBE, at 103-104, per McGarvie J.  American Surety Company of New York v Wrightson (1910) 103 LT 
663 (KBD/Hamilton J). 
461Hebdon v West (1863) 3 B& S 579 
462Rateable proportion clause means that proportion which would be borne by any insurer if the assured had been 
entitled to look and had looked, to him alone and that insurer had exercised his right to claim equ itable contribution 
from other insurers. 
463[1932] 2 KB. 563 This particular situation arising is very fact specific as was the case in Hayden.  See also 
Commercial Union where the wording provided as follows:  If at the time of any claim arising under this  Section 
there shall be any other insurance covering the same risk  or any part thereof the Company shall not be liable for 
more than its ratable proportion thereof. Lloyd's policy provided for: If any claim covered by this Policy is also 
covered in whole or in part by any other insurance, the liability of the Underwriters shall be limited to their rateable 
proportion of such claim.)       147 
 
Before embarking on the types and methods of calculations used it must first be shown that both 
insurers must be liable and actually liable for the loss.
464 Ex gratia payments made by an insurer, 
who  then  seeks  to  claim  contribution  from  the  other  insurer  will  not  be  entitled  to 
recovery
465.According to section 80(1) of the Marine Insurance Act
466 it provides: 
 
  “Where the assured is over-insured by double insurance, each insurer is bound, as between 
himself and the other insurers, to contribute rateably to the loss in proportion to the amount 
for which he is liable under his contract” 
 
There are three methods of calculation which lead to different conclusions (1) the maximum 
potential liability, (2) the independent actual liability and (3) the Common liability. There is no 
requirement that the Court follow one method, it is entirely discretionary, to which the above 
mentioned equitable principles apply.
467This however causes uncertainty for insurers. However, 
looking from an assureds’ point of view it will not really matter to him because he would have 
received his share of indemnity for the loss he has suffered. Therefore would it be better for there 
to be one fixed method of calculation for all claims or should the courts do away with the current 
methods of calculations that have evolved? It seems that this may be hard to do where, in most 
cases, insurers are liable for different sums or the sum exceeds the liability of one but not the 
other
468.  
                                                            
 
464 Although see HIH Casualty & General Insurance Ltd v FAI General Insurance Co Ltd (1997) 9 ANZ Ins Cas 
61-358, which was a case dealing with settling of third party claims against an insured.  
465 See Sydney Turf Club v Crowley [1971] 1 NSWLR 274. Although, subrogation may be a possible option in such 
cases. Also see Layne & Bowler (Australasia) Pty Ltd v Pearson Machine Tool Co Ltd (unreported, 25 November 
1984) dealing with workers compensation liability and where the court originally stated that the insurer could seek 
recovery by contribution from other insurers who had also provided cover in respect of injuries which occurred in 
previous  years.  However  see  Manufacturer’s  Mutual  Insurance  Ltd  v  National  Employer’s  Mutual  General 
Insurance Association Ltd (1990) 6 ANZ Ins Cas 61-038 where the courts to the opposite view and considered that 
the correct approach would be to look at each year separately to which policy covered that particular year.  
466 This also applies to non-insurance cases. 
467Government Insurance Office of New South Wales v Crowley [1975] 2 NSWLR 78 per Helsham J at (84 - 85), 
although it was not expressly stated it could be seen that the approach taken was of a discretionary nature.  
468 In the People’s Republic of China, the law was amended in the form of Insurance Law of the PRC, arts.56, which 
states that in the event of double insurance, the proposer shall notify all the insurers concerned of the relevant 
information  with  respect  to  such  double  insurance;  the  total  sum  of  indemnity  patments  made  by  all  insurers 
concerned in double insurance shall not exceed the insured value. Unless specified otherwise in the contract, the 
insurers concerned shall be liable for indemnity payment in proportion to their respective sum insured and the total 148 
 
 
6.2 Methods of calculating insurer’s liability for insurance 
6.2.1 Maximum Potential Policy 
 
Under the maximum potential liability the contribution of the insurer having lesser liability is 
limited to the proportion that its maximum liability bears to the aggregate of maximum liabilities 
under both policies
469. In Commercial Union Assurance Co Ltd v Hayden
470 the court held that 
where there were two insurers with differing upper limits for claims the inference was that they 
were  both  accepting  the  same  level  of  risk  up  to  the  lower  of  the  limits  and  a  "rateable 
satisfaction" would be an equal division of liability up to the lower limits. Under the maximum 
potential liability method, the contribution of the insurer having the lesser liability is limited to 
the proportion that its maximum liability bears to the aggregate of maximum liabilities under 
both policies
471. 
 
Contribution of the insurer having the lesser  liability is limited to the proportion that its 
maximum liability bears to the aggregate of maximum liabilities under both policies
472. 
 
6.2.2 Independent Actual Liability 
 
Under the independent actual liability method, the contributions are assessed according to the 
proportions that the independent liability of each insurer, if it were the only insurer, bears to the 
total of such independent liabilities
473. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
amount of sum insured; the proposer of double insurance may, with respect to the portion of the total amount of the 
sum insured which exceeds the insured value, request each insurer to return the premiums pro rata. Further, double 
insurance has been defined as insurance where a proposer enters into insurance contracts with two or more insurers 
in respect of the same insured subject matter, the same insurable interest and the same insured event, while the total 
sum insured exceeds the insured value. 
469Drayton v Martin (1996) 67 FCR 1, Commercial Union Assurance Co Ltd v Hayden [1977] 1 QB 804 
470 [1977] 1 QB 804 
471Drayton v Martin (1996) 67 FCR 1 at 37 - 38 
472CCH, Australian and New Zealand Insurance Reporter, para.27-140. 
473Drayton v Martin (1996) 67 FCR 1, at 37 – 38; Commercial Union Assurance Co Ltd v Hayden [1977] 1 QB 804. 
Where Policy A provided a formula for sharing liability and another policy, Policy B, was silent as to this, Policy A 
could not bind the insurers of Policy B. In these situations the courts in Canada have also tended to favour the 
Independent Liability approach: Dominion of Canada General Insurance Co v Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Co. 149 
 
 
There have been cases where the courts have concluded that what test to apply did not matter and 
liability would be based on 50% apportionment. A case in point would be WorkCover Qld v 
Suncorp Metway Insurance Ltd
474, where parties agreed to apportionment on a 50% basis and 
liability of each insurer was to indemnify to an unlimited extent for the full amount of damages 
suffered  by  the  insured.  The  payment  by  WorkCover  Queensland  freed  Suncorp  Metway 
Insurance Limited from liability to the insured for its ratebale proportion, as its potential liability 
was  for  the full  amount of the claim.  The contribution  should be 50%.  In WorkCover Qld, 
Jerrard JA concluded that  there was  double insurance in  existence between WorkCover  and 
Suncorp which entitled the Suncorp, as co-insurer to pay an equal contribution to an assured 
which WorkCover had indemnified. The facts of these proceeding arose from proceeding which 
commenced at an earlier stage. Here there was a transport business partnership and an employee 
was injured while driving the prime mover, which was owned and registered under the name of 
Mr. White of the partnership as required under the Motor Vehicle Insurance Act 1936 (Qld). At 
the  time  there  were  insurance  policies  in  effect  for  accident  insurance  which  was  between 
WorkCover and the Whites, who made up the partnership. As a result the Whites were entitled to 
indemnity under this policy. WorkCover took over the proceedings from the employee against 
the Whites. A compromise was reached and WorkCover paid the employee $632,183.67 together 
with $40,000 as agreed costs. The trial judge held that where there was sufficient identity of the 
insured which resulted in double insurance, which meant that equality was equity and therefore 
required Suncorp Metway to contribute $336,091.83. Jerrard JJ did not find the argument that 
Suncorp’s contribution should be 50% of Mr. White’s indemnified liability, and therefore only 
25% of the sum which was settled up was attractive, even though he found that this argument 
was a forceful one. The reason for this was that it was contrary to the decided case from the New 
South Wales Court of Appeal of AMP Workers’ Compensation Services and considered that the 
calculation by the trial judge should be followed, i.e Suncorp’s contribution should be 50%. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
(1985), 64 B.C.L.R. 122 (S.C) This case was approved in Milos Equipment Ltd v Insurance Corporation of Ireland 
et all 47 B.C.L.R (2d) 296 at 302. 
474[2005] QCA 155 150 
 
An example of the tests would be as follows: 
 
Maximum Potential Liability 
Example A (where the difference between the respective policy is not that great: 
 
Policy A £1000000  Policy B£500000   Loss suffered: 10000 
The maximum liability apportionment under both policies = Policy A + Policy B is £1500000 
  Policy A pays  1000000× 10000 = 6667 
         1500000  
  Policy B pays   500000 × 10000 = 3334 
         1500000 
 
Independent Actual Liability Apportionment 
 
The total independent liabilities is 20000. 
Policy A pays 10000 × 10000 = 5000 
      20000  
Policy B pays 10000 × 10000 = 5000 
      20000 
 
Example B (where the difference between the respective policy is greater): 
 
Policy A £2000000  Policy B £50000   Loss suffered: £10000 
The maximum liability apportionment under both policies = Policy A + Policy B is £2500000 
  Policy A pays  2000000× 10000 = 8000 
         2500000  151 
 
  Policy B pays   50000 × 10000 = 2000 
         2500000 
Independent Actual Liability Apportionment 
The total independent liabilities is£60000. 
Policy A pays 10000 × 10000 = 1667 
      60000  
Policy B pays 50000 × 10000 = 8333 
      60000 
 
6.2.3 Common Liability Test 
 
This method of calculation requires each party to be liable up to the limits of the lower-valued 
policy, and surpluses will be covered by the insurer with the higher policy. An example would be 
as follows: 
 
Policy A is capped at £100,000 and Policy B is capped at £250,000. If the loss incurred is 
£100,000, then the liability will be divided equally between them. It the loss is £150000, then the 
sum will be divided equally between the insurers and the extra amount will be borne by the 
insurer with the higher policy.  
 
What is the position where the policy does not cover a specific loss but a wide range of events? 
In the decision of GIO v Crowley
475, the court considered that the maximum liability test may do 
justice and equity where there is some direct bearing between the loss and policy, as opposed to 
some wider range of events. The amount of insurance cover could not enable one to ascertain in 
a fair manner the proportion of loss each insurer should bear for the loss in question. In GRE 
                                                            
 
475(1975) 2 NSWLR 78 152 
 
Insurance  Ltd  v  QBE  Insurance  Ltd
476,  a  dispute  arose  between  two  insurance  companies 
regarding individual liabilities of each of them for damages caused by a fire to certain buildings 
each having issued cover notes. The QBE sought contribution from GRE of a rateable proportion 
of $800,000 to which the latter was liable for, the court however ordering GRE pay $373,333.33 
together with $111,079.93 interest and costs to QBE. QBE had a Contribution clause (Clause 10) 
which stated that, “If at the time of any destruction or damage to any property hereby insured, 
there be any other subsisting insurance or Insurances, whether effected by the Insured or by any 
other person or persons, covering any of the property, the Company shall not be liable to pay or 
contribute any more than its rateable proportion of such destruction or damage.”  QBE then sued 
GRE  for  contribution  but  later  amended  its  claim  to  add  the  vendor  and  the  purchaser  as 
plaintiffs and to add a claim based on subrogation. Here the court settled for the independent 
liability  test  stating  that  there  were  competing  bases.  O’Bryan  J  held  QBE  was  entitled  to 
contribution from GRE according to the principles based on equity, as each insurer was liable 
under its particular policy rateable proportions and if not liable as a matter of equity, then QBE 
would be entitled to recover from GRE in a similar rateable proportion. The Court of Appeal 
however concluded that this was the wrong approach and that there was no right of contribution 
where only one insurer is liable
477. There was no subrogation as the insured had no claim against 
GRE as no cover have been effected at the time of the occurrence of the loss or damage, 
therefore there was no right that was capable of being assigned or subrogated to QBE.  
 
The GRE v QBD decision was followed in William John Drayton, Nancy Mae Drayton, Bruce 
William Drayton and Ross Drayton v John Leslie Martin, the National Mutual Life Association 
of Australasia Limited and Roger Budd Agencies Pty Limited Fai General Insurance Company 
Limited (Cross Claimant)
478– the judge concluded that the independent liabilities test applied as 
there  was  nothing  to  suggest  that  the  application  of  such  test  would  not  lead  to  a  just  and 
                                                            
 
476[1985] VR 83 
477North British and Mercantile Insurance Co v London Liverpool and Globe Insurance Co (1877) 5 Ch D 569; 
Sickness and Accident Assurance Association v General Accident Assurance Corporation (1892) 19 R (Ct of Sess) 
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equitable result. 
 
6.3 Criticisms and possible solutions 
 
These three tests have been applied at the discretion of the courts, where there is no express 
agreement.  The application of each test has not been straightforward.  
 
There was an interesting discussion in the case of Zurich Australian Insurance Limited v Metals 
&Minerals  Insurance  Pte  Ltd
479  where  Johnson  J  was  referred  to  the  authorities  and  the 
approaches  of  the  courts  when  deciding  which  approach  should  be  used  when  deciding 
contribution. In Zurich, Zurich argued that the correct approach as regards to contribution should 
be that of the maximum potential liability method. MMI on the other hand argued that in the case 
of  liability  insurance,  the  correct  approach  should  be  that  the  independent  actual  liability 
approach. Johnson J agreed that the Court is entitled to apply some variant of the two types of 
approaches if there are particular circumstances which make it necessary to depart from the 
principal methods if a just result is to be achieved. He was of the view that as the maximum 
potential liability method
480 had been rejected on numerous occasions by the courts in both 
Australia and Great Britain when dealing with liability insurance, that approach should not be 
followed. The arguments in favour of the independent actual liability were more compelling. To 
follow the maximum potential liability would lead to gross distortion of reason, justice and 
fairness because it would mean that the insurer would be liable for only a small amount of total 
liability, which would be result if it were to be followed in Zurich’s case.  
 
On the surface, the application of the maximum potential liability may be an attractive method to 
adopt as it results in the same proportion throughout the range of possible claims, regardless of 
the sum of loss claimed. However, the Courts are more likely to apply the independent actual 
liability method
481. Although applying both methods lead to different results the Courts will 
                                                            
 
479[2007] WASA 62 
480 The ALRC Report No.20 also aired its dissatisfaction with this approach as well, as lacking any legal or othe r 
principle 
481Government Insurance Office (NSW) v Crowley [1975] 2 NSWLR 78; GRE Insurance Ltd v QBE Insurance Ltd 154 
 
approach each case on the basis of just, fair and equitable manner.  
 
In Tai Ping Insurance Co Ltd v Tugu Insurance Co Ltd & Anor
482the Counsel in that case tried to 
argue that the court should not use either the maximum liability test or the independent liability 
test. Instead the court should adopt a third approach called the “other interest” approach, which 
must and should take into account the “other interests” the subject of the policy. In this case, it 
was the particular loss involving the property of all six companies which was considerably more 
that the maximum limit of liability under the Tugu/General Accident Policy. Counsel did not put 
forward any authorities to support this “ingenious and diverting” argument. The court although 
agreeing that this was an innovative course, concluded that this could well amount to a recipe for 
potential inequity in the context of a contribution exercise which looks at equitable principles 
when dealing with the facts of the case. The court correctly pointed out that such an application 
could lead to a large number of variables arising which would extend beyond the well-known 
parameters of the maximum liability test and the independent liability basis. The learned judge 
placed reliance on Professor Bird’s analysis of the complexities which could arise, even where 
there were situations of only two insurers. This approach is correct especially when you have, as 
was pointed out by Professor Bird, sums which have been insured which are not the same or the 
policies have different ranges so it becomes difficult to calculate the ranges
483. 
 
6.4 Volunteers in Indemnifying and the Right of Recovery 
 
The general principal is that contribution can only be made if both insurers were liable at the date 
of the loss, and not if liability only arises afterwards. The contract must cover identical loss
484, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
[1985] VR 83. Also see John v Rawling (1984) 36 SARA 182 where an employee had died in a trailer accident, 
where the trailer and the utility were both insured with different insurers, in addition to the workers compensation 
insurance which was also in existence. Pryor J rejected the argument put forward that each insurer should be liable 
rateably for the loss according to each insurer’s actual liability. He held that each insurer was liable in respect of the 
same losses equally. It was of no significance that one insurer’s liability arose in two contracts.  
482[2001] 2 HKC 401,406 H-I 
483[2001] 2 HKC 401,408 A-B 
484see Albion Insurance Co Ltd v Government Insurance Office of New South Wales (1969) 121 CLR 342 per Katto J 
at 353, cf Bovis Construction Ltd v Commercial Union Insurance Co Plc [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 416 155 
 
the assured, the subject matter in question, the interest and risk have to be the same.  According 
to Legal & General v Drake Insurance,
485the court was of the view that double insurance must 
exist before contribution arises and this is at the date of the loss. A right to repudiate wo uld be a 
good defence to a claim for contribution if the assured had been in breach of condition prior to 
the loss. 
486 In Legal & General Assurance Society the driver of a car was insured under two 
policies covering different periods. Under the Drake policy, and similarly under the Legal and 
General Policy, immediate notice in writing, a condition precedent, was required. A rateable 
proportion clause was included stating that payment would not be made or contribution made 
more than its rateable proportion if there was any other insurance present. The Court of Appeal 
re-confirming the principles of Lord Mansfield stated that an insurer is entitled to recover from 
another insurer in cases of double insurance, not based on contract but based on equity and that 
burdens should be shared equally
487. Another issue is what happens where notice is a condition 
precedent and liability of an insurer to indemnity only arising when notice is given, and such 
notice is not given due to the insured claiming only against one of the insurers. The court was of 
the view that interpretation of the clauses was necessary and  ‘potential’ liability would suffice, 
but validity of the claim was also an important factor that had to be considered. Even though the 
parties  are  permitted  either  to  exclude  or  modify  the  right  of  contribution  by  contract,  they 
cannot modify or exclude the equitable right to contribution. The Court of Appeal held that the 
plaintiff’s could recover only a contribution in respect of Mr. Arora but as contribution was to be 
made  by  claimant  in  excess  of  his  rateable  contribution  between  co-insurers,  no  claim  in 
contribution  could  be  made.  Contribution  had  to  be  made  but  limited  to  the  amount  in  the 
rateable  proportion  clause.    A  third  party  who  has  obtained  judgment  against  an  assured  in 
respect of liability required to be insured under the Act
488, can enforce the judgment against the 
insurer, notwithstanding any provision contained in the policy of insurance, such as the rateable 
proportion clause. Section148
489 strictly prevents policy defences but the insurer must exercise 
his right of recourse to obtain the benefit of monies paid out as a volunteer. Therefore Legal and 
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th edition 2010 
487Qui senti commodum sentire debet et onus 
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General Assurance Society Ltd did not do so and were only able to recover 50% from Drake. 
 
The decision of Drake Insurance has been critisied by academics such as Goff and Jones
490 
where the authors stated that (1) Drake Insurance protest did not magically oblige it to make the 
payment; (2) the rateable proportion clause was not the subject of litigation in Eagle Star and (3) 
the insurer was liable to third party for the whole loss did not mean that it was entitled to claim 
contribution from the co-insurer. The authors went on to state that the Court of appeal’s decision 
could be justified, based on the fact that the defendant insurer had an arbitral award in his favour.  
 
The Privy Council in Eagle Star Ltd v Provincial Insurance plc
491 had to consider the position 
where both policies contained rateable proportion clauses. One cancelled before the accident and 
another cancelled after the accident. Lord Woolf noted that both parties had an obligation to 
indemnify third parties under the legislation and concluded that the contractual approach was 
appropriate as their respective liabilities to the person insured would indicate the scale of the 
double insurance. The incidence of liability was not the date at which the insurer was discharged 
from liability. According to Lord Woolf’s logic
492, both insurers each should contribute to its 
statutory liability in the same propo rtion, based on their contractual duty. In this case both 
insurers had this.  
 
It is interesting to note that the Court of Appeal in  Drake Insurance plc v Provident Insurance 
plc, where the facts were very similar to that of Legal and General Insurance decision, came to a 
different view. According to Drake Insurance, if in a co-insurer situation, a ratebale proportion 
clause is present and one of the insurers does not seek or pursue contribution from the other co-
insurer prior to paying the insured or does not check whether a situation of double insurance 
arises, then the court will treat that insurer as a volunteer. It is crucial it seems for such a request 
to be made. In Drake Insurance plc v Provident Insurance plc, Drake had a policy with Mrs. Kaur 
who was driving her husband’s car and injured Mr. Beach. Drake Provident who had insured 
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491[1994] 1 AC 130 
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Mrs. Kaur, had paid out first. Drake then sought to recover. Provident refused to pay on two 
grounds: (1) it had validly avoided Mr. Singh’s policy for non-disclosure and (2) due to a special 
clause in Drake’s Policy. Drake’s liability in a case of double insurance was only to the extent of 
half the loss. The arbitration award was not binding and the avoidance was also invalid which 
resulted in there being double insurance. Lord Justice Rix decided that the important question 
was the circumstances of the case before a decision could be made on Drakes right to recover 
contribution. If litigation had preceded the payment by Drake, then the voluntary payment point 
would not have existed and it would not make sense if a sensible settlement which could have 
been  made  is  not  made  until  litigation  proceedings  between  Drake  and  Legal  and  General 
conclude. It was therefore concluded that the claimants were able to recover as they were not 
volunteers. Lord Justice Rix went further and stated that he did not see what difference s151 road 
Traffic Act 
493 should make. 
 
Similar principles have been followed in Singapore as well, such as in the case of  SHC Capital 
Ltd v NTUC Income Insurance Co-operative Ltd
494, where the High Court
495.  
 
The problems arising in Drake do not arise in Australia due to s45 Insurance Contracts Act 1984 
cancelling the effects of a rateable proportion clause or other clauses which seek to limit the 
liability of the insurer.
496 In Limit (No.3) Ltd v ACE Insurance Ltd 
497the excess layer sought 
100% indemnity having paid on the ground that they were on risk. The primary layer insurer 
denied liability. The Supreme Court of New South Wales held that as the excess layer insurer 
was not liable at the date of loss, no contribution arose. 
 
6.5 Whether Incidental overlaps allow a contribution? 
 
                                                            
 
493s149 preceding Act 
494 [2010] SGHC 224 
495 at para 46 
496See also SHC Capital Ltd v NTUC Income Insurance CO-operative Ltd [2010] SHGC 224, although the facts did 
not raise an issue of contribution as the claimant argued that sole liability rested with the defendant, the court stated 
that the sole question was whether the claimant paid as a volunteer. 
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The general principle is that an assured cannot recover more than he is indemnified for. The 
court will not conclude that double insurance exists unless there is an overlapping policy. The 
importance of this is that it is usually the case that insurance contracts will include a pro-rata 
clause by the insurer
498 if double insurance exists.   
 
A policy covering the same risk and same property alone may not result in double insurance. It is 
common for there to be multiple insurance policies taken out over the same interest in the subject 
matter.
499 It is the assured’s interest in the subject matter that is important.
500  Further where there 
is an overlap, all policies must respond to the claim. The policy must be legal and in force at the 
time of the loss. In addition to these requirements other conditions that must be satisfied include: 
(1) all the policies concerned must comprise the same subject -matter;  (2) must be effected 
against the same peril
501; (3) must be effected by or on behalf of the same assured and (4) no 
policy must contain any stipulation by which it is excluded from contribution.
502 The policy must 
not be void.
503 Further the risk under the policy must not have attached.
504 
 
There will be no overlap in cases where the policy is consecutive, as was the case in  National 
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AXA  was not able to show  that GBA had any legal liability  for the  fire. Therefore there  was no overlapping 
coverage. 
502Ivamy E.R (1993) General Principles of Insurance Law, 6
th Edition, Butterworths, London, UK. 
503Lord Woolf in Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd v Provincial Insurance Plc [1994] 1 AC 130(PC) 
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Employers  Mutual  General  Insurance  Association  Ltd  v  Haydon.
505  It is also common for 
different assured having different interest in the same property, where each insurer has his own 
interest on his behalf. There will not be any double insurance present. Likely cases where double 
insurance may not be present, if each insures their own interest, may include owner and bailee of 
goods,  mortgagor  and  mortgagee,  landlord  and  tenant  or  vendor  and  employer  and 
contractor.
506Other areas where double insurance may not be present include where a primary 
policy and a later excess of loss policy is taken out, as was the case in  Pacific  Employers 
Insurance Co v Non-Marine Underwriters
507. Neither would double insurance arise where there 
is a primary policy and an increased value policy
508 
 
The court in  North  British  and  Mercantile  Insurance  Co  v  London,  Liverpool  and  Globe 
Insurance Co.
509, held that there was  no double insurance as each party had insured his own 
interest.
510 As there was no double insurance, no pro-rata payment was necessary. This principle 
was further reinforced in the decision of Boys v State Insurance General Manager.
511 
 
It is also very common  for there to be insurance taken out on the same premises by a landlord 
and tenant. The courts have held that as the landlord and tenant had insured their interest 
separately, the landlord was not entitled to the benefit from the tenant’s insurance contract. 
512 In 
Andrews v Patriotic Assurance Co (No.2) the landlord and tenant insured the same building. 
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There was a covenant to repair. There was no covenant to insure. A fire broke out. The tenant 
recovered  the  loss  in  full  from  his  own  insurers  but  did  not  reinstate  the  premises,  due  to 
bankruptcy. The landlord then sought to recover from his insurer, who claimed that liability was 
only on a pro-rata basis.  
 
Where the parties each relies on his own insurers to pay for the loss, no double insurance is 
present. Although if the assured does derive a benefit from another’s insurance, then there would 
arise a situation where there would be double insurance, even thought their interest was different. 
This is what happened in the case of Portavon Cinema Company Ltd v Price
513. The Plaintiff 
here brought proceedings under two fire insurance policies issued by Lloyd’s underwriters. The 
Lloyd’s  underwriters  were  represented  by  Mr.  Edward  Steane  Price  and  Century  Insurance 
Company Ltd. The Plaintiff were lessees of Empire Cinema. These policies were concurrent at 
the time in respect of Empire Cinema. The Plaintiff claimed 14,766 under the policy for building, 
fixtures, furnishings, films &c. The landlords were insured by Woodward Theatres Ltd., against 
loss or damage to the Empire Cinema.  
 
Also see Nichols & Co v Scottish Union and National Insurance Co (1885) 2 T.L.R.190, where 
the society  rules  required that property mortgaged to  the building society  would have to  be 
insured in the name of the trustees. The member would have to pay the premiums. A mill was 
sold to A & Co by the society. A & Co then mortgaged the property to the society. It later 
insured  the  property  for  their  own  benefit  with  Y  &  Co.  Under  the  two  policies  there  was 
provision made for payment only on a pro-rata basis. Loss was suffered and A &Co’s sued its 
insurers.  The  court  held  that  the  society  did  in  fact  have  an  interest  in  both  parties,  as  the 
arrangement  that  they  were  in  effect  using  the  insurance  money  to  pay  off  the  debt.  This 
triggered double insurance and the pro-rata clause was applicable, although this decision was 
doubted in O’Kane v Jones, The Martin P
514. The court questioned the correctness of the decision 
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in Nicholas. It concluded that Nicholas did not established the proposition that there is double 
insurance for the purposes of MIA if different assureds with different insurable interests in the 
same property, even if one may have to hold all or part of the proceeds of any insurable claim in 
trust or for the account of the other.
515MacGillivray on Insurance Law
516stated that the better 
view in circumstances like those in Nicholas & Co v Scottish Union and National Insurance Co. 
was that each party insures his own interest and can recover in full against his insurer; since the 
mortgagor has a contractual right to have the debt paid off by the mortgagee, the mortgagor’s 
insurers will be subrogated to  that right  after payment  by them  to  the  mortgagor. Although 
neither the mortgagor, nor his insurer, can compel the mortgagee to make any recovery, the 
overall result would probably be that the loss fell on the insurers of the mortgagee.
517 
 
Where there are successive mortgages, if the insurance policies are taken out in the name a loan 
company by the proprietors in each case and in the name of the mortgagees  in reversion, the 
courts have held that there will be no double insurance.
518. 
 
This principle can be seen in the case of  Clarke v Fidelity Fire Insurance Co. of New York
519 
where the court held that there was no overlapping. In Clarke, Clarke insured the house against 
destruction by fire. A statutory condition was imposed where there was “other insurance”. A 
separate policy was taken out by the mortgagee to insure against his interest in the building. The 
court held that the homeowner was owner in possession and the mortgagee was the holder of a 
security to indemnify him against losses on his loan, and as there was no “other insurance”, the 
homeowner could claim for her loss in full. The case of Davjoyda Estates Pty Ltd v National 
Insurance Co of NZ Ltd
520 is another example of where the court held that there was no double 
insurance. This was a case where one was dealing with a vendor and purchaser situation, and 
where both had insurable interest, even though the risk may pass to the purchaser. In such cases 
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it is common for the purchaser to be usually advised to cover the full value of the improvements. 
The vendor will retain the existing insurance until completion. Two premiums were usually be 
paid between the contract stage and stage of completion on one property.  
 
There  was  no  overlapping  policy  as  each  assured  was  insuring  his  own  interest.  In  Allianz 
Australia  Workers  Compensation  (NSW)  Ltd  v  NRMA  Insurance  Ltd
521,  a  claim  made  by 
Workers’ Compensation insurers against a motor vehicle third party insurer for contribution. Mr. 
Noel Harris was employed by Trueform Pty Ltd. He was injured while unloading a semi-trailer 
during his course of employment. The semi-trailer consisted of a prime mover and trailer owned 
by Trueform. The Plaintiff was Trueform’s workers’ compensation insurer. The Defendant was 
the authorized insurer of both the prime mover and the trailer. Proceedings were commenced for 
personal injury. The court held that where the defendant in proceedings was not identical with 
the insured under the third-party policies, and where the registered owner would not be liable if 
sued, the claim for contribution must fail.   
 
Primary or excess coverage cases where there are numerous insures could result in them not 
covering the same risk because they are covering different layers of risk. The way such layered 
covers work means that the primary policy will have to respond first due to the insurer’s liability 
attaching when the loss insured happens
522. Any coverage over and above that of the primary 
policy is known as an ‘excess’ policy. Another type of policy is known as an umbrella policy 
which includes (1) standard form excess coverage and (2) broader coverage.
523 Therefore in such 
cases, it is unlikely for there to be double insurance. 
 
Therefore  if  there  is  no  double  insurance,  the  insurer  will  have  to  seek  recourse  through 
subrogation
524, through Covenants under the contract
525 or contractually. 
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CHAPTER 7: ASBESTOS LITIGATION FROM AN INSURANCE PERSPECTIVE 
 
7.1 Development of the cases regarding Mesothelioma 
 
It  could  be  argued  that  double  insurance  does  not  apply  to  mesothelioma  cases,  due  to  the 164 
 
structure of the policies. However, this issue is unresolved and there has been discussion
526 as to 
whether double insurance does in fact occur in asbestos cases and if so, the next issue would be 
one of how contribution would be distributed between the insurers.  Mesothelioma operates 
across long periods and different policies   of insurance. This is the first time that issues   of 
construction of such polices has arisen between different insurers during different policy years, 
possibly under different forms of liability cover  in particular, liability insurance and personal 
injuries (i.e employers’ liability and public liability). There is also the difficulty of identifying 
the defendant insurer, as it is unclear which policy applies. This chapter sets out the background 
to the Mesothelioma problem, and shows how the issue of contribution arises from it. There has 
been very little literature on this particular aspect. This chapter  discusses the issues not resolved 
by English courts and whether in fact the issue of double insurance applies, and if so, when and 
how it may arise. The development of legislation (i.e The Compensation Act 2006) to try and 
resolve the issue of distribution of liability and the amount of liability.  
 
There is no double insurance where there is the existence of consecutive policies, as opposed to 
the presence of concurrent policies that would result in double insurance.  A further issue which 
arises is whether there is a single indivisible loss in every year or separate losses in each year. In 
such situations, there may not be any double insurance. It would still be interesting to look at 
whether the principles of s45 would have a role to play in such cases, and if so, what this role 
would be.  
 
For these questions to be answered, it is important to go through the analysis of the decisions in 
this area which have developed, such as Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd
527, Durham 
v BAI(Run off) Ltd
528, Barker v Corus
529, Sienkiewicz v Grief(UK) Ltd
530, Bolton Metropolitan 
Borough  Council  v  Municipal  Mutual  Insurance
531,  Rainy  Sky  SA  v  Kookmin  Bank
532, 
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International Energy Group Ltd v Zurich Insurance Plc UK
533 and Phillips v Syndicate 992 
Gunner
534. One interesting issue is whether there was in fact a need for the courts to develop the 
principles in the way that they did.  
 
The passing of the Compensation Act 2006 will also have to be looked at after Parliament was of 
the  view  that  there  should  be  intervention  in  the  form  of  legislation  regarding  the  issue  of 
whether and when liability should be joint or several. This was due to the effects of the decision 
in Barker v Corus. The cases developed from the perspective of tort and the issue of causation, 
when one was looking at the issue of which employer was liable. The legislature thought that 
protection  was  needed,  and  laws  were  passed.  The  same  outcome  should  be  adopted  when 
implementing legislation similar to that of s45. This specific issue was not discussed in ALCR.  
 
7.2 Mesothelioma Litigation and its impact 
 
7.2.1 The decision in Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd 
 
It is important to understand the history and medical aspect of the disease of mesothelioma. It is 
therefore necessary to look at the approach that they courts felt were necessary to deal with the 
issue. A good starting point is the judgment of Lord Bingham of Cornhill who summarised the 
disease in the decision of Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd. Since the 1930s the 
implications of inhaling large quantities of asbestos dust have been studied 
535and understood in 
greater detail
536.   He stated
537 as follows: 
 
"Thus in the case of asbestosis the following situation may arise. C may contract asbestosis 
as a result of exposure to  asbestos dust while employed by A, but without such exposure 
involving any breach of duty by A. C may then work for B, and again inhale quantities of 
asbestos dust which will have the effect of aggravating his asbestosis. If this later exposure 
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does involve a breach of duty by B, C will have no claim against A but will have a claim 
against B. B will not escape liability by contending that his breach of duty is not shown to 
have had any causative effect." 
 
He went on to say
538:  
 
"From about the 1960s, it became widely known that exposure to asbestos dust and fibres 
could give rise not only to asbestosis and other pulmonary diseases, but also to the risk of 
developing a mesothelioma. This is a malignant tumour, usually of the pleura, sometimes 
of the peritoneum. In the absence of occupational exposure to asbestos dust it is a very rare 
tumour indeed, afflicting no more than about one person in a million per year. But the 
incidence of the tumour among those occupationally exposed to asbestos dust is about 
1,000 times greater than in the general population, and there are some 1,500 cases reported 
annually. It is a condition which may be latent for many years, usually for 30 -40 years or 
more; development of the condition may take as short a period as 10 years, but it is thought 
that that is the period which elapses between the mutation of the first cell and the 
manifestation of symptoms of the condition. It is invariably fatal, and death usually occurs 
within 1-2 years of the condition being diagnosed. The mechanism  by which a normal 
mesothelial cell is transformed into a mesothelioma cell is not known. It is believed by the 
best medical opinion to involve a multi -stage process, in which 6 or 7 genetic changes 
occur in a normal cell to render it malignant. Asbestos a cts in at least one of those stages 
and may (but this is uncertain) act in more than one. It is not known what level of exposure 
to  asbestos  dust  and  fibre  can  be  tolerated  without  significant  risk  of  developing  a 
mesothelioma, but it is known that those l iving in urban environments (although without 
occupational  exposure) inhale  large  numbers  of  asbestos  fibres  without  developing  a 
mesothelioma. It is accepted that the risk of developing a mesothelioma increases in 
proportion to the quantity of asbestos du st and fibres inhaled: the greater the quantity of 
dust and fibre inhaled, the greater the risk. But the condition may be caused by a single 
fibre, or a few fibres, or many fibres: medical opinion holds none of these possibilities to be 
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more probable than any other, and the condition once caused is not aggravated by further 
exposure. So if C is employed successively by A and B and is exposed to asbestos dust and 
fibres during each employment and develops a mesothelioma, the very strong probability is 
that this will have been caused by inhalation of asbestos dust containing fibres. But C could 
have inhaled a single fibre giving rise to his condition during employment by A, in which 
case his exposure by B will have had no effect on his condition; or he could have inhaled a 
single fibre giving rise to his condition during his employment by B, in which case his 
exposure by A will have had no effect on his condition; or he could have inhaled fibres 
during his employment by A and B which together gave rise to his condition; but medical 
science cannot support the suggestion that any of these possibilities is to be regarded as 
more  probable  than  any  other.  There  is  no  way  of  identifying,  even  on  a  balance  of 
probabilities, the source of the fibre or fibres which initiated the genetic process which 
culminated in the malignant tumour. It is on this rock of uncertainty, reflecting the point to 
which medical science has so far advanced, that the three claims were rejected by the Court 
of Appeal and by two of the three trial judges." 
 
The Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd decision was an appeal by employees who over 
the years had developed mesothelioma due to their working conditions. It was argued that due to 
the  breach  of  duty  by  the  defendants  of  failing  to  protect  the  claimants  from  the  risk  of 
contracting the disease, this had led to the employees inhaling substantial quantities of asbestos 
dust or fibers. The judge was of the view that in two
539 of the three cases in the appeal, that what 
was required, was for the plaintiff to establish that on a balance of probabilities that a particular 
tortfeasor had exposed that employee to the asbestos dust which had the effect of causing the 
disease. In the third case
540, the judge concluded that each of the employers had cont ributed to 
the employee being exposed to asbestosis dust and fibers, and as a result, materially contributed 
to the employees' developing the disease, and ruled that the liability should be apportioned 
between the employers.  
 
The requirement that the employee had to prove that the employer was the one who exposed him 
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to the asbestos dust can, unless the employer is the only employer who the employee has worked 
for, proved extremely difficult. Placing such a burden on the employee would, from an insurance 
perspective, leave him with no protection at all. However, the approach adopted by the Court of 
Appeal was similar. 
 
7.2.2 Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd: The Court of Appeal Stage 
 
The case went on appeal to the Court of Appeal who were of the view that the disease was a 
indivisible disease which was triggered on a single unidentifiable event by one or more of the 
tortfeasors, and that it could not be safely concluded, on a balance of probabilities, as to which of 
the tortfeasors and which period of exposure, could be said to have exposed the employee to 
asbestosis or the fibers. The issue of causation had to been established, which was required to 
prove the tort. This had not been done and so  the defendants in the case, and the first two 
appellants’ case were dismissed by the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal however allowed 
the appeal of the third appellant. As a result, the matter was then taken further to the House of 
Lords.  
 
Lord Bingham had stated
541 that the essential questions which underlined the appeal before could 
be expressed as follows, which is worth repeating in full: 
 
"If (1)C was employed at different times and for differing periods by both A and B, 
and (2)A and B were both subject to a duty to take reasonable care or to take all  
practicable measures to prevent C inhaling asbestos dust because of the known risk 
that asbestos dust (if inhaled) might cause a mesothelioma, and (3) both A and B were 
in breach of that duty in relation to C during the periods of C's employment by each 
of them with the result that during both periods C inhaled excessive quantities of 
asbestos dust, and (4) C is found to be suffering from a mesothelioma, and (5) any 
cause of C's mesothelioma other than the inhalation of asbestos dust at work can be 
effectively discounted, but (6) C cannot (because of the current limits of human 
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science) prove, on the balance of probabilities, that his mesothelioma was the result of 
his inhaling asbestos dust during his employment by A or during his employment by 
B or during his  employment by A and B taken together, is C entitled to recover 
damages  against  either  A  or  B  or  against  both  A  and  B?  To  this  question  (not 
formulated in these terms) the Court of Appeal (Brooke, Latham and Kay LJJ), in a 
reserved judgment  of the court  reported at  [2002] 1 WLR 1052, gave  a negative 
answer. It did so because, applying the conventional "but for" test of tortious liability, 
it  could  not  be  held  that  C  had  proved  against  A  that  his  mesothelioma  would 
probably not have occurred but for the breach of duty by A, nor against B that his 
mesothelioma would probably not have occurred but for the breach of duty by B, nor 
against A and B that his mesothelioma would probably not have occurred but for the 
breach of duty by both A and B together. So C failed against both A and B. The 
crucial  issue  on  appeal  is  whether,  in  the  special  circumstances  of  such  a  case, 
principle, authority or policy requires or justifies a modified approach to proof of 
causation." 
 
This  was  a case  which  looked at  the tort  of  liability from a completely  different  angle and 
perspective, and it was then to be decided whether the principles as laid down applied generally 
or had this case redefined the causation (that is the "but for" test) to only apply in cases which 
dealt with mesothelioma.  
 
The usual position for cases of personal injury require the plaintiff to prove that there is a duty 
owed, the duty owed has been breached, the plaintiff has suffered a loss or damage, and that the 
breach lead to the damage. Therefore, but for the breach, the Plaintiff would not have suffered 
the damage. The Plaintiff has to prove this on a balance of probabilities
542.The House of Lords 
was asked to consider whether on the present facts, which were considered to be of a special 
nature, it should vary or relax the general principles of causation.
543 The House of Lords also had 
to look at the situation where there was more than one tortfeasor who could have exposed the 
victim to the disease but the victim was unable to point to a particular tortfeasor due to the nature 
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of the disease.  Further what would be the situation where there was a "mechanical application" 
of the general principles and what the results would be, and whether it would be appropriate in 
these sort of cases.
544 
 
Lord Bingham went thr ough a detailed analysis of all the literature and cases from various 
jurisdictions, and pointed out that although the problem was universal, the approach to it was not 
universal.
545 Although it would seem that in certain countries the Plaintiff would lose h is claim 
based on the test applied, i.e causation, and in others, the courts seem eager to obtain the end 
result  of  allowing  the  Plaintiff  to  succeed  in  his  application.
546  Lord  Bingham,  stated  as 
follows
547: 
 
"Whether by treating an increase in risk as equiva lent to a material contribution, or by 
putting a burden on the defendant, or by enlarging the ordinary approach to acting in 
concert,  or  on  more  general  grounds  influenced  by  policy  considerations,  most 
jurisdictions would, it seems, afford a remedy to the plaintiff. Development of the law in 
this country cannot of course depend on a head-count of decisions and codes adopted in 
other countries around the world, often against a background of different rules and 
traditions. The law must be developed coherently, in accordance with principle, so as to 
serve, even-handedly, the ends of justice. If, however, a decision is given in this country 
which offends one's basic sense of justice, and if consideration of international sources 
suggests that a different and mo re acceptable decision would be given in most other 
jurisdictions, whatever their legal tradition, this must prompt anxious review of the 
decision  in  question.  In  a  shrinking  world  (in  which  the  employees  of  asbestos 
companies may work for those companies in any one or more of several countries) there 
must be some virtue in uniformity of outcome whatever the diversity of approach in 
reaching that outcome." 
 
Clearly, his approach was to ensure that the end result was a just one, although clearly being 
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aware of the fact that such a result could lead to a clash of policy considerations.
548Therefore it 
could be argued that this should be the correct as no matter what factors are looked at, the 
ultimate one should be that of providing a remedy to the employee. 
 
The court went on to look at the arguments put forward by the parties. The appellants' arguments 
would result in the employer being held liable even though the damage may not have been 
caused by him. The risk was said to be greater when more tortfeasors were  involved but they 
were not present before the court, as they had gone into liquidation or disappeared.
549 In such 
situations why should the employer be held liable when causation has not been shown to exist by 
the Plaintiff. The alternative argument put forw ard placed more emphasis on strong policy 
arguments which favoured compensating the Plaintiff who had suffered substantial and serious 
harm. In such situations, who's interests should take priority in such litigation. Lord Bingham 
was of the view that the imposition of such liability on a "duty-breaking" employer was heavily 
outweighed by the injustice of denying redress to a victim.
550 He based his finding on the view 
that to find otherwise, would result in an employer who exposes his employee to asbestos be ing 
completely immune against mesothelioma and not asbestosis, by deciding to employ only 
persons who had been previously exposed to excessive quantities of asbestos dust.
551 In reaching 
this conclusion, he placed weight on the decision of  McGhee v National Coal Board
552 where 
Lord Wilberforce stated that the employers should be liable for an injury, and should suffer the 
consequence of the impossibility, foreseeably inherent in the nature of the purser’s injury of 
segregating the precise consequences of the employers default.  
 
The above analysis resulted in the House of Lords agreeing that if a claimant is able to show that 
conditions  (1)  to  (6)  have  been  satisfied,  he  would  be  entitled  to  sue  not  just  against  one 
tortfeasor but he would be able to sue both, as used in this example, A and B for their conduct of 
exposing the employee to the risk, to which he should not have been exposed to in the first place, 
and  to  which  they  should  have  protected  him  from.  Emphasis  was  again  laid  on  policy 
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considerations.  It  seems  that  what  should  be  received  in  terms  of  compensation  from  the 
employer is nothing less than full compensation, which means, 100%. Lord Bingham went on to 
suggest that it was open to the employer to seek contribution against each other or any other 
employer liable in respect of the same damage in "the ordinary way". 
553 
 
What is of significant importance is that Lord Bingham seems to be suggesting that his opinion 
or conclusion was to be directed to cases where each of the conditions as stated above, tha t is 
condition (1)-(6), would have to be satisfied and to no other cases. This means that this variation 
or introduction of a new test would only apply to specific cases. He did go on to say that it would 
be unrealistic to suppose that the principles which  have been laid down in Fairchild would not 
over time be the subject of "incremental and analogical development."
554 He disagreed with Lord 
Hutton's approach and preferred the view that the ordinary approach of causation should be 
varied rather than drawing legal inferences which were inconsistent with the proven facts. It is 
interesting to note that the courts do take a flexible approach and are willing to depart from 
established principles to reach a just result in favour of an employee. This should also be  the 
approach when looking at insurance contracts which deal with double insurance. If the courts are 
willing to depart when the case warrants it, it could also be suggested that the courts would give 
more protection to the assured and rule that contracts  which try and exclude liability are 
completely void. 
 
Lord Nicholls agreed with the other lordships and was of the view that the scope of the 
defendant's liability should be extended due to the "unattractiveness" which would result if the 
plaintiff was left without a remedy. The facts of the present case he stated was a good example 
where policy decisions would warrant a departing from the usual threshold of the "but  for” 
test
555, although noting that considerable constraint would be called for where there is an attempt 
to relax the threshold "but for" test of causal connection
556. There must be good reason for 
departing, which must be sufficiently weighty to justify depriving the defendant of the protection 
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of the test which is normally and rightly afforded to him.
557 
 
Lord Hoffmann considered it important to deal with the issue of whether causation was a 
question of fact or a matter of common sense.
558 In his opinion, the causal requirements were just 
as much part of the legal conditions for liability as the rules which prescribed the kind of conduct 
which attracts liability or the rules which limit the scope of that liability.
559 Further he considered 
that the concepts of fairness, justice and reason were connected with the rules which governed 
what would be the requ irements to conclude that the conduct was tortious
560. The significant 
features in the present case which would warrant a departure from the long -standing principles 
were (1) the duty which specifically required the protection of employees by preventing them to 
being unnecessarily exposed to the risk of being exposed to a particular disease; (2) the duty was 
intended to create a civil right to compensate for injuries which were relevantly connected to the 
breach; (3) the greater the exposure to asbestos, the  greater the risk it is for one to contract the 
disease; (4) except where there has been only one significant exposure to asbestos, medical 
science cannot prove whose asbestos is more likely to have produced the cell mutation which 
caused the disease; and ( 5) the employee has contracted the disease to which the employee 
should have been protected
561.  
 
Lord Hoffman was of the view that to now put in place a requirement that there be proof of a link 
between the defendant's asbestos and the disease contracted by  the claimant, would empty the 
duty of content, unless one was dealing with a situation where you had a single-employer. He did 
leave  open  the  possibility  of  the  court  in  future  occasions  formulating  different  casual 
requirements in these class of cases. This may be correct but there are unlikely to be many cases 
where there is a single- employer, especially cases of this sort. 
 
Therefore if the above five requirements were in place, the next issue would be which rule would 
result in a more just result and  conform to policy considerations in regard to common law and 
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statute to ensure that employees do not contract asbestos-related diseases. He raised the question 
of whether a rule should be in place in a situation, where the employer in breach of his duty 
would be held liable for the injury to the employee because of the creation of a significant risk to 
the  employees'  health,  even  thought  the  physical  injury  caused  could  have  been  caused  by 
someone else. Or a rule that would apply only where the employee has been subjected to risk by 
a breach which is caused by a single employer, which would result in the employee not having 
any remedy.
562 After carrying out a balancing exercise, Lord Hoffman was of the view that it 
would be wrong to impose a casual requirement which excluded liability.  
 
After discussing in some detail the decision of McGhee
563 on the principle of authority, he erred 
on  the  side  of  caution  and  stated  that  Wilsher's
564  decision  indicated  the  dangers  of  over-
generalisation,
565although  admitting  that  th e  principle  was  capable  of  development  and 
application in new situations.
566 
 
Lord Hutton also went through a detailed analysis of the authorities.
567 He again confirmed the 
decision of McGhee and was of the view that it was in the interest of justice that it should be a 
matter of law that that approach is the correct approach to be followed by trial judges where the 
facts were similar to the present one, where the claimant could prove that the employer's breach 
of duty materially increased the risk of him contracting a particular disease and the disease 
occurred, but where on the medical knowledge which stood at the time, it was unable to prove by 
medical evidence that the breach was a cause of the disease. 
568 He was not of the view that 
McGhee's  approach  suggested  that  a  new  principle  was  being  laid  down,  where  there  was 
medical evidence of the exact cause could not be shown.
569 Justice will be achieved if the burden 
is placed on the employer who has breached a duty imposed on him and who has materially 
increased  the  risk  of  the  employee  contracting  the  disease,  to  pay  damages  rather  than 
concluding  that  the  employee  is  not  entitled  to  damages  and  is  unable  to  receive  any 
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compensation.
570 Further he noted that as the argument had been put forward as to whether there 
should be apportionment, he was of the view that the liability should be joint and severally, 
which meant that each employer would be liable in full for the claimant's damages, although it 
was open to a defendant to seek contribution against one of the oth er employers who were held 
also liable for causing the disease.
571 However, Lord Hutton confined his opinion to the specific 
circumstances of the present case.  
 
Lord Rodger echoed similar findings as the other Lords. He was of the view that the House of 
Lords should look at the state of the evidence of the medical knowledge at the present moment 
and that one should leave the problems of the future to be resolved when they occur at a later 
stage. 
572 He went through the law of different jurisdictions to conclud e that it was possible, if 
certain conditions 
573were present. He stated as follows: 
 
"First, the principle is designed to resolve the difficulty that arises where it is inherently 
impossible for the claimant to prove exactly how his injury was caused. It ap plies, 
therefore, where the claimant has proved all that he possibly can, but the causal link 
could only ever be established by scientific investigation and the current state of the 
relevant science leaves it uncertain exactly how the injury was caused and , so, who 
caused it. McGhee and the present cases are examples. Secondly, part of the underlying 
rationale of the principle is that the defendant's wrongdoing has materially increased the 
risk  that  the claimant  will  suffer injury.  It  is  therefore  essential   not  just  that  the 
defendant's conduct created a material risk of injury to a class of persons but that it 
actually created a material risk of injury to the claimant himself. Thirdly, it follows that 
the  defendant's  conduct  must  have  been  capable  of  causin g  the  claimant's  injury. 
Fourthly, the claimant must prove that his injury was caused by the eventuation of the 
kind of risk created by the defendant's wrongdoing. In McGhee, for instance, the risk 
created by the defenders' failure was that the pursuer wou ld develop dermatitis due to 
brick dust on his skin and he proved that he had developed dermatitis due to brick dust 
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on his skin. By contrast, the principle does not apply where the claimant has merely 
proved that his injury could have been caused by a number of different events, only one 
of  which  is  the  eventuation  of  the  risk  created  by  the  defendant's  wrongful  act  or 
omission. Wilsher is an example. Fifthly, this will usually mean that the claimant must 
prove that his injury was caused, if not by exactly the same agency as was involved in 
the defendant's wrongdoing, at least by an agency that operated in substantially the same 
way. A possible example would be where a workman suffered injury from exposure to 
dusts coming from two sources, the dusts being particles of different substances each of 
which, however, could have caused his injury in the same way. Without having heard 
detailed argument on the point, I incline to the view that the principle was properly 
applied by the Court of Appeal in Fitzgerald v Lane
574.Sixthly, the principle applies 
where the other possible source of the claimant's injury is a similar wrongful act or 
omission  of  another  person,  but  it  can  also  apply  where,  as  in  McGhee,  the  other 
possible  source  of  the  injury  is  a  similar,  but  lawful,  act  or  omission  of  the  same 
defendant" 
 
He did however, reserve his position as to whether these principles would be applicable where 
the other possible source of injury was similar but lawful act or omission of someone else or a 
natural occurrence.  
575 
 
7.2.3 Bolton Metropolitan BC v Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd 
 
This case deals with a policy which includes the provision for an excess clause, which arises in 
cases dealing with issues of double insurance. In Bolton Metropolitan BC v Municipal Mutual 
Insurance Ltd
576, the employer was the local authority who occupied a building site where there 
was an employee who had accidentally inhaled asbestos fibres between 1960 and 1963. As a 
result the employee started to develop chest symptoms in 1990 and later he was diagnosed with 
mesothelioma in January 1991. He later died in 1991. There was a settlement reached with the 
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widower  and  as  a  result  the  claimant  sought  to  obtain  recover  through  the  public  liability 
insurance policy against, Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd (MMI). The public liability policy had 
been in force since 1980, which provided for indemnity by the Company to the insured in respect 
of all sums which the insured shall become legally liable for to pay as compensation which arose 
out of (a) accidental bodily injury or illness (fatal or otherwise) to any person other than any 
person employed under a contract of service…with the insured if such injury or illness arose out 
of the course of employment…occurs during the currency of the policy and arises out of the 
exercise of the functions of a local authority. There was a further provision
577 which acts as an 
excess clause and provides that if there is any occurrence which gives rise to a claim under the 
policy, and there is at the time another insurance policy in place, which is also applicable to the 
claim, then the company shall not be liable in respect of the claim, except in the amount of the 
excess beyond the amount which would be payable under such other insurance, had the present 
policy not been in force. Another requirement of the policy was that written notification had to 
be given, which had not been in this case by the second defendant. At trial the judge ruled that 
the first defendant was liable to pay the claimant and further, that the second de fendant was not 
liable because it was not on cover when the injury had occurred and since no notification had 
been given to the second defendant. On appeal, the first claimant’s case was dismissed and the 
court  rejected  the  argument  put  forward  that  injury  occurred  at  the  point  when  there  was 
inhalation of the fibres, that is, when there was accidental injury. It was inconsistent because the 
contract between the parties is an agreement to indemnify against liability and there should not 
be liability when there is initial exposure or initial bodily reaction to this kind of exposure. 
Bolton should not be liable where they could be required to be indemnified under any public 
liability insurance policy. Further it was well established that the words “injury” or “damage” in 
indemnity  agreements  would  not  include  injury  or  damage  which  will  happen  in  the 
future.
578Longmore LJ went on to say that the proximity of the word “accidental” to “bodily 
injury” did not mean that both the accident and the injury have to be within the currency of the 
policy
579. All that was necessary was that the injury occurs within the period of the policy and 
that it has to be caused accidentally. He specifically stated that the triple trigger theory did not 
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apply to employers’ liability policy at present.  
 
It  has  been  stated
580  that the  Bolton  decision  provides  that  public  liability  policies  provide 
retrospective  cover, which results  in  the incurring of liability when the negligent  act  occurs 
before the inception of cover but resulting in injury during the period of cover.  This is however 
contrary to the framework of the operation of public liability policies which are designed to give 
current  or  prospective  cover,  as  retroactive  cover  only  applies  to  claims  made  policies  that 
respond to earlier negligent acts.
581 Therefore public liability policies now exclude liability for 
exposures in earlier years which give rise to injury during the currency of the policy
582. 
 
There was discussion in Bolton as to whether there was the issue of double insurance a nd 
whether there was contribution. That is, whether CU could deny liability on the basis that Bolton 
had failed to give the notice of the accident or claim that was required, and whether as a result, 
MMI could argue that there was double insurance and then be entitled to claim contribution from 
CU. The trial judge ruled that there was no contribution. Although the Court of Appeal did not 
want to decided whether the decision in  Legal and General  Assurance Society Ltd  v Drake 
Insurance Co Ltd
583 or the decision of the Privy Council in  Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd v 
Provincial Insurance Plc
584 was correct Longmore LJ did however state that the Court of Appeal 
had the power to do so. Further Longmore LJ stated that he preferred the reasoning of the Privy 
Council which relied on the basis that the doctrine of contribution could be modified by contract 
and that the matter should considered by reference to the parties’ contractual liabilities. In his 
view, an insurer is entitled to say that he has only agreed to insure on certain terms and that he 
ought to be able to rely on that position against his insured and against his co-insured. It would 
not be a case of double insurance if one of the insurers agrees to be liable without imposing any 
condition precedent to liability in relation to notice requirement and another insurer says that he 
will only be liable if due notice is given of an accident or claim has been given.
585 There was a 
difference where you had a situation where the co -insurer who was himself a party to an 
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arrangement which after there was a loss suffered, relieved him from liability to his insured and a 
situation where you had a co-insured who tries and relies on a term of contract which existed at 
the time of loss.
586 
 
The use of the words “injury”, “accidental” and “bodily injury” arises in insurance policies, and 
would, in most cases, cover periods where this results during the period of cover. To read the 
policy in the above manner, that is, that there was no requirement that the accident and the injury 
had to happen in during the period of the policy, when dealing with cases that does not involve 
mesothelioma, cannot be correct. If that were the case, it would be limited to cases which would 
involve injury, in particular, which were injury to the body. This is too restrictive. Therefore 
where there was any matter which was covered by the insurance policy, and if there were clauses 
in the policy which excluded or limited liability, the court should exercise its discretion to hold 
that all these clauses cancel out each other and should have no effect. This would be in line with 
the objectives of s45. 
 
7.2.4 Barker v Corus: revisiting Fairchild 
 
The next case in the string of decisions was Barker v Corus
587. Barker's decision revisited the 
decision  of  Fairchild  and  led  to  more  uncertainty  in  the  area  of  liability  principles  in 
mesothelioma claims. In Barker, there were in fact three cases. The first involved the claimant's 
husband who had been exposed to asbestos during his working life for a period of some three 
years, while working for his first employer who had become insolvent, the defendant, and finally 
while he was self-employed.  The judge in this case ruled that the defendant's liability was joint 
and severable with the insolvent company, to which the Court of Appeal was in agreement. In 
the other two cases, there were a number of employers involved, and the employees had died as a 
result  of  exposure  to  asbestos.  The  problem  was  that  most  of  the  employers  had  become 
insolvent and proceedings were then brought against the remaining ex-employers. Again, the 
judge was of the view that liability of the defendants was joint and several. The Court of Appeal 
here agreed with this conclusion. As a result of this, the defendants appealed the above ruling.  
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Lord Hoffmann gave his reasons, with which the other Lords agreed with, with Lord Rodger of 
Earlsferry  dissenting.  Lord  Hoffmann  reiterated  the  emphasis  placed  by  the  House  of  the 
exceptional nature of such cases, in terms of the nature of liability, as he was also one of the 
judges on the Fairchild decision. He noted the importance of the court on relying on fairness to 
come to their conclusion, and how the court had applied an exceptional and less demanding test 
for  the  necessary  casual  link  between  the  defendant's  conduct  and  the  damage.
588  The two 
important issues that were raised in the appeal were (1) what were the limits of the exception of 
the decision in Fairchild and (2) what is the extent of the liability?  
 
The difference between the facts of Fairchild and the facts of the present case, was that here not 
all the exposures which could have caused the disease involved breaches of duty to the claimant 
or were within the control of the Defendant
589. One question which the court had to decide was 
that if this was the case, would the exception as laid down in Fairchild extend to such situations? 
Further, the court went on to state that if this were not the case, then, the issue would be whether 
Corus was liable for all the damages suffered to the Claimant, here Barker, or only for its aliquot 
contribution to the materialised risk that he could have contracted mesothelioma.
590 In the other 
two appeals it was not challenged that their cases did fall within the exception of  Fairchild, but 
what had to be decided was the issue of joint and several or only several liability. 
591 
 
Lord Hoffmann noted the differing views and mechanisms
592 of the lordships in their attempt to 
confine the approach of the extent of the principle of liability.   Also, the situation where the 
employee himself had contributed to the significant exposure in some way had not arisen in 
Fairchild, and was not dealt with by the lordships. His understanding of the analysis by the other 
lordships,  for  example,  Lord  Bingham's  view  required  that  all  possible  sources  of  asbestos 
should involve breaches of duty to the claimant. Lord Rodger he thought, went further to allow 
for non-tortious exposure by the defendant who was in some way responsible for a tortious 
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exposure but did not go on to deal with situations where there was possibility of liability where 
there had been non-tortious liability.  The other lords did not as such formulate the issues in 
terms  which  excluded  the  possibility  of  liability  when  there  was  non-tortious  exposures. 
593 
Although ultimately agreeing that the formulations on the exceptions that were expounded in 
Fairchild were not confined if different situations arose.
594 
 
The decision in McGhee was discussed and its implications, where there were situations like that 
in McGhee which resulted in other possible sources of the injury which was similar, but lawful, 
act or omission in relation to the same defendant. Lord Hoffmann was of the view that it did not 
matter whether the tortfeasor who committed the non-tortious act was the same tortfeasor who 
committed the tortious act. The Fairchild exception would allow for situations where it would 
not matter whether the exposure to the defendant was tortious or non-tortious, caused by natural 
causes or human agency or if it was attributed to the defendant himself. 
595  This would only be 
relevant to whether and to whom responsibility could also be attributed to, but that where there 
was an argument of a  causal link between the defendant's conduct and the claimant's injury, it 
was decided that it did not matter. 
596  An essential condition, as Lord Hoffmann put it, for the 
operation of the exception was that the difficulty in proving that it was the defendant who caused 
the damage was due to the existence of other potential causative agents which operated in the 
same way. 
597  The mechanism which caused the damage must be the same. 
598 
 
In relation to apportionment, Counsel for the defendant argued that as liability was approached in 
a novel way that apportionment should also be looked at in the same way. Lord Hoffmann again 
focused on the protection of the Claimant and the likely consequences of not following the 
"normal principles" which were that this was an indivisible injury. This would be the position 
even though it may cause problems to the defendant where you had a situ ation where as time 
went  by  and  the  number  of  employers  remaining  solvent  and  traceable  was 
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diminishing.
599Therefore liability should be joint and severable, to prevent the claimant from 
being out of pocket where there was a possibility that the tortfeasor was insolvent. 
 
The interesting development in Barker was the discussion of whether liability was for the risk or 
for the injury. If the court were to characterise the damage by basing the liability on the wrongful 
creation of a risk or a chance of causing  the disease, and which the damage caused by the 
defendant is the creation of such a risk or chance, then it would not matter that the disease, 
namely mesothelioma, would be indivisible. 
600 Chances it was said, were infinitely indivisible 
and different people could be separately responsible to a greater or lesser degree for the chances 
of the event happening. 
601 These cases, it was correctly pointed out, involves uncertainty as to 
the cause of a known outcome, which was mesothelioma, and Lord Hoffmann considered that it 
was possible for the courts to quantify, as he put it, "the chances of X having been the cause of Y 
just as well as the chance of Y being the outcome of X." Again the issue of fairness was 
considered,  in  relation  to  the  characterizing  of  the  dam ages  as  the  risk  of  contracting 
mesothelioma. He was of the view that fairness should be considered and if a person may be 
liable then, liability should be divided according to the possibility that one or the other may be 
liable.  
 
Damages should be apportioned according to the defendants’ contribution to the risk, according 
to the time of exposure for which the defendant was responsible, with allowance being made for 
the intensity of exposure and the type of asbestos. 
602This issue was not discussed before t he 
House but the House commented that the parties, their insurers and advisers should devise 
practical and economical criteria for dealing with them.
603 
 
Again, fairness is a common factor that the courts take into account. Although, the issue of 
contribution would be more relevant when deciding the amount of damages that should be 
awarded from a tort perspective, from an insurance perspective, contribution will not be relevant 
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to the issue of the amount of damages to be awarded. As the courts were dealing with a case 
where the illness or cause itself was very uncertain and indivisible, liability, should be of a joint 
and severable nature. When looking at a double insurance situation, the court should view such 
cases as being unique and exceptions should apply, like the Fairchild decision to such cases. 
Fairness  should  be  an  overriding  objective  when  deciding  such  cases.  Liability  between  the 
insurers should be of a joint and severable nature. This would give protection to the assured.  
 
7.2.5 Durham v BAI (Run Off) Ltd- A review of the cases 
 
The next case in a line of authorities which reviewed Fairchild, Barker and Bolton in some detail 
was the decision of Durham v BAI (Run Off) Ltd
604(referred to as "Trigger"). This case was 
subsequently referred to as the Trigger Litigation
605. In Trigger, claims were brought against the 
employers' insurers who had policies under the employers liability insurance in situations where 
the  employee  had  died  from  mesothelioma  due  to  inhaling  asbestos  fibers  during  their 
employment when employed with the employer. There were policies in place which covered the 
period from 1940 to cira 1998. The specimen policies were worded differently in each policy, 
although stating that the policy would operate where there was disease which was "su stained" 
and/or  when  disease  was  "contracted  during  the  policy  period  in  question”.  Personal 
representatives of the deceased sued under Third Parties (Rights against  Insurers) Act 1930, 
employers who had paid out but wanted to obtain indemnity under their  employers' liability 
insurance, and five employers' liability insurers (BAI (Run Off) ("BAI"), Excess Insurance Co 
Ltd,  Independent  Insurance  Co  Ltd,  Municipal  Mutual  Insurance  Ltd  ("MMI")  and  Zurich 
Insurance Co.) 
 
This  case  dealt  with  employers'  liability  insurance  and  looked  at  the  relationship  and  the 
activities  between  the  employer  and  employee.  After  the  implementation  of  the  Employers' 
Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Act 1969, all employers are required to maintain the approved 
policies under the Act. The argument put forward by the insurers was that under such employers' 
liability  insurance,  the  policy  would  only  respond  where  the  disease  of  mesothelioma  was 
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developed,  or  manifested  itself,  during  the  relevant  period  of  insurance,  which  could  have 
occurred years back. The employers and the personal representatives on the other hand argued 
that  the  insurance  policy  must  respond  to  the  disease  of  mesothelioma  which  develops  and 
manifests itself at a much later stage and that once the victim has been exposed during the 
insurance period then the tortfeasor should be liable as the law places such responsibility on the 
tortfeasor. It was stated that these alternative bases of response (or "triggers" of liability) have 
been loosely described as an occurrence (or manifestation) basis and an exposure (or causation 
basis).
606 Burton J decided that relevant insurances would only respond on an exposure basis and 
the majority
607  in the Court of Appeal agreed, especially where there was insurance which 
covered  disease  " contracted"  during  the  relevant  periods.  The  Court  of  Appeal  however 
concluded that where there was a policy which covered disease "sustained" then the policy 
would only respond on an occurrence or manifestation basis.   
 
Burton J held that all policies which were claims against the insurers were made, should respond 
where it was decided that the employer was liable on the basis that the inhalation by the 
employees was during the policy period. This was upheld by Rix, Smith and Stanley Burton LJJ 
when it went on appeal and where they were of the view that this was the position where the 
policy provided for cover for diseases "contracted" during the period of insurance but permitted 
the insurers appeal, where the policy provided for cover for diseases "sustai ned" during the 
policy period.  
 
Burton J stated
608 that single fiber theory as put forward in Fairchild’s case had been discredited 
and  that  the  analysis  of  Lord  Rodger,  who  provided  an  alternative  explanation  was  fully 
accepted. He went on to state that it was common ground that the asbestos fibers in the body 
could not be causative of mesothelioma during the last 10 years immediately prior to death, as 
the process started before that.
609 He noted the problems that such disease raised for the purposes 
of the Employers’ Liability Act 1880, which required that the employee show that employer has 
caused the injury and for the purposes of s4 of the Act, the sustaining of the injury was only to 
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refer to injury which had been so caused. Due to the unfairness which resulted, the Workmen’s 
Compensation Act
610 was passed by Parliament. He also noted the decision in  Fairchild and 
Barker v Corus, and was of the view that the majority view was that found at paragraph [48]
611 
of the judgment. However, as a result of the decision in Barker v Corus, Parliament decided that 
it  was  necessary  that  legislation  be  passed  in  the  form  of  the  Compensation  Act  2006,  in 
particular section 3, which specifically deals with mesothelioma jurisprudence.    
 
Section 3
612 is an interesting piece of  legislation, in relation to damages, which requires some 
attention. Under the section, reference is made to “the responsible person” who has negligently 
or in breach of statutory duty caused or permitted the victim to be exposed to asbestos and as a 
result the victim had contracted mesothelioma due to the exposure to the asbestos. Further that 
due to the nature of the mesothelioma and the lack of determination with any certainty due to the 
state of medical science, whether such exposure caused the victim to become ill and liability falls 
on the shoulders of the responsible person, in connection with damage caused to the victim by 
the  disease,  either  by  reason  of  having  materially  increased  a  risk  or  for  any  other  reason. 
Liability under s3(2) will make the responsible person liable in whole for the damage caused to 
the victim by disease, this would still apply regardless of whether the victim was also exposed by 
persons other than the responsible person, as liability would be regarded as joint and several with 
any other responsible person. Therefore as can be seen, one solvent employer will be facing 
liability when the employee showing that they had been tortuously exposed to asbestos while 
being exposed to it during their employment.  
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The next issue which was discussed was that of insurer’s liability under the Employers’ Liability 
insurance  which  is  owed  by  the  employer  to  the  employee,  until  the  establishment  and 
ascertainment of which there is no right of indemnity by the employer against the insurance 
company
613. It is the wording of the insurance policy that has to be looked at. The issue as 
pointed by Burton J was that the question of once the employer is held to be liable to the 
employee, as to what trigger or key unlocks a relevant period of cover, when l ooking at the 
wording of the insurance policies in place at the time.
614 Burton J correctly identified that that 
issue was what would be the temporal limitation where you have a Employers’ Liability Policy 
which provided for indemnity  against liability for compensation for bodily injury or disease 
which was suffered by a person to contract of service which arises out of or in the course of the 
employee’s employment by the employer. He then went to state that there were five kinds of 
liability insurance triggers which were relevant to Employers’ liability insurance, which were as 
follows: (1) occurrence or event, which was at the date of breach; (2) causation/exposure; (3) 
occurrence  of  loss/damage,  which  was  also  known  as  injury  of  fact;  (4) 
manifestation/diagnosis/notice; and (5) claims made. It was stated that (i) – (iv) are all known as 
“events occurring”, which should be contrasted with (v).
615 Employers’ Liability it was said, was 
causative, which required that liability of the employer has to be shown and that the injury must 
have arisen out of the employment, which to that extent had to be caused by the employer. Public 
liability insurance on the other hand does not have an employment relationship in existence.   
 
Burton J concluded that both words ‘sustained’ and ‘contracted’, are required to be construed in 
their context and within the factual matrix, and the words ‘caused’ or ‘be caused’ are to be 
construed  as  meaning  the  same  as  a  causation  test.  On  the  present  case,  such  a  reading  is 
consistent  with  the  commercial  purpose  of  Employers’  Liability.  Burton  J  said  that  this 
construction is consistent with public policy, when considering the Workman’s Compensation 
Act  and  the  courts’  approach  of  giving  protection  to  the  employee  who  could  look  to  the 
insured’s employers, taking into consideration the likelihood that there would be a change of 
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insures during the period of the employees’ employment. Further that including the wording 
‘caused’ or to have a ‘sustained’ wording, which is construed as meaning, ‘be caused’ was the 
only way to achieve consistency with public policy and the Act, so protection would be given 
“irrespective of what may happen thereafter”
616 He went on to say that on a construction of the 
words which apply on a causation or exposure basis, ‘contracted’, inflicted, was wide enough to 
mean  ‘be  caused’.  Looking  at  the  wording  of  the  policies,  injury  is  ‘sustained’  when  it  is 
‘caused’ and the disease is ‘contracted’ when it is ‘caused’. 
617 
 
The Supreme Court was of the view that a review of the principles as discussed at First Instance 
and at the Court of Appeal was necessary
618. Reference was made to the wordings of the policy 
which were reproduced in Annex A, which the insurers argued that the policies would not 
respond to many of the mesothelioma claims because the claims only emerge in the 1980s. This 
was clearly in the hopes to avoid paying out under the insurance policies. The words that were 
relied on were crucial. These were the words "sustain" whether in connection with the phrase 
“personal  injury  by  accident  or  disease"  or  "bodily  injury  or  disease"  or  in  the  conjunction 
"injury  or  disease...sustained  or  contacted"  or  "injury  sustained  or  disease  contracted".  The 
majority  in  the  Court  of  Appeal  were  of  the  view  that  "sustain"  looked  prima  facie  at  the 
experience  of  the  suffering  employee  rather  than  its  cause.  Therefore  this  would  not  cover 
situations where the mesothelioma was sustained long afterwards.  
 
The Court of Appeal in its judgment again went through the leading authorities in mesothelioma 
claims. In a split decision, Smith LJ in his analysis agreed with what was stated by Burton J. The 
majority, comprising of Rix and Stanley Burnton LJJ partially disagreed with the decision of 
Burton J.    
 
Rix LJ when dealing with the issue of the construction of the wording 'sustain' injury, which he 
considered  to  be  crucial  in  terms  of  wording  in  all  the  policies,  stated  that  the  concept  of 
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sustaining injury in its normal sense refers to the suffering of injury
619. Injury he though only 
occurred when it was suffered, or is incurred, or when it occurs, or is inflicted upon one. The 
judge's approach, Rix LJ thought, left one with ambiguity, by substituting the word 'caused' with 
the word 'sustained'. Therefore, the issue was, was one to look at the injury or was one to look at 
the cause of the injury. Rix  LJ stated that sustaining injury prima facie looks to the injury rather 
than its cause. 
620 These were standard wordings which were included in contracts which would 
be renewed by the parties on a yearly basis, and in some cases, tariff wordings were used which 
tended to adopt the causative approach. 
621 This approach starts with the concept of sustaining 
injury and then goes on to state that what will have to occur in the policy year is not the injury 
itself but the cause of that injury, as usually the words "if any person under  a contract of 
service...shall sustain bodily injury or disease caused during the period of insurance"
622 Although 
he noted the conflict which may arise when looking at it in conjuncti on with the Employers' 
Liability insurance but such a definition would not be an absurd or meaningless or irrational 
interpretation. 
623 He equated it with the way the court defines "injury occurring" that is used in 
public liability insurance. He noted and seemed to suggest that although it is mesothelioma and 
its "extraordinary circumstances" which was where such a test is usually applied,
624 he went on 
to say that it would also be possible that the test could also be used in other forms of cancers.  
 
Further, the words "disease contracted" was important and could be looked at in two ways. If the 
phrase is to be looked at together with the words 'injury sustained' then this would seem to 
suggest that this would be dealing with the onset of the disease and not  looking at the origin of 
the disease, which would be consistent with the Bolton Metropolitan BC case’s interpretation. On 
the other hand one could look at it in a commercial sense with regard to the purpose of the 
Employers Liability insurance contracts, which looks at the casual origins of the disease in the 
employee's exposure to noxious activities which he is subject to during his employment. He 
preferred the later one, and held that prima facie the phrase 'disease contracted' refers to the time 
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of the disease's causal origins.   
625 
 
In terms of injury, Rix LJ felt that he was bound to the decision of  Bolton Metropolitan BC, 
which clearly stated that there was no injury until the injury's onset, even though he was of the 
view that he had serious doubts about its correctness. He went on to discuss the decision of 
Fairchild, Barker and Rothwell and concluded that on his analysis that where mesothelioma 
develops, it is the exposure, and the risk of mesothelioma which is the damage, and as a result 
the  employer  should  be  liable.
626  He reached this based on the  Barker's  case  where  Lord 
Hoffman stated that the underlying purpose of Fairchild exception 'is to provide a cause of action 
against a defendant who has materially increased the risk that the claimant will suffer damage', 
and where the risk has materialised.
627 Such an understanding would, in his view, lead to the 
time of the creation of the risk, the creation which should also be the time of the cause of action, 
which is caused by the risk and injury or damage  which leads on to the mesothelioma. This he 
claimed reflected a common sense approach and was consistent with the medical literature at the 
time. Bolton's decision
628 was precedent and although he stated that he was bound, he still went 
on to state why he did not agree with the case. 
 
Justice would be done if such a conclusion was followed, which requires the employers to cover 
for liability which arose out of injuries which the employee obtained during the employment in 
any given policy year where such injur ies arise out of the employee's exposure to the insured 
employers' activities in that year. He went on to say that this would in some ways prevent the 
"unknowable and serendipitous mystery" 
629of the problems of mesothelioma, which was when 
the onset starts. This would result in the situations arising where one would not be able to say 
whether and which employer the employers liability fell on, or if it fell within one wording or 
another, or whether it was not covered at all.  
630  If one were to follow the analysis of Rix LJ, he 
considered that this would result in the precedent of the  Bolton  decision  not  applying  or 
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extending to other types of diseases. Further, he was of the view that this would also be in line 
with other jurisdictions. He ultimately concluded that the word sustain meant sustain, but that 
'disease contracted' looked towards the causative origins. 
 
Smith J agreed with the decision of the judge, but on doing so came to his conclusion based on 
the principal ground that the sustained wording should be read in such a way that would result in 
the user's meaning at the time of the policies in question and by looking at the factual matrix of 
the policies at the time when reading the policies, which had the same effect of causation. This is 
due to the acceptance of the change of the medical knowledge being different at different points 
of time.    Burton LJ agreed with Rix J's decision but disagreed on the Independent analysis
631 
and his conclusion regarding the decision that the 1969 Act required causation wording. Further, 
whether employee included ex-employee was another factor to be considered.  
 
Lord Mance JSC, in the Supreme Court, decided that the correct way to resolve the interpretation 
of the words was to avoid looking at the meaning of the single  words or phrases but one had to 
look at the insurance contracts more broadly. Five factors were looked at that were indicative of 
a causative approach being preferred. The first was the wordings on their face required the 
course of employment to be contemporaneous with the sustaining of injury, although "sustain" 
would equate more with occurrence. Secondly, there would be a close link between the actual 
employment undertaken during each insurance period and the premium which was agreed to be 
payable for the risks that were undertaken by the insurer during that period.   Thirdly, there 
would be a potential gap in cover where there was an employers' breach of duty in a period 
which only led to injury or disease in another further period, if one were to look at the insurance 
policies only addressing risks during the period of the policy. Fourthly, employers would be left 
open to the possibility that the insurers may not renew the policy, even though such situations 
may not arise in large number of cases. However, Lord Mance JSJ was of the view that Rix LJ, 
failed to take into account the decision of  Rainy Sky SA v Kookmin  Bank
632  where it  was 
considered that where there was more than one interpretation, it would be appropriate to adopt an 
interpretation with business common sense. Further that even 1% of cases where there may be no 
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cover was not insignificant. 
633 The fifth point was the issue of territorial scope, where one would 
have a result of the disease experienced during employment covered even though it was  caused 
by pre-employment exposure, and a situation where disease cause by employment not covered if 
only experienced while the employee was working abroad.  
 
The wording of the BAI and MMI policies would still lead to uncertainty regarding disease and 
the difference between "injury sustained" and "accidents arising" as it could be read either as 
deliberate or as suggesting that no significance was attached to the difference or that the real 
concern was causation. 
634 
 
Lord Mance then went on to deal with rele vant parts of the history and the wordings of the 
Workmen’s Compensations Acts, agreeing with the analysis by Rix LJ
635.  
 
Lord Mance agreed with Smith LJ's conclusion that public liability and employers' liability gave 
rise to different considerations, which according to Smith LJ was necessary as on the factual 
matrix  he  felt  that  they  were  dealing  with  Employers'  Liability  rather  than  public  liability 
policies. 
636 This was due to the effect of the particular terms and consideration
637 which to be 
taken into account. He then went on to proceed on the basis that  Bolton Metropolitan was not 
binding on the court, without discussing the accuracy of the decision but basing it on the fact that 
it was unnecessary to decide what the position would be if one were to deal with public liability 
insurance.   
 
He agreed with the Court of Appeal that the word "contracted" looked at together with disease 
looks to the initiating or causative factor of the disease. The word "sustained" may at first glance 
refer to the development or manifestation of such an injury or disease as it impacts employees, 
the only approach which is consistent, would be to look to the initiation or causation of the 
accident or disease which injured the employee. Therefore this would be when the disease was 
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caused or initiated even though it would only develop and manifest at a much later stage. The 
case of Fairchild which imposed liability for the mesothelioma on persons who have exposed the 
victim to asbestos and as a result created the risk of mesothelioma is not a rule which, as he put 
it, even as between employers and employees, would deem that the employee has suffered injury 
or disease when there was exposure. Even if it is viewed that liability is retrospective on the 
employers, the insurance policies do not insure risk of physical injury or disease, but only actual 
injury or disease
638. 
 
However, what is important from a double insurance aspect is the application of the insurance 
provided for mesothelioma victims. This issue only became significant wh en raised by Lord 
Phillips, who stated that exposure to the risk of mesothelioma was the correct analysis of the 
Fairchild rule and that exposure could not satisfy the concept of injury or the concept of 
causation for the purposes of the policies.  Lord Mance on the other hand, went on to state that if 
Lord Phillips is correct in his approach and analysis, then this meant that all the present 
insurance claims would fail, not to mention the majority of the claims that were settled by other 
insurers or by pre sent insurers. The only exception he said would be situations where an 
employee exposed to asbestos when employed by only one employer who had at the time been 
insured with only one insurer throughout. The conclusions which the decision of  Fairchild, 
Barker and Sienkiewicz provides is that of a special rule which provided for a deeming provision, 
that  once  an  employer  had  exposed  an  employee  to  asbestos  and  as  a  result  that  employee 
suffered mesothelioma, then the insurance policies should pay out. Therefore the decision of 
Fairchild would create liability not for the disease but “for the creation of the risk of causing the 
disease”.  Further, that  according to  Lord Phillips analysis, no assistance would be given to 
employers and employees from the conclusion that a person who suffers from mesothelioma was 
caused or initiated in any particular policy period. This he stated would suggest that even if the 
employers’ policy responded, when there are injuries caused or initiated during their period, the 
employer and employee would fail for want of proof.
639 
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Lord Mance did not agree with this analysis after referring to the decisions in Fairchild and 
Barker,  and  the  House  of  Lords  decision  which  rejected  this  fictional  approach,  that  each 
exposure would have caused or materially contributed to the disease
640. Further that the liability 
was not the causing of the disease but for materially increasing the risk of the  mesothelioma
641. 
After a closer analysis of Barker, Lord Mance stated that one could conclude that the common 
law position after the Barker decision was concerned with the issue of the “causal requirements” 
or “causal link” between the defendant’s conduct and the disease. Of course, the precondition that 
the person actually develops mesothelioma was required
642. The cause of action would lie where 
the victim could have been exposed by the employer previously, and not because that the 
employee had been, and therefore mesothelioma may have been suffered by him. In relation to 
the exposure, is that some exposure to  the asbestos by someone, something or some event had 
led to the mesothelioma. 
643  Therefore, the cause of action is  “for”  or  “in  respect  of”  the 
mesothelioma and the defendant  who  exposes a victim of mesothelioma to  asbestos  will be 
responsible  “for”  and  “in  respect  of”  both  that  exposure  and  the  mesothelioma,  which  later 
develops.
644 
 
The main issue of the present appeals was on what basis the employers ’  liability  insurance 
policies  respond  as  a  matter  of  construction,  where  you  have  situations  which  fell  with  the 
framework of Fairchild and Barker. Lord Mance went on to say that the employer must accept 
situations  and  the  possibilities  where  the  common  law  would  develop  to  a  stage  where  the 
employer’s liability would be increased, if they were within the limits of the relevant insurance 
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and insurance period. 
645 
 
He considered the liability only arose where because of the incurring of the disease and is for the 
disease.
646 The liability arises when the employer had exposed the victim to the disease. The 
same would apply in situation where there is vicarious liability. The way the insurance policies 
should be read, is that of a causative basis which would effectively cover any liability which 
arises during the employers’ activities during the period of coverage, and only if liability for 
mesothelioma flows from the negligent exposure during an insurance period is covered by the 
policies, otherwise the  policy would not  respond.
647 For the purposes of insurances, a more 
justified  approach  when  dealing  with  insurance  would   be  one  where  the  liability  of 
mesothelioma  following  the  exposure  to  asbestos  which  was  created  when  the  policy  of 
insurance was in effect and during the insurance period, would provide a sufficient  “weak” or 
“broad” causal link for the disease to be regarded as “caused” within the insurance period.
648 The 
law would be unjust for there on the one hand to be a deeming provision of causation of the 
disease which could have created policy liability, and on the other, insist that the risk for such 
cases would be for the risk of causation. The risk, he went on to say was no more than an 
element or condition necessary to establish liability for the mesothelioma. The 2006 Act was, in 
his view, there to impose liability on the employer for the mesothelioma.  
 
For the purposes of the policy, the negligent exposure of the employee to the asbestos could have 
a sufficient causal link or being sufficiently causally connected with subsequently arising of 
mesothelioma, in which case the policy will respond to the claim. The  fundamental focus of the 
policies, he regarded, was on the employment relationship and activities during the insurance 
period and on liability arising out of and in course of them, which would result in the liability 
attaching.  
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Lord Clarke when dealing with the insurers and whether the policy would respond, was of the 
opinion that the employers’ liability insurers would  be liable to  indemnify the  employers in 
respect of that liability.  Further he was of the view that once it was held that on the present facts 
that the employers were liable to the employees, it would be remarkable if the insurers were not 
liable under the policies.
649 
 
Lord Phillips’s analysis is an interesting one and some commentators have said that his analysis 
and conclusion is wrong.
650He raised a few questions which he thought would lead to some 
difficulty if an employer was unable to prove that an employee ’s mesothelioma was caused in 
whole or in part by any particular period of exposure to asbestos dust. This would mean that the 
employer would not be able, once the special rule was applied and he was held liable, on a 
balance of probabilities, that the liability was initiated in any particular policy year. If this were 
the case, then the issue would be, how could the employer prove that his liability fell within the 
scope of cover, even if the policy bore the construction contended for by the employers and 
which was upheld by the court? Lord Phillip was of the view that the court should not redefine 
the special rule which would enable the claims to  be brought  under the employers’ liability 
policy. He went on to say that the object of the special approach in the decision in Fairchild and 
Barker was there to enable that where an employer had breached his duty, which was owed to 
the employee, did not escape liability because of the scientific uncertainty which was present in 
relation  other  types  of  cases.  Lord  Phillips  felt  that  it  would  be  “judicial  law-making”  of  a 
different dimension if the courts were able to create such a fiction as to the policy years in which 
mesothelioma cases were initiated in order to render liable insurers who could not otherwise be 
able to show that they were in fact liable.
651 He considered that if there was a compelling reason 
that a means should be founded which wo uld result in employers’ liability insurers liable, he 
thought that this would be a matter for Parliament and not for the courts. It would, in his view be 
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wrong in principle for the Supreme Court to depart from the reasoning of the majority in Barker 
for the only reason and purpose of imposing liability on the employers’ liability insurers.
652 
 
In Durham, there was emphasis placed on the wordings of the policies and how they should be 
read, causation and whether liability should fall on a  “responsible person” who was connected 
with damage caused to the victim by the disease. These play an important part when one deals 
with  mesothelioma  cases,  although  it  has  been  suggested  that  these  requirements  could  be 
branched out other diseases. It can be seen that the courts realized the problem with this unique 
type  of  situation  and  the  likely  unfairness  which  was  could  arise,  and  as  a  result  further 
protection was implemented in the form of legislation. It could be argued that a similar approach 
should be adopted for other cases or situations where double insurance could arise. Similarly, a 
legislative  framework  in  the  form  of  s45  could  be  developed  in  England,  to  resolve  the 
unfairness which has arisen in double insurance cases.  
 
 
7.3 Reasoning of the Mesothelioma case: What is the possible solution and does it apply to 
double insurance? 
 
 
The issue of causation is relevant to double insurance because it is unclear which policy applies 
and so the defendant insurer cannot be identified.  
 
As can be seen from the above discussion of the authorities and the reasoning of the courts, there 
have been different ways of approaching the issue of mesothelioma cases. It is not disputed that 
such cases are unique. It can also be seen how the courts have attempted to grant the protection 
to such victims where you have a situation where it would be almost impossible for the claimant 
to be able to point his finger at one particular employer, when you have a situation where you 
have numerous employers, as to who is liable for the injury suffered by the employee. The same 
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applies to situations of double insurance and which insurer to sue then becomes relevant. This 
results in the insurer arguing that it is not liable as their policy does not cover the period in 
question. 
 
The courts have stretched the general rules of causation and extended it all the way to provide 
protection to the victim. In relation to the liability of the employer in such situations, the issue 
then  is  whether  the  courts  approach  should  also  apply  to  situations  where  you  have  double 
insurance. It could be argued that the Australian legislation under s45 could provide a solution in 
cases where double insurance would arise. 
 
From an employees’ perspective, he would not have to worry as to whether he will get paid or 
not, where you have a situation where there are numerous employers, as under tort law he can 
pick any employer he wishes. Accordingly, the employer can make a claim against the insurer in 
every year of exposure and for every act of exposure which is on risk for any one year during 
which it is alleged that the exposure may have taken place. Further, if an insurer has paid out 
under a policy, whether the insurer can then go on to seek contribution from other insurers. The 
courts removing the requirement of the causative effect will permit an assured to sue whichever 
insurer he wishes. This will be the case, only if there is in fact a situation of double insurance 
arising. The insurer will now be liable to pay in full, i.e 100%, of the loss which has arisen. It 
could be argued that there is no double insurance (i.e because there are no concurrent policies in 
place) for mesothelioma cases and therefore no contribution arises. The policies are consecutive 
in nature, and which respond to different exposures. 
 
The employer does not need to respond to a request by the insurer to identify a particular year, 
because there is a claim for every year. This request may only be relevant for dealing with any 
reinsurance claims. 
 
Under the law of tort, the position is that there is entitlement to compensation.
653Issues regarding 
payment of the liabilities will only be looked at in terms of mere practice and is only of 
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subsidiary concern.
654 One of the reasons why this is so, is the view that liabilities are usually 
paid for by the insurance that has been taken out and the legislative provision in place, such as 
Employers’ Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Act 1969.
655 This legislation specifically provides 
for a requirement that the employer who carries any type of business in Great Britain, to take out 
insurance, and is required to maintain insurance for liability for bodily injury or diseases which 
the employee may get.
656 
 
There  has  been  suggestion  that  the  Fairchild,  Bolton  and  Durham  have  been  far  from 
satisfactory
657 and that there is no need for the analysis as put forward by the courts as to the 
distinguishing of the types of wordings used as to whether there is cover or not. The problem is 
that there is room to argue whether “sustained” is genuinely unambiguous in its meaning.
658 It is 
the principles of contractual interpretation and looking at the intentions of the parties which 
should be relevant when interpreting the contractual terms of the contract entered into between 
the parties. If such an approach was adopted then such an ambiguity  would not arise.
659The 
reasoning of the judges meant that whether the employer is covered or not depended on the 
wording of the policy, for example, where the wording was stated as “injury sustained” would be 
uninsured  against  exposes.  However,  if  the  wording  used  was  “injury  sustained  or  disease 
contracted”, this would suggest that there was cover present and that those making a claim under 
the policy would be covered.
660 This does not, it has been argued, reflect the contractual intention 
of the parties.  
 
According to the case  of  Investors  Compensation  Scheme  Ltd  v  West  Bromwich  Building 
Society
661 , the House of Lords provided principles in terms of how the wording in the contracts 
                                                            
 
654 R Merkin and J Steele, ‘Compensating Mesothelioma Victims’ (2011) 127 LQR 329 
655 R Merkin and J Steele, ‘Compensating Mesothelioma Victims’ (2011) 127 LQR 330 
656 Section 1(1) 
657 R Merkin and J Steele, ‘Compensating Mesothelioma Victims’ (2011) 127 LQR 331 
658 R Merkin and J Steele, ‘Compensating Mesothelioma Victims’ (2011) 127 LQR 331 
659 R Merkin and J Steele, ‘Compensating Mesothelioma Victims’ (2011) 127 LQR 331 
660 R Merkin and J Steele, ‘Compensating Mesothelioma Victims’ (2011) 127 LQR 331 
661 [1998] 1 W.L.R. 896 199 
 
should be construed. The interpretation the court said was to be ascertained by looking at the 
document and to see what a reasonable person having all the background knowledge which 
would  reasonably  been  available  to  the  parties  when  they  entered  into  the  contract  has.
662 
Further, what would fall under background would be absolutely an ything which would have 
affected the way in which the language of the document would have been understood by a 
reasonable man.
663 Therefore, should one have to look at the actual wording or should one have 
to look at the intention of the parties when they en tered into the contract. The way the law had 
developed when it reached the Court of Appeal stage could create potential problems such as 
what sort of “injuries” would be actually be necessary before they fall within the confines of the 
insurance policy, which would be unsatisfactory to define due to the changing nature of the 
mesothelioma cases, where a more definite understanding could be provided when the medical 
literature is more abundant.
664 It has been argued that the commercial purpose of the parties 
should take significance over the actual wordings that the parties choose, as it could always 
secure the rights and duties which had been defined in the terms, but contextual interpretation 
should not be confined in such a way.
665 
 
The Court of Appeal decision, has been argued
666 to be wrong in the following four respects (1) 
that the distinction raised by the courts regarding  “injury sustained” and “disease contracted” is 
artificial; (2) the ruling seriously undermines the legislative provision in place, which is the 1969 
Act;  (3)  the  wider  policy  context
667; and (4) the Court of Appeal did not distinguish
668  the 
decision in Bolton.  
 
For point (1), it is unclear why the courts should read into the words in such a way that was not 
what was intended by the parties in the first place. These words have been standard wordings in 
the policies and could be one argument in favour of its continuing use in Employers Liability 
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Policies.  
 
For point (2), the whole point for the implementation of the Employers’ Liability (Compulsory 
Insurance) Act 1969 was to give protection to the employee by ensuring that the employer takes 
out such insurance on behalf of the employee. The ambiguity in the terms of the contract
669 is not 
required for contextual issues for it to be considered rele vant, but the ambiguity in the wording 
“disease contracted” could have been considered as interchangeable when considering or using 
the phrase “injury sustained”.
670There should not be a distinction when dealing with other types 
of cases. 
 
For point (3), it has been said that the process of trying to determine how words are used by the 
parties, that parties had drafted many years back in such cases, and apply them to unforeseen 
circumstances is an artificial exercise.
671 It seems unlikely that after the legisla ture decided to 
implement the Compensation Act as a result of the decision in  Barker to protect the victim, that 
it would now remove such protection.
672 
 
For point (4), it has been suggested that when looking at tort law, one will not look at the 
physical harm that has been caused but the earlier cause.  
673This was compatible with the 
decision of Rothwell v Chemical & Insulating Co Ltd
674. The issue that one has to focus on is the 
injury that has been caused and not the damage in an insurance policy.
675 The markets have 
criticised the decision in  Bolton when one looks at the effects that the obligation that has now 
been placed on a public liability insurer to provide cover for torts which have occurred some four 
decades ago. 
676The effect now is that injury cover is now almost changed to claims made cover, 
which creates retroactivity for public liability policies, which does not seem to be the intended 
effect. 
677 This does not apply in situations where you have employers' liability policy due to the 
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effect  of  the  decision  in  Durham,  which  provided  that  once  you  have  clear  wording  in  an 
occurrence-based policies, the employee has to be working for the employer at the time of the 
exposure  and  at  the  time  of  the  injury.
678  The problem with the suggested approach is that 
occurrence-based policy will not cover the  employers’  liability  to  pay  compensation  to  the 
former  employee,  as  public  liability  and  employers'  liability  policy  will  only  achieve  their 
purpose when one is operating on an exposure based structure. 
679 Further, if the Supreme Court 
overturns  the  Durham  decision,  another  issue  which  is  of  importance  is  the  allocating 
responsibility as between the consecutive annual insurers if there is only employer, as the courts 
have now stated that there is no need for the employee to identify any single year of exposure, 
due to the protection now given to the employee, due to the unique situation that has arisen in 
such cases, for him to bring his claim.
680 This has implications when dealing with the issue of 
double insurance and issues of contribution.  
 
Further when one looks at the 1969 Act itself, no specific provision or wording is made for what 
type of policy would have to be taken out to comply with the wording of the Act
681. One view
682 
is that Rix LJ was correct in his approach  that an exposure-based cover was the only type of 
policy which would be able to satisfy the wording of the 1969 Act, this was subject to the insurer 
having a right of recourse to the employer if the policy was otherwise written on an injury basis.  
The reason why Rix LJ’s view is more logical is that the policy, if it is an occurrence –based 
policy, will only apply to current employees, this would mean that all the ex-employees who had 
contracted mesothelioma would not be given any protection or be able to  recover under the 
policy, as they must remain employed at the date of the onset of the injury.
683 If one were to 
follow the analysis of Stanley, Burnton and Smith LJJ
684, this would leave out employees who 
have left the employment of their employer. Further th e legislation does not make express 
provision for ex -employees to be covered and to do so would lead to the prohibition of 
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contractual exclusions for liability which arose from previous acts.
685 
 
Lord Mance’s approach, that is one where the insurance contracts must be looked at in broad 
terms is correct and should be the way such contracts are looked at when trying to interpret the 
construction of the contracts. Although it has been argued that the courts do not need to look at 
the wording of policy and that what one has to look at is instead the intention of the parties. This 
may be correct but ultimately you have to look at the wording to ascertain the intention of the 
parties.  
 
As the employee already has protection afforded to him under the law of tort, it could be argued 
that the only concern then is for the protection of insurers in respect of whether they can seek 
contribution from other insurers once an insurer had already paid out under the policy. Lord 
Clarke correctly pointed out that it would be remarkable if the insurers were not liable under the 
policies. If that is the case, then surely an approach that would be most beneficial to the insurer 
would be if the deemed causation approach is followed.  
 
It is important to note the differences in application of the deemed causation approach and the 
new tort approach which have been suggested by the courts as likely outcomes. It should also be 
bore in mind the type of medical condition that was before the courts. The difficulty to identify 
the exact time a victim has come into contact with asbestos either accidentally or through his 
work as an employee has been discussed in the case, in particular Fairchild’s case and  shown by 
the medical evidence. This therefore had led to the development of the special rule. 
 
According to the Fairchild decision, which adopts the causative approach, the employee can 
choose to sue either or both of his employers. The employer can then submit the claim to his 
insurer to recover the whole loss for any year.  If the new liability of materially increasing the 
risk of mesothelioma is followed, then the burden would be on the employer to have to point to a 
particular exposure which had caused the injury, this may prove difficult and this would result in 
the employer unable to submit his claim.
686   Another possible interpretation was it would render 
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liabilities uninsured, even though there is a legislative requirement to do so.
687 Further there may 
be problems of re-insurance problems, where the re-insurer will refuse to pay out if a particular 
could not be identified. 
 
However matters may become complicated due to the type of liability insurance
688. It could be 
possible that one year the insurance taken out is under a causation policy which would make the 
employer liable and another year the policy may be that of an injury policy. The employer may 
choose different insurers during different years. Further each insurance policy could also be 
different. The significance will be apparent depending on the year of exposure and the year the 
injury is suffered by the employee.  The date of the trigger is important and one has to look at the 
status of the employee.
689 
 
These cases, although mainly dealing with the tort aspect of litigation, also have to be looked at 
from the perspective of the insurers and the likely implications for them. Application of different 
tests leads to different results. The case of  Durham  is  of  broad  significance.
690  The courts 
approach of the cases is a “transparent illustration of holistic law making, identifying an injustice 
in the application of the rule in causation and then allowing the matching of insurance with the 
modified approach”.
691 This is the correct approach if a more balanced and fair approach is to be 
achieved.   
 
However, in some cases the policies may not be concurrent, which is one of the requirements for 
double insurance. The policies may still include rateable proportion clauses. The type of cases 
where this situation arises can be found in cases where the insurer pays out for the loss that has 
been suffered. These cases usually involve the inhalation of asbestos, where it is impossible to 
know whether any particular inhalation of the asbestos, which occurred many years previously 
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plays a part in contributing to the death of the employee. This is what happened in the decisions 
of  Phillips  v  Syndicate  992  Gunner
692, Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd 
693  and 
Barker  v Corus  (UK) Ltd
694. There have been differences  of opinion, such as  whether  each 
employer was liable to the employee or was each employer liable only for its proportionate 
share, but the decision in Fairchild has been considered to be the correct approach that the courts 
will take. In the case of Fairchild, although not directly dealing with rateable proportion clauses, 
held that the employers were liable for the loss suffered to the employee. Situations like those in 
Fairchild would arise when (a) two separate potential causes exposes the claimant to the same 
risk, one involving the act of the defendant, (b) either one gives rise to the risk and (c)one does, 
but (d) neither of which can as a matter of probability be shown to have done so. This position 
now extends, due to the decisions in Barker and Sienkiewicz v Grief (UK) Ltd
695to any case 
where an act or omission exposing a person to asbestos, which may have caused  mesothelioma, 
but where it was not possible to show as a matter of probability. In Barker it was then concluded 
that any person’s liability should be proportionate to the extent that he had exposed another to the 
risk of mesothelioma. However, this was reversed due to the enactment by Parliament of the 
Compensation  Act  2006
696, which now has the effect of making each such person liable in 
respect of the whole of the damage
697 caused by the mesothelioma. Under this legislation the 
Financial  Services Authority has the power to make rules for compensation to such victims 
where employers’  liability  insurers  have  become  insolvent  where  claims  are  made  before  1 
December 2001. Therefore in Sienkiewicz, it seemed that this Act assumes liability and only 
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alters the measure of recovery
698. Eady J provided some guidance in the decision of Phillips. In 
Phillips, the deceased employee had been exposed to asbestos dust for a period of time and 
contracted malignant mesothelioma. The defendant relied on express terms of the employer’s 
liability policy which stated that if there was other insurance covering the same liability when a 
claim  arose,  the  underwriters  would  not  be  liable  to  pay  or  contribute  more  than  their  due 
proportion of any such claim. It was also argued that the rateable proportion clause should be 
implied into the contract to give business efficacy. Eady J concluded that the wording used by 
the insurers would not be sufficient to cover situations where there are successive policies of 
insurance which covered different periods and different risks. He also did not see the need to 
imply into the contract that a rateable proportion clause to give it business efficacy. The latter 
cases
699  state  that  the  conclusion  should  be  for  the  purposes  of  insuranc e,  liability  for 
mesothelioma following upon exposure to asbestos created during an insurance period involves a 
sufficient “weak” or “broad” casual link for the disease to be regarded as “caused” within the 
insurance period. 
 
First of all there is only a peak in such case due to the exposure which happened to an employee 
which took place decades ago but only recently have the effect so exposure to asbestos arisen. 
The fact that these events took place a long time should not matter. By the decision of Fairchild 
and the implementation of legislative provisions in the form of Compensation Act 2006, it is 
obvious that there was a need to provide protection to employees. These are cases where it would 
almost impossible to point the finger at any one particular employer where you have a situation 
where there are numerous employers. In some cases, the employer that the employee had worked 
with may have become insolvent, which would leave the employee without any protection or 
where the insurance company of the employer that he was working for no longer exists. There 
would not be a problem where the employee worked for only one employer and the insurance 
company which the employer insured with is still in existence. It is crucial that the way that the 
law has developed that the insurance claims should not fail in such cases. Fairness is a matter 
that should be at the forefront of the courts’ mind when dealing with such issues. Therefore Lord 
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Phillips approach should not be the approach that the courts should follow and there does not 
have to be legislation in place as suggested by Lord Phillips. It is sufficient for the courts to deal 
with it.   
 
If  there  is  only  one  employer  then  the  situation  may  not  be  complicated,  especially  if  the 
employer has been insured with the same insurer. The issue of double insurance will arise in 
such  cases  where  there  is  one  employer,  who  takes  out  insurance  to  cover  that  particular 
employee and there is a period of cover which overlaps. However it could be said that is no 
overlap between the parties but that the policies are one of a consecutive nature, which does not 
fall within the definition or principles of double insurance. In Phillips v Syndicate 992 Gunner, 
Eady J stated that successive periods of insurance cover will not be treated as dealing with the 
same liability. 
 
 When an employee looks towards his employer to compensate him 100 per cent, the employer 
then has to look towards his insurers. The insurer, if he is on risk when there was exposure to the 
employee would have to pay out under the policy. The matter of concern to the employer is 
whether the insurer has been the same throughout or where there have been different insurers 
during different number of years or where the amount recoverable varies due to the exhaustion 
through other claims or policy terms.
700 If the insurers are still in operation, then the employer 
can seek to recover full indemnity from them
701.  
 
The issue is whether an insurer on risk would have to be fully liable or whether this should be 
done on an apportionment basis, so as not to be liable for the full amount of the loss. Lord Mance 
JSC’s view is correct when he stated that the increase of an employer’s liability is a risk which 
the insurers must accept. He then went on to deal with the declaratory theory as laid out by Eady 
J in Phillips. Further it was suggested that liability should be 100 per cent.
702 Since the law has 
developed in this area to entitle the employee to recover 100 per cent. The correct position would 
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then be for the employer to receive 100 percent indemnity from whichever insurer he chooses.
703 
 
However, it could be argued that there is in fact no contribution because each insurer is only 
liable to the risk for a particular period of time or year and that there are no concurrent policies in 
place. This is not correct. For these sorts of cases, and as the Supreme Court in  Durham has 
confirmed, there is only one claim which the employee can make and this is not a situation where 
you  have  separate  claims.  There  is  a  single  indivisible  loss.  Therefore  the  rules  of  double 
insurance will apply to such cases. If this is correct, if an employer picks one insurer to seek full 
indemnity, the insurer that was chosen could then seek contribution from the other insures. It 
should be noted that the loss does not have to be shown to have arisen in one particular year. 
This could be done under the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 which applies in this case, 
which is unlike other cases where this Act would not apply, under s3. Here one responsible 
person can then claim contribution from another, his proportion of liability.  
 
 
It  has  been  suggested  that  the  common  law  should  not  redefine  liabilities  so  they  are  not 
susceptible to being insured by policies which exist at the time, and then claim that the result is a 
principled result.
704 
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CHAPTER 8  CONTRIBUTION  UNDER  COMMON  LAW  AND  ITS  EQUITABLE 
POSITION  
 
8.1 Contribution under Common Law and equity 
 
The term ‘common law’ has been used in numerous contexts. In some cases it has been described 
as the law which has developed through case law. This is different from statutes. It has been 
described as the body of rules which were originally developed by Chancery courts, before the 
Supreme Court of Judicature Acts 1873 and 1875 came into effect.
705Lord Mansfield, it could be 
argued,  approved  of  the  development  of  parties  bringing  contribution  claims  in  unjust 
enrichment
706,  and  he  further  developed  the  principles  of  co -sureties  into  principles  of 
contribution
707 from Scottish law.
708In England, the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 is of 
importance when looking at contribution and it is important to look at whether it will apply to 
cases of insurance.  
 
8.2 Joint Liability and Contribution: its implication for insurance   
 
In most cases liability will arise where a loss of damage has been suffered by a claimant due to 
the torts committed by a tortfeasor. In some situations, there may be joint liability by tortfeasors, 
which will have an impact on how the liability should be distributed. These situations include 
where the tortfeasors could be jointly liable, or cause the same damage or cause different damage 
to the claimant. The definition of a tortfeasor can be ascertained by identifying whether the cause 
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of action against each tortfeasor is the same, whether they are both responsible and if the same 
evidence  can  be  used  to  bring  the  action.  If  so,  then  it  could  be  said  that  they  are  joint 
tortfeasors
709.This would not be the case where each is independently responsible for a separate 
tort and the two torts cause the same damage.
710This arrangement is also common from a double 
insurance perspective where you have numerous insurers and who are responsible under the 
policy for the loss that has been suffered by the assured. In the case of The Koursk
711Scrutton L.J 
stated that the same damage did not mean the same tort, and therefore does not mean the same 
cause of action.
712Where there are numerous tortfeasors and where there is a distinct cause of 
action against each tortfeasor, then each tortfeasor will only be liable for  the part of damage 
which he is responsible for.
713If the amount which the tortfeasor will be liable for is not 
stipulated, then the amount will be distributed equally between the tortfeasors
714.This is similar 
to the position that was raised in the case of Barker v Corus (UK) Plc
715, and could be relevant in 
cases of other industrial diseases where there were several former employers who owed a duty of 
care to the claimant and had breached that duty of care
716. This could also be the position for 
double insurance cases. 
 
Another important matter is to ensure that the Claimant only receives the amount that he is 
entitled to. This was a concern when looking at joint tortfeasors and several tortfeasors who had 
caused the same damage. When dealing with a situation where there were joint tortfeaors, it was 
considered that each would be responsible for a separate tort and successive actions could be 
brought against them although the damage was one and indivisible.
717There is now legislative 
protection  in  the form  of  s3  Civil   Liability  (Contribution) Act  1978.  This  section  covers 
proceedings against persons who are jointly liable for the same debt or damage, and states that 
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Judgment recovered against any person liable in respect of any debt or damage shall not be a bar 
to an action, or to the continuance of an action, against any other person who is (apart from any 
such bar) jointly liable with him in respect of the same debt or damage. The courts are also 
reluctant to permit a Claimant from bringing action against numerous defendants for the same 
damage suffered. This was the situation in the case of Talbot v Bekshire County Council
718where 
the court relied on res judicata, stating that as the Plaintiff’s claim against the Council arose out 
of substantially the same facts as the cause of action
719 as the passenger’s claim which had been 
made out and the Plaintiff’s appeal was dismissed. The courts have in such situations stayed or 
struck out the litigation for abuse of process.
720 It would therefore be better for a Claimant to sue 
all likely defendants
721.Wigram V-C in the decision of  Henderson v Henderson
722 stated that 
parties to the litigation should bring forward their whole case and the courts will not permit the 
same parties to open the same subject of litigation on a matter which might have been brought 
forward as part of the litigation.
723 
 
In the case of  Gardiner v Moore
724, Thesiger J dealt with the situation where if there was a 
release of one joint tortfeasor, would it release the others. Although not a point which he relied 
on to decide the case, he was of the view that where there was a release by one joint tortfeasor, 
either by way of deed or by accord and satisfaction, it would release all the others. In some 
situations  there could  be the possibility of double recovery due to  the wording of the Civil 
Liability (Contribution) Act 1978, and it has been suggested that it would be better to suggest 
that prior to accepting settlement, to expressly leave the option of bring proceedings against the 
other concurrent tortfeasors.
725 
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It has always been the case and the correct approach, that the remedies that are provided for 
under contribution or reimbursement are restitutionary in nature and the main purpose behind 
this is to prevent the likelihood of unjust enrichment of a defendant who has been conferred a 
benefit by the Plaintiff’s payment.
726 
 
The courts have also drawn a distinction between the common law and equitable principles of 
liability.  It  was  stated  in  the  decision  of  Bonner  v  Tottenham  and  Edmonton  Permanent 
Investment Building Society
727, Vaugham Williams LJ, that the common law principles required 
a common liability to be sued for that which the plaintiff had to pay, and an interest of the 
defendant as the defendant receives a benefit from the payment. He went on to give examples of 
situations where there is an assignee of a lease, or pro tanto, in situations where the surety pays 
first and then looks towards his co-surety for contribution. The position in equity is different as 
the scope of interests are wide and would include a community of interest in the subject-matter to 
which the burden would attach and is enforced against the Plaintiff alone, together with the 
benefit of the defendant, even though there is no common liability to be sued. This meant that the 
Plaintiff could recover in equity, even though there existed no common liability to sue.  
 
Further, the equitable principle requires that the burden will be borne equally between the parties 
even if there are requirements of the law or the parties themselves agree that burden will be 
attached by one of the parties for the benefit of others who are associated with him for that 
interest.
728Clauson LJ in Whitham v Bullock
729, applied such a principle when dealing with the 
lessee of land who had assigned the lease partly to X and partly to Y. In this case it was held that 
as the Plaintiffs paid the whole amount which was claimed by the landlord under the treat of the 
process of distress
730, the Court was of the view that they were permitted to seek reimbursement 
                                                            
 
726Grupos Torras SA v Al-Sabah (No.5)[2001] Lloyd’s Rep Bank 36 at 64. 
727[1899] 1 Q.B. 161. This has been followed in the decisions of  FBI Foods Ltd – Aliments FBI Ltee v Glassner 86 
BCLR(3d) 136; Friend v Brooker [2009] HCA 21 at [44]; Whitham v Bullock [1939] 2 KB 81 at [87] 
728Whitham v Bullock [1983] 2 KB 81 
729 para [89]  
730Friedmann, Double Insurance and Payment of Another’s Debt (1993) 103 LQR 51 at 53, discussed the public 
interest factor in trying to settle claims, but also the problem of where payment is made where the Plaintiff pays out 
when they are not liable to make such payment. The problem he identified was that the payor was not the debtor as 
such, and the rules of contribution would not apply. England does not look favourable to those who would come 
under the category of “volunteers”. 212 
 
from the defendant. 
 
As stated above, the doctrine of contribution is not confined to double insurance but also to co-
sureties. The principles of contribution when dealing with a co-surety situation is similar and the 
burden  still  apply  equally  even  though  they  are  not  aware  of  the  existence  of  each  other’s 
existence.  However,  they  must  be  liable  in  respect  of  the  same  debt.  The  amount  which  is 
recoverable  depends  on  the  number  of  sureties.
731  The common burden applies due to the 
common obligation of the co-sureties. 
 
8.3 The implementation of the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 
 
The  Civil  Liability  (Contribution)  Act  1978  developed  due  to  the  way  the  common  law 
developed regarding the liabilities that arose where there was damage, which were the same and 
applied to the tortfeasors, who had liabilities which were joint and several.
732 The law, it was 
thought should cater for contribution between the tortfeasors.
733 There were problems which 
arose where the tortfeasor who was not the party who committed the wrongdoing, and there was 
only one tortfeasor who was liable, although the damage was the same. 
734 As a result of the 
recommendation of the Law Commission’s Report, the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 
was enacted by Parliament. There have been suggestions
735 that the Civil Liability (Contribution) 
Act 1978 is not without its problems.  
 
It is worth looking at the wording of the legislation to see in what, if any, situation the Civil 
Liability  (Contribution)  Act  1978  would  apply  to  double  insurance  and  the  principles  of 
contribution when dealing with double insurance.  
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The general principle was as stated in Merryweather v Nixon
736 that where the damage is the 
same, then, regardless of whether it is a joint tortfeasor or several tortfeasors causing it, there 
could not be contribution or indemnity between them unless there was an express or implied 
agreement.  The  Civil  Liability  (Contribution)  Act  1978  has  changed  that,  and  now  permits 
contribution to persons who are liable for the same damage.
737 
 
According to the Civil Liability ( Contribution) Act 1978, the long title to the Act makes 
provision for contribution between persons who are jointly and severally liable for the same 
damage and in certain cases where two or more persons have paid or may be required to pay 
compensation for  the same damage. Under  s1 (1) any person who is liable in respect of any 
damage suffered by another person may recover contribution from any other person liable in 
respect of the same damage, whether jointly with him or otherwise. This is however subject t o 
the other provisions in the Act itself. The other sections in the Act list out certain situations 
where liability may cease in respect to the damage in question. Section 6(1) provides that a 
person is liable in respect of any damage for the purposes of the Act if the person who suffered it 
is entitled to recover compensation from him in respect of the damage, regardless of the legal 
basis of his liability.   
 
The decision by the Court of Appeal of Royal Brompton Hospital NHS Trust v Hammond
738dealt 
with  s1(1)  and  6(1)  of  the  Civil  Liability  (Contribution)  Act  1978,  and  Lord  Steyn  felt  it 
necessary to read s1(1) with the interpretation section of s6(1). He agreed that the 1978 Act 
should be given a broad interpretation. The critical question before the court was in relation to 
the words “liable in respect of the same damage”. He did not feel that the words would justify an 
expansive interpretation of the words “the same damage” to mean substantially or materially 
similar  damage,  due  to  the  likely  unfairness  that  would  arise  and  the  uncertainty  of  the 
application of the law. The correct approach was to interpret and apply a correct evaluation and 
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comparison  of  claims  alleged  to  quantify  for  contribution  under  s1  (1).
739The natural and 
ordinary meaning of the words   of  “the  same  damage”  is  sufficient
740  and that  “no  glosses, 
extensive or restrictive, were warranted”
741.  
 
As mentioned above, another issue was  whether the Civil  Liability  (Contribution) Act  1978 
applied to contributions claims between indemnity insurers, when one looks at the liability to pay 
damages when situations arise where  you have a breach of a contract term, which does not 
involve  the  requirement  to  pay  a  debt.  It  has  been  stated  that  whether  contribution  claims 
between indemnity insurers falls within the confines of the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 
1978, depends on the exact wording of the relevant policies.
742 Further, the preferred view was 
stated in the case of  Bovis Lend Lease Ltd v Saillard Fuller & Partners
743, which was that 
liability for ‘damage’ under the 1978 Act was made because the insurer had to pay damages for a 
breach of the contract which was stated under s6 (1), on the basis that the insurer had committed 
a wrong by not preventing the insured from suffering a risk.
744 
 
The case of Bovis Construction Ltd and Anor v Commercial Union Assurance Co Plc
745 clearly 
settled the issue of whether an insurer could rely on the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978, 
and the issue of subrogation. In Bovis, there were two claims that were made. Firstly, a claim 
made by the first claimants, Bovis Construction Ltd (Bovis) relying on their policy of insurance, 
and the second was that of the insurers, Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd (Eagle Star), relying on 
their right  to  contribution.  Eagle Star had at  the time insured Bovis  under a public liability 
policy. There was also  another insurance company called Commercial Union Assurance  Ltd 
(CU) which had insured Rosehaugh Estates Ltd (Rosehaugh), to which Bovis was also insured at 
the time. There was then a claim by CU seeking indemnity or contribution for the amount of 
                                                            
 
739 [2002] 1 WLR 1410, para 27 
740 [2002] 1 WLR 1410, para 27 
741 [2002] 1 WLR 1410, para 27 
742 The Law of Contribution and Reimbursement, Charles Mitchell, Oxford, (2003 4.43 p. 88 
743 [2001] 77 Con LR134, 184-5 
744 The Law of Contribution and Reimbursement, Charles Mitchell, Oxford, (2003) 4.44 p. 89 
745 [2001] Lloyd’s Rep IP 321. The principles were followed by the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa in 
Samancor Ltd v Mutual &Federal Insurance Company Limited & Ors (Case Number 565/03) 215 
 
damages and costs which were paid by Bovis to General Accident Life and Assurance Ltd (GA), 
who where the assignees of Rosehaugh. A contract was then entered into between Bovis and 
Rosehaugh  regarding  the  managing  of  the  construction  to  which  Bovis  was  in  charge.   
Rosehaugh would be required to obtain and maintain an insurance policy which covered their 
liabilities for injury and damage to the property which resulted during the contract period. This 
cover was to be taken out in joint names of Rosehaugh and Bovis. Further joint name insurance 
had to be taken out for all executed works, goods and materials which were to be incorporated 
into the works, construction works and other materials.  This policy was taken out in the name of 
Rosehaugh and Bovis with CU. An “all risks” was included in Section 1 and another part of the 
policy was for a “public liability”. It was argued that the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 
applied and as a result the claimant should be entitled under Section 3. If this is correct then they 
would be entitled to indemnity or contribution. Bovison receiving a claim from GA referred the 
claim to CU, which repudiated the claim on the basis that the claim was not one which the policy 
covered. Due to this Bovis had to turn to its own liability insurer, Eagle Star who had provided 
the indemnity for the amount that was given to GA. 
 
Repudiation by CU was not accepted. CU however argued that that claim was not covered by 
either Section 1 or Section 3, and that since indemnity was already provided for by Eagle Star 
before the proceedings had started, Bovis should not be entitled to obtain contribution.   
 
The court then went on to look at the issue of double insurance. Judge Steel J started by looking 
at the position of Bovis’s claim, before he went on to look at Eagle Star’s Claim. The first 
“hurdle” was that since Eagle Star had already made payment to Bovis, they should not be 
allowed  to  make  a  claim  under  another  policy.
746  Judge  Steel  J  stated  that  the  right  to 
contribution as between insurers existed where there was a situation where you have more than 
one policy which covers the risk which gives rise to the claim. He relied on the cases of  Albion 
Insurance  Co  Ltd  v  Government  Insurance  Office  of  New  South  Wales
747and  confirmed  the 
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decision of Caledonia North Sea Ltd v London Bridge Engineering
748. On the facts of the present 
case, Bovis was unable to satisfy the elements required and it was for that reason alone their 
claim must fail.  
 
Another argument put forward was that the claim should be successful, based on a breach of the 
Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 so that both Bovis (through the management contract) 
and CU (under the policy) were liable to Rosehaugh. Judge Steel J held
749 that there was no 
liability against CU under the heading of “in respect of the same damage” as Bovis. This meant 
that Rosehaugh could not claim against CU for compensation as CU had no “responsibility for 
the damage” which Rosehaugh had received. Therefore no apportionment of liability could be 
received. He went on to say that to hold otherwise would lead to an overriding of the principles 
which related to contribution between the insurers. Bovis’s liability for flood damage and CU’s 
liability under the policy of insurance would not fall within the confines of “in respect of the 
same  damage”.  The  case  of  Royal  Brompton  Hospital  National  Health  Service  Trust  v 
Hammond
750 was relied on to emphasis the point that it was not the same damage.  
 
Where there are terms in the contract which exclude liability or there is the presence of limitation 
clauses, and where the damage is covered by a joint names insurance policy, contribution cannot 
then be sought. This was the position in the case of Co-operative Retail Services Ltd v Taylor 
Young Partnership Ltd
751. In this case there was a standard form contract which was entered into 
with the main-contractor, W Ltd. The Defendants were architects and engineers. The electrical 
subcontractors were H Ltd who were hired by W Ltd under a standard form subcontract. In 
addition  to  this  H  Ltd  entered  into  a  warranty  agreement  with  the  building  owner  and  W 
Ltd.Liability was excluded for damage caused before practical completion to the works which 
were due to the contractors’ negligence or breach of statutory duty, under the main contract. The 
contractors were required to take out policies in their joint names for all risks insurance which 
provided cover against loss or damage to the works in respect of specified perils, which included 
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fire. A fire broke out prior to practical completion and the Defendants issued proceedings under 
sections 1 and 6 of the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 against W Ltd and H Ltd as liable 
for the fire damage from whom the owners of the building were entitled to compensation from. 
This was a Part 20 action and the judge stated that such a claim could not be brought by the 
Defendant. This decision was appealed and the Court of Appeal looked at the structure of the 
contractual scheme and concluded that it provided for the restoration and completion of the 
damaged works which was funded under the joint names policy and that the building owner and 
the  contractors  would  each  bear  other  losses  themselves.  There  was  no  requirement  for  the 
contractors to compensate the building owner for the damage caused by the fire and as a result, 
the Defendant could not seek contribution under the 1978 Act. The House of Lords analysis was 
that the usual rules which apply to compensation for negligence and breach of contract did not 
apply here, and that the building contractor could only require reinstatement works to be carried 
out and authorise the insurance money to be paid out. The contractors could not ask the building 
owner  for  compensation  from  the  building  owner,  and  all  that  could  be  required  was  that 
insurance money which were used for payment of those works be made. Further according to s6 
(1), H  Ltd  were not  the category of persons  compensation could  be sought  by the building 
owners. 
 
As  stated  above,  as  the  Civil  Liability  (Contribution)  Act  1978  does  not  apply  to  double 
insurance  cases,  an  insurer  cannot  rely  on  the  provisions  of  s1(4)  of  the  1978  Act,  which 
provides that contribution may be obtained where that person has made or agreed to make any 
payment in bona fide settlement or compromise of any claim made against him in respect of any 
damage (including a payment into court which has been accepted) shall be entitled to recover 
contribution in accordance with this section without regard to whether or not he himself is or 
ever was liable in respect of the damage, provided, however, that he would have been liable 
assuming that the factual basis of the claim against him could be established. Contribution will 
be recoverable where there is damage and it has to be the same damage that results as the person 
claiming contribution. Damage is to be given its natural and ordinary meaning as stated in the 
case of Royal Brompton Hospital NHS Trust v Hammond (No.3)
752. 
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In terms of apportionment generally, under s2(1) of the 1978 Act, the amount of the contribution 
recoverable from any person shall be such as may be found by the court to be just and equitable 
having regard to the extent of that person’s responsibility for the damage in question. Further, 
under s2(2) of the 1978 Act, the court shall have power in any such proceedings to exempt any 
person from liability to make contribution, or to direct that the contribution to be recovered from 
any  person  shall  amount  to  a  complete  indemnity.  Factors  which  the  courts  take  into 
consideration include the faults of the respective parties and causative relevance
753. In cases 
involving double insurance, if double insurance is established, the issue of contribution then 
arises. The courts will then calculate contribution based on the m aximum liability, independent 
liability and common liability.  
 
When dealing with liability in tort, it is very common for the parties who have committed the tort 
to seek contribution or indemnity from a third party, for example their insurers. In most cases 
this would be done by way of an agreement
754 or required by Statue
755.This has to now be looked 
at in relation to the legislative provision under s7(3) of the 1978 Act provides specifically that 
the right to recover contribution in accordance with section 1  above supersedes any right, other 
than an express contractual right, to recover contribution (as distinct from indemnity) otherwise 
than under this Act in corresponding circumstances; but nothing in this Act shall affect— (a)any 
express  or  implied  contractual  or  other  right  to  indemnity;  or  (b)  any  express  contractual 
provision regulating or excluding contribution; which would be enforceable apart from this Act 
(or  render  enforceable  any  agreement  for  indemnity  or  contribution  which  would  not  be 
enforceable apart from this Act). Therefore this section provides that statue will supersede the 
common law position.
756It has been further suggested however, that the 1978 Act does not render 
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an  agreement  for  indemnity  which  was  originally  void,  valid.
757  The  problem  w ith  the 
apportionment of damages and the way the 1978 Act and common law operates could result in 
uncertainty because of the different results that could occur, and it has been stated that where 
there is a contractual indemnity, which is provided for against liability for an unintentional tort, it 
will be considered valid.
758 Further, when dealing with an employer and employee situation, the 
same  principles  of  joint  tortfeasor  will  apply,  and  the  employer  would  be  able  to  claim 
contribution from the employee, where the employee is negligent.    
 
An interesting case dealing with subrogation and indemnity is the Court of Appeal decision of 
Morris v Ford Motors Co.Ltd
759, although the point regarding the right of subrogation was not 
pleaded or argued, Lord Denning was of the view that where the risk of a servant’s negligence 
was covered by insurance, his employer should not seek to make the servant liable for it. Just and 
equitable principles apply. It was not just and equitable for Fords to allow their names to be lent 
to the cleaner to sue their servant R, neither was there an implied term that the cleaners should be 
entitled to.
760In Morris v Ford Motors Co.Ltd Fords had employed a firm of cleaners to clean the 
factory under a contract which contained general clauses, one of the clauses provided that the 
cleaners were bound to indemnify Fords against their liability to Morris, who was an employee at 
the firm of cleaners. The plaintiff was injured due to the negligence of Fords’ servant, R. Third 
party proceedings were brought against the cleaners who claimed an indemnity as provided for in 
the contract. R was then brought in as a fourth party under the doctrine of subrogation, to enjoy 
the rights which Fords has against R. Lord Denning commented that the decision in Lister v 
Romford  Ice  and  Cold  Storage  Co.  Ltd 
761was  an  unfortunate  decision  and  should  not  be 
followed.  
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In Drayton v Martin
762Sackville J stated that an insurer under an indemnity policy who was 
seeking contribution from a co-insurer must establish (1) it is liable to indemnify the insured 
under its own policy; (2) it has paid out sums in respect of that liability; (3) the co-insurer is also 
liable under its policy to indemnify the insured; and (4) the co-insurer had not paid out moneys 
to meet its liability to the insured.  
 
It is then important to look at the issue of when does subrogation rights arise and when are there 
issues of contribution, and their distinction. It has been stated that in the broad sense, the doctrine 
of contribution and subrogation are complimentary in nature.
763 
 
The difference between contribution and subrogation is that for contribution, there is usually the 
existence  of  more  than  one  insurance  contract.  Under  contribution  the  insurer  can  seek 
contribution from other insurers, if one of the insurers has paid out to the assured.
764 Subrogation 
on the other hand involves the presence or the requirement that the assured who has taken out 
insurance obtains the amount of indemnity for which he is entitled to
765, and to which the 
insurers can step into the shoes of the assured and exercise its rights against third parties. 
Therefore, subrogation does not allow one to enforce a right of indemnity which would not have 
been enforceable. This is due to the principles of indemnity and the prevention of  a person 
obtaining indemnity twice. The well- established principle
766that where a person is entitled to 
two or more indemnities is not permitted to enforce more than one of them. 
 
In the decision of  Austin v Zurich Insurance
767, MacKinnon L.J and Uthwatt J, when dealing 
with the issue of subrogation and contribution, and deciding who would be the correct party to 
bring the proceedings, stated that this issue was a very technical matter. MacKinnon L.J was of 
the view that if the case was one of subrogation, then the claim should rightly be brought in the 
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name of Austin himself, however, on looking at the matter closely, he went on to state that Bell’s 
claim was one of contribution and not subrogation, as they were looking to recover from Zurich 
company,  through  double  insurance.  The  correct  party  to  bring  the  proceedings  was  the 
underwriters against the defendants. MacKinnon L.J did not think that it was appropriate to bring 
a subrogation claim, which in fact should be brought as contribution claim. Uthwatt J agreed that 
as the Plaintiff had already obtained indemnity from one of the insurers, he cannot then seek to 
obtain indemnity for something that he has already been indemnified for. When dealing with two 
insurers then the correct approach would be one of contribution.
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The case of Caledonia North Sea Ltd v London Bridge Engineering
769, was a decision which was 
appealed from the decision of the Inner House of the Court of Session
770 to the House of Lords. 
This case has been referred to as the Piper Alpha Case. In  1988, there was an explosion which 
destroyed the Piper Alpha oil platform, injuring and killing numerous persons. The employees 
were employed by the contractors so as to build and maintain the platform. There had been 
settlements  already  reached  regarding   the  victims  claims.  The  issue  however  was  that 
contractually, between the operator of the platform and the contractor, who at the time had 
employed the victims, the liability of the financial costs that were suffered as a result of the 
settlements. The amount of the settlement which was accepted by the operator, other participants 
and their respective insurers were at levels far greater than the amount that would have been 
awarded by the Scottish Courts but less than what would have been awarded in Texas.   It was 
after settlement figures were given and agreed to with the claimant, that the contractors were 
asked to pay indemnity to the operator and the other participants, to which they refused. Due to 
the numerous insurance policies in place at the time, th e insurers of the operator and other 
participants decided to pay the whole of the settlement figures, apart from a small sum. The 
terms of the agreements in place required the contractors to indemnify the operators where as a 
result of the contractor’s default, the operators may incur a liability. The indemnity provision 
was found in Clause 15(1) under Contractor’s Indemnities, in particular Clause 15(1)(c). As a 
result of the agreements in place, the insurers paid out, and then went on to bring proceedings by 
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claiming subrogation rights against the contractors.  
 
The issue that had to be dealt with was (1) whether on a proper construction of the contract 
between the parties, the operator was entitled to indemnity in respect of claims arising from the 
death or injury of the contractor’s employees in circumstances where the contractor was not 
liable at common law or for breach of statutory duty in respect of the death or injury in question; 
(2) whether insofar as the action was a subrogated claim, the contractor’s liability to the operator 
had  been  discharged  by  the  payments  made  by  the  underwriters;  (3)  whether  on  a  proper 
construction of the contract between the parties recovery of the excess above the Scots law value 
of the claims was excluded by cl.21 which provided that they should not be liable for indirect or 
consequential losses suffered.
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When dealing with the issue of subrogation Lord Bingham agreed with the conclusions which 
were expressed by Lord MacKay where he stated that it was a well established  principle that an 
insurer who has fully indemnified an insured against a loss which has been covered by a contract 
of insurance between them may ordinarily enforce, in the insurer ’s  own  name,  any  right  of 
recourse available to the insured
772.  
 
The trial Judge’s reasoning was overruled on appeal. The argument which was put forward was 
that Caledonia’s rights were not extinguished as a result of the insurers paying out, and would 
mean that they would be entitled to proceed on the basis of a subrogated action in Caledonia’s 
name. If this was correct then the insurers would be able to bring the proceedings in the name of 
the original right-holder. However, it was then argued by the contractors that Caledonia’s rights 
and  contractual  obligation  to  indemnify  no  longer  existed  the  moment  the  insurers  satisfied 
Caledonia’s  loss  under  their  contractual  responsibility.  The  correct  party  to  the  proceedings 
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should have been in the insurer’s name.  
 
Interestingly on appeal the court looked at who under the contract would be liable for the sum 
that was to be paid out, and concluded that in fact the contractor’s rights and obligations were not 
extinguished or discharged. Lord Hoffman
773, in particular dealt with it in terms of stating the 
general principle is that a person can not claim more than he is entitled to, so he can only be 
indemnified once. He stated that there were numerous ways that one could give effect to such 
principles, such as a person should be entitled to subrogation against those who were liable, and 
is usually adopted when the liability is of a secondary party of the other party liability. Another 
method would be to state that one payment would discharge the liability, which applies when the 
liability of the party who has made payment was in fact the primary or are equal and co-ordinate. 
It has been suggested that this analysis is wrong
774 for the reason being (1) that this goes against 
the authorities in countries such as Australia and Canada
775 which had laid down the principle 
that there could be a discharge of  a third party’s contractual liability to indemnify the insured 
once payment was made by an indemnity insurer’s payment, although the insurer could receive 
full payment from a third party; (2)  that this does not conform to the decision in England, as 
100% contribution could be ordered by the court against tortfeasors and (3)  when a surety pays 
the  principal debtor’s liability has been discharged. Further, procedural problems may arise with 
this  argument  as  the  insurer  would  be  forced  to  decide  before  proceedings  have  actually 
commenced to decide that it would be able to obtain the whole of its payment or only some of its 
payment but not up to 100%. 
 
However, the distinction  is  a clear one and in  cases  of double insurance the Civil  Liability 
(Contribution) Act 1978 does not apply. 
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CHAPTER 9 CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis has tried to illustrate the problems which occur when situations of double insurance 
arise. This is a frequent problem that arises when insurance policies are taken out with numerous 
insurers. It can arise (1) by mistake, (2) where the assured is not aware of the existence of other 
policies and (3) where an assured over insures his property. The main issue of double insurance 
is whether an assured who has taken out policies with more than one insurer should be permitted 
to claim from any one of the insurers where a policy has been taken out. 
 
The type of clauses that can be found in insurance policies are: escape clauses, excess clauses, 
rateable proportion clauses and other insurance clauses The main reason for insurers imposing 
these clauses is to prevent the possibility of fraud, ie. where the assured is indemnified for more 
than the loss he has suffered. In some cases, there can be a combination of these clauses which 
can be complex. An escape clause completely excludes the liability of an insurer if an event 
occurs which is specifically provided for under the policy. An excess clause applies to cover the 
excess  where  there  is  another  policy  in  existence.  A  rateable  proportion  clause  limits  the 
insurer’s liability, to the proportional rate for the loss suffered by the assured. The problem with 
the existence of such clauses is that the assured will be left with no cover, even though they had 
paid premiums (in some cases high premiums). In particular, the insurer can refuse to pay out for 
the loss incurred by the assured by relying on exclusion clauses or limiting the amount that could 
be recovered. The assured pays a high premium in the hopes that when a loss is incurred, the 
assured  can  look  to  the  insurer  to  ensure  that  payment  will  be  made.  When  balancing  the 
interests between the parties, the interest of the assured is paramount. The insurer can impose 
terms of notification in the policy to ensure that if an assured knows that there is another policy 
in existence, this should be disclosed. The insurer can then decide how this will affect the terms 
of the policy. This could then be done by way of limiting or excluding liability completely. This 
would only be possible if the assured knows that there is a policy already in existence. In cases 
where the assured is not aware of other policies in existence, the insurer should not be allowed to 
rely  on  such  limiting  or  exclusion  provisions.  In  some  jurisdictions,  this  has  been  given 
legislative effect. 225 
 
A comparative study of the courts in England, USA, Canada, Australia, South Africa, China, 
Singapore  and  India  reveals  the  Courts  struggling  to  avoid  dealing  with  double  insurance 
situations by concluding in many cases that on the facts, double insurance does not arise. The 
law in the other jurisdictions is unclear and unsatisfactory. There is a lot of literature on double 
insurance from America, but the UK courts have stated clearly that these authorities provide no 
guidance in the UK. The Canadian courts have preferred to follow the English authorities. 
 
 
The requirements for the existence of double insurance are that the insurance policies cover (1) 
the same subject matter, (2) the same assured, (3) the same interest, (4) the same risk and (5) the 
same policy period. Furthermore, there have been cases where the lower courts may rule that 
there is no double insurance, but on appeal it is held that double insurance exists, and vice versa.  
If double insurance arises, the cases have shown that the courts are more likely to hold the 
insurers liable, and payment should be made to the assured. This usually results in the similar 
clauses (e.g. excess/excess or ratable proportion/ratable proportion) ‘cancelling out’ each other 
and both insurers paying out up to the total of the loss with the insurers fighting it out between 
themselves subsequently.  However a better solution to the problem, which could lead to more 
certainty, is in the form of legislative provisions similar to Australia with some modifications. 
The thesis looks at the provisions in Australia, mainly under s45 Insurance Contracts Act 1984 
and the effects of the implementing similar provisions into English law.  Although it could be 
argued that this would be a drastic step, as the common law position is sufficient to protect the 
interests of the parties, the legislature in Australia considered that it was beneficial to impose 
statutory provisions to give similar protection.  
 
It is unlikely that the UK will follow Australia by imposing a similar statutory framework in the 
near  future.  Therefore  from  a  common  law  perspective  I  conclude  that  a  workable  possible 
solution to double insurance would be as follows: 
 
If  there  is  double  insurance,  regardless  of  the  type  of  clause  present  and  its 
wording,  an  assured  should  be  able  to  choose  whichever  insurer  he  wishes  to 
recover  for  the  loss  he  has  suffered,  and  the  insurers  will  then  have  to  seek 226 
 
contribution amongst themselves.  
 
 
This would give greater protection to the assured, particularly consumer assureds, which should 
be the ultimate aim of the courts. It must be noted that contribution only arises when there is 
double insurance. There are three methods for calculating contribution (1) Independent Actual 
Liability,  (2)  Common  Liability  Test  and  (3)  Maximum  Potential  Liability.  The  judge  has 
absolute discretion as to which method of calculation is appropriate, depending on the facts of 
the case.   
The English provision should read that where an insurer includes terms such as excess, ratable 
proportion and escape clauses in the policies, they should all be held void. Again, it should only 
be the reference to such clauses which will be void, and not the whole term of the contract. This 
is the position that Australia has adopted. The assured can then make a claim from whichever 
insurer he wishes to claim for the loss he has suffered. This should be general position, but 
exceptions should be provided which are similar to the Australian provision, which expressly 
provide that such clauses will not be void only in situation where there is a true excess liability in 
a policy or where there is a requirement under statute. The English legislature has been slow to 
implement legislation, but such legislative provisions should be enacted to give more protection 
to the assured.  
 
If English law does not implement such legislative provisions, then the courts should change the 
common law position. The cases at present in this area have not provided much assistance. The 
courts should in such circumstances rule that the combination of the clauses is irrelevant and that 
in such situations, the clauses cancel out each other and each insurer will be equally liable under 
the policies. The assured can chose to seek indemnity from anyone of the insurers. The insurer 
who had paid out, can then seek contribution from the other insurer, thorough common law 
principles of contribution. This may seem drastic, but the courts in England have devised a 
similar result when dealing with Mesothelioma cases, where an employee is now entitled to 
recover damages of 100% from whichever employer he wishes to. The same principles should 
also apply in cases of double insurance, although it can be argued that Mesothelioma cases are 
few in number and therefore such exception should be permitted. Furthermore, another argument 227 
 
could be whether in fact there is double insurance in such cases, as there are numerous policies 
over many years and identifying whether there is overlap of policies and when the period of 
overlap may be is  difficult.  The  above suggestions  could  provide a possible solution  to  the 
problem of double insurance, a situation which constantly arises in insurance policies. However 
there are a lot of unresolved questions, partly because of the way that the new wordings of the 
clauses have developed, which have been developed by using 18
th Century principles. There is 
also  a  lack  of  coherence  from  the  courts  and  other  jurisdictions  which  could  provide  some 
guidelines or principles in this area. In any event, whichever method or principles the courts 
adopts, in a consumer market, the ultimate beneficiary who should be protected are the assured.  
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